Bohaker v. Travelers' Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn.

• Decision Date: 24 May 1913
• Citation: 102 N.E. 342,215 Mass. 32
• Parties: BOHAKER v. TRAVELERS' INS. CO. OF HARTFORD, CONN.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

215 Mass. 32

102 N.E. 342

BOHAKER v. TRAVELERS' INS. CO. OF HARTFORD, CONN.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

May 24, 1913

COUNSEL

Alonzo E. Yont, of Boston, for plaintiff.

Walter I. Badger and Wm. Harold Hitchcock, both of Boston, for defendant.

OPINION

RUGG C.J.

This is an action of contract to recover upon a policy of accident insurance for the death of the insured, John M. Babson. The circumstances under which the insured lost his life were these: He was delirious by reason of severe typhoid fever in a room with a single window which was covered by a screen and its sill was 28 inches above the floor. Along the outside of the building slightly below the window was a balcony 5 feet wide with a protecting railing about 30 feet above the rough and stony ground beneath. He was left alone momentarily on an August evening by his attendant, who on returning found the room vacant, and the screen, whole and in position when he left the room, torn from the window. On immediate investigation, the insured was found on the ground under the room unconscious, with severe injuries, which according to physicians probably would have caused his death, even if he had not been suffering from typhoid fever. The policy insured 'against bodily injuries, effected directly and independently of all other causes, through external, violent and accidental means (suicide, whether sane or insane, is not covered), as specified in' a schedule annexed.

The case was tried without a jury by a judge, who found for the plaintiff after refusing to rule as requested by the defendant (1) that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover as matter of law; (2) that the death of the insured was not effected, directly and independently of all other causes through external, violent and accidental means; and (3) that the death of the insured was the result of suicide, sane or insane, and hence not covered by the policy.

1. The defendant's first request was denied rightly. 'Accidental means,' is used in the contract of insurance in its common significance of happening unexpectedly, without intention or design. U.S. Mutual Accident Ass'n v. Barry, 131 U.S. 100, 9 S.Ct. 755, 33 L.Ed. 60. The cause of injuries was not wholly conjectural as matter of law. It is plain that the immediate cause was the fall. This manifested itself in evidence which was violent and external. There was basis for the inference that it was accidental, as we have defined that word. It may have been that the deceased, in the heat of his fever and the warm season, in an effort to reach fresh air went to the balcony just outside his window, and there without premeditation or purpose or delirium, but only through weakness, lost his balance and went over the low railing, and received mortal harm. Cases where it has been necessary for a plaintiff to show negligence of some person as the cause, and where it has been said that the cause was conjectural, are clearly distinguishable. accident is a far more comprehensive term than negligence. Noyes v. Commercial Travelers' Eastern Accidental Ass'n, 190 Mass. 171, 76 N.E. 665; Wicks v. Dowell, [1905] 2 K. B. 225.

2. It would have been error to rule as matter of law that the insured's death was not effected 'directly and independently of all other causes' through accidental means. The point of difficulty in this connection is whether the disease did not contribute to the injuries, or at least was it not a cause co-operating with the fall in inducing the result. But the disease may have been found to have been simply a condition, and not a moving cause of the fatal injuries. A sick man may be the subject of an accident, which but for his sickness would not have befallen him. One may meet his death by falling into imminent danger in a faint or in an attack of epilepsy. But such an event commonly has been held to be the result of accident rather than of disease.

In Manufacturers' Accident Indemnity Co. v. Dorgan, 58 F. 945, at page 954, 7 C. C. A. 581, at page 590, 22 L. R A. 620, it was said by Taft, J.: 'If the deceased suffered death by drowning, no matter what was the cause of his falling into the water, whether disease or slipping, the drowning in such case would be the proximate and sole cause of the disability or death, unless it appeared that death would have been the result, even had there been no water at hand to fall into. The disease would be but the condition; the drowning would be the moving, sole, and proximate cause.' To the same effect in substance are Winspear v. Accident Insurance Co., 6 Q. B. D. 42; Lawrence v. Insurance Co., 7 Q. B. D. 216; Ludwig v. Preferred Accident Insurance Co., 113 Minn. 510, 130 N.W. 5; Preferred Accident Insurance Co. v. Muir, 126 F. 926, 61 C. C. A. 456. The language of this contract, to the effect that the 'accidental means' must have...