Ileyac Shipping, Ltd. v. Riera-Gomez

• Decision Date: 20 April 2005
• Docket Number: No. 3D04-879.,3D04-879.
• Citation: 899 So.2d 1230
• Parties: ILEYAC SHIPPING, LTD., Appellant, v. Alberto RIERA-GOMEZ, et al., Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

899 So.2d 1230

ILEYAC SHIPPING, LTD., Appellant, v. Alberto RIERA-GOMEZ, et al., Appellees.

No. 3D04-879.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

April 20, 2005.

Horr, Novak & Skipp and David J. Horr, Miami, and Eduardo J. Hernandez, for appellant.

Waks & Barnett and Andrew L. Waks, Miami, for appellee Alberto Riera-Gomez.

Fowler White Burnett and Alan R. Kelley and Helaine S. Goodner, Miami, for appellee Maersk Sealand Transport, Inc.

Hayden and Milliken, Miami, and Richard R. McCormack, Ocala for appellee CMA-CGM (Caribbean), Inc.

Before GERSTEN, SHEPHERD, and ROTHENBERG, JJ.

ROTHENBERG, J.

Defendant Ileyac Shipping, Ltd. ("Ileyac") appeals from an order denying its Motion to Dismiss Third Amended Complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. We affirm.

The plaintiff, Alberto Riera-Gomez, filed a third amended complaint alleging, in part, that he was injured as a result of a tortious act committed by Ileyac within the State of Florida, specifically the Port of Miami, while servicing a ship owned by Ileyac. Thereafter, Ileyac filed its motion to dismiss, asserting that it lacked sufficient minimum contacts with the State of Florida. Ileyac also filed a memorandum of law in support of its motion to dismiss stating that, "As to the first step of the inquiry for determination of the propriety of exercising long arm jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, in his Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiff would appear to have satisfied this step of the inquiry." Further, at the hearing on the motion to dismiss, Ileyac's attorney stated, in part,

the exercise of personal jurisdiction by this Court will be governed by the Florida Long Arm Statute and the Minimum Contacts. . . . In the third amended complaint, the Plaintiff alleged sufficient jurisdictional facts which did not exist in the second amended complaint. The Court still needs to perform the second prong of the analysis and ascertain whether minimum contacts exist....

The trial court denied Ileyac's motion to dismiss.

In this appeal from the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the applicable standard of review is de novo. See Wendt v. Horowitz, 822 So.2d 1252, 1256 (Fla. 2002). A two-prong test is used to determine whether a state has long-arm jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. "First, it must be determined that the complaint alleges sufficient jurisdictional facts to bring the action within the ambit of the [Florida long-arm] statute; and if it does, the next inquiry is whether sufficient `minimum contacts' are demonstrated to satisfy due process requirements." Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So.2d 499, 502 (Fla.1989) (quoting Unger v. Publisher Entry Serv., Inc., 513 So.2d 674, 675 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987), review denied, 520 So.2d 586 (Fla.1988)).

Ileyac concedes that the plaintiff has alleged sufficient jurisdictional facts to satisfy Florida's long-arm statute, section 48.193(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2003), thereby satisfying the first prong of the analysis. Section 48.193(1)(b) subjects nonresident defendants to jurisdiction in Florida if they commit "a tortious act within this state."

Ileyac argues, however, that the plaintiff did not meet his burden of establishing that there are sufficient minimum contacts between Ileyac and Florida such that the maintenance of the suit in Florida does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, the second...