Bohlander v. Robert Dean & Associates

• Decision Date: 22 February 2006
• Docket Number: No. 3D05-1941.,3D05-1941.
• Citation: 920 So.2d 1226
• Parties: P. Thomas BOHLANDER, Appellant, v. ROBERT DEAN & ASSOCIATES YACHT BROKERAGE, INC., Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

920 So.2d 1226

P. Thomas BOHLANDER, Appellant, v. ROBERT DEAN & ASSOCIATES YACHT BROKERAGE, INC., Appellee.

No. 3D05-1941.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

February 22, 2006.

Gray Robinson, P.A. and Michael J. Bittman (Orlando) and Monterey Campbell (Lakeland), for appellant.

Chapman & Galle and Craig T. Galle (West Palm Beach), for appellee.

Before LEVY, RAMIREZ, and SUAREZ, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The defendant, P. Thomas Bohlander ("Bohlander"), appeals from a non-final order denying his motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. We reverse.

In 1996, Bohlander owned a 60-foot Viking motor yacht known as "Sunshine Man." In October of that year, Bohlander decided to sell the yacht and entered into a Central Agency Listing Agreement with Gilman Yacht Sales, Inc. of Palm Beach County ("Gilman"). The Agreement provided that Gilman would distribute information and advertise "Sunshine Man" on a multiple listing service known as the BUC Yacht Sales Network system, and generally "manage the sale of the Vessel." Although Florida law governed the agreement, no services were required to be performed in Florida under the agreement. Gilman listed "Sunshine Man" on the BUC system. The listing showed that the yacht was located in Lakeside, Ohio. Bohlander sold "Sunshine Man" to a purchaser in June, 1997.

Subsequently, in 2001, Robert Dean & Associates Yacht Brokerage, Inc. of Miami-Dade County ("Dean") filed suit for damages against Bohlander and others, claiming that it was the procuring cause of the sale of "Sunshine Man." Specifically, Dean alleged claims for breach of an implied contract, fraud, and conspiracy to commit fraud against Bohlander. The Complaint alleged that the court had jurisdiction over Bohlander, a Michigan resident, because he owned property in Delray Beach, Florida, and was engaged in the marketing and attempted sale of "Sunshine Man" in Florida.

After receiving the Complaint, Bohlander filed a motion for dismissal for insufficient service and lack of personal jurisdiction. Along with his motion, Bohlander filed an affidavit in which, among other things, he stated that other than the Central Agency Listing Agreement with Gilman, he made no efforts to sell or market "Sunshine Man" in Florida.

In response to Bohlander's motion, Dean filed an Amended Complaint in which it asserted that Bohlander, through the Central Agency Listing Agreement, agreed that "Sunshine Man" would be listed for sale, marketed and advertised in Florida, and that Florida law governed the Agreement. Dean supported its specific jurisdictional allegations with the deposition testimony of Bernard Campbell, a Gilman broker, along with certain documents. Among these documents were the statement of brokers' commissions and the seller's closing statement both of which were prepared on Gilman stationary.

After a hearing on Bohlander's Motion to Dismiss, the court denied Bohlander's defensive motion. The court stated that Stomar, Inc. v. Lucky Seven Riverboat Co., L.L.C., 821 So.2d 1183 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), was controlling and found that "Bohlander had minimum contacts." Bohlander appeals from this Order.

Initially, we note that the standard of review for a trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is de novo. Execu-Tech Bus. Sys., Inc. v. New Oji Paper Co., Ltd., 752 So.2d 582 (Fla.2000); Ileyac Shipping, Ltd. v. Riera-Gomez, 899 So.2d 1230 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005). In determining whether it has personal jurisdiction over a party, a trial court must first determine whether the Complaint alleges sufficient jurisdictional facts to bring the action within Florida's long-arm statute, Section 48.193, Florida Statutes (2005). If the Complaint properly alleges such facts, a trial court must consider whether the constitutional requirement of minimum contacts has been met. Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So.2d 499 (Fla.1989); Smith Architectural Group, Inc. v. Dehaan, 867 So.2d 434 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004).

The due process requirement of minimum contacts is not satisfied by a showing that a party has entered into a contract with a non-resident, or a showing that payment must be made in Florida. See Venetian Salami, 554 So.2d at 502; Group One Enters., Inc. v. Publishers' Representative, Inc., 899 So.2d 402 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005); Hartcourt Cos., v. Hogue, 817 So.2d 1067 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002); deMco Techs., Inc. v. C.S. Engineered Castings, Inc., 769 So.2d 1128 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). The due process requirement may be satisfied, however, when it is established that a non-resident defendant entered into a contract with a Florida party for substantial services to be performed in Florida; in that situation, the defendant has purposely availed himself of the privilege of conducting...