Bohlmann v. Lindquist, 19654

• Decision Date: 18 February 1997
• Docket Number: No. 19654,19654
• Citation: 1997 SD 42,562 N.W.2d 578
• Parties: Patrick BOHLMANN, Petitioner and Appellant, v. Steven LINDQUIST, Administrator of the South Dakota Human Services Center, a South Dakota State Facility, Appellee. . Considered on Briefs
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Page 578

562 N.W.2d 578

1997 SD 42

Patrick BOHLMANN, Petitioner and Appellant, v. Steven LINDQUIST, Administrator of the South Dakota Human

Services Center, a South Dakota State Facility, Appellee.

No. 19654.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Considered on Briefs Feb. 18, 1997.

Decided April 16, 1997.

Douglas R. Kettering of Hosmer and Kettering, Yankton, for Petitioner and Appellant.

Michael E. Ridgway, Yankton County State's Attorney, Yankton, for Appellee.

MILLER, Chief Justice.

¶1 Patrick Bohlmann, a patient at the South Dakota Human Services Center (HSC), appeals the dismissal of his application for a writ of habeas corpus. We affirm.

FACTS

¶2 Bohlmann was charged with several crimes committed between May 12 and May 30, 1994. ¹ Based upon stipulated facts, the trial court found him mentally ill and incapable of knowing the wrongfulness of his actions at the time of the crimes. The trial court further found Bohlmann not guilty by reason of insanity. Bohlmann was therefore acquitted of all charges and committed to the HSC "until such time that he is eligible for release pursuant to SDCL 23A-26-12.5." He was placed in the security treatment unit at the HSC.

¶3 Bohlmann waived his right to a later statutory hearing and stipulated to the court's consideration of a supplemental report by Dr. William Grant. ² On November 29, 1994, based on Dr. Grant's recommendation, the court ordered Bohlmann to "continue his commitment at the South Dakota Human Services Center until such time as he is eligible for release pursuant to SDCL 23A-26-12.5." Bohlmann remained in the security treatment unit.

¶4 On February 20, 1996, Bohlmann filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus. His written application requested that he be released from the HSC's custody. At hearing, however, Bohlmann agreed he requested only that he be transferred to a less restrictive ward within the HSC. He acknowledged that he is not an appropriate candidate for release. After review of the application, the habeas court concluded Bohlmann did not comply with the procedural requirements of SDCL 23A-26-12.5 and dismissed his application. He appeals.

DECISION

¶5 Bohlmann was committed to the HSC pursuant to SDCL 23A-26-12, which provides the procedure for detaining a defendant acquitted of a crime by reason of insanity:

When the jury has returned a verdict acquitting the defendant upon the ground of insanity, the court shall order that the defendant be committed to the human services center until such time as he is eligible for release pursuant to § 23A-26-12.5.

Following a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, a defendant is entitled to a hearing within forty days. SDCL 23A-26-12.2.

If, after the hearing, the court fails to find by the standard specified in § 23A-26-12.3 that the person's release would not create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to property of another due to a present mental disease or defect, the court shall order that the defendant be committed to the human services center for treatment until the person's mental condition is such that his release, or his conditional release under a prescribed regimen of medical, psychiatric or psychological care or treatment, would not create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to property of another.

SDCL 23A-26-12.4. A defendant committed to the HSC pursuant to SDCL 23A-26-12 is subject to the supervision and custody of the Department of Human Services until such time as the court finds the conditions for release set forth in SDCL 23A-26-12.5 are satisfied. SDCL 23A-26-12.5; SDCL 1-36A-1.3.

¶6 SDCL 23A-26-12.5 provides, in pertinent part:

When the administrator of the human services center determines that the person has recovered from his mental disease or defect to such an extent that his release, or conditional release ... would no longer create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to property of another, he shall promptly file a certificate to that effect with the clerk of the court that ordered the commitment.... The court shall order the discharge of the acquitted person, or, on the motion of the prosecuting attorney or on its own motion, shall hold a hearing, conducted pursuant to the provisions of § 23A-46-3, to determine whether he should be released. If, after the hearing, the court finds by the standards specified in § 23A-26-12.3 that the person has recovered from his mental disease or defect to such an extent that:

(1) His release would no longer create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to property of another, the court shall order that he be immediately discharged; or

(2) His conditional release under a prescribed regimen of medical, psychiatric or psychological care or treatment would not create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to property of another, the court shall

(a) Order that he be conditionally discharged under a prescribed regimen of medical, psychiatric or psychological care or treatment that has been prepared for him, that has been certified to the court as appropriate by the administrator of the human services center and that has been found by the court to be appropriate; and

(b) Order, as an explicit condition of release, that he comply with the prescribed regimen of medical, psychiatric or psychological care or treatment.

The court at any time may, after hearing, employing the same criteria, modify or eliminate the regimen of medical, psychiatric or psychological care or treatment.

¶7 The habeas court, in concluding SDCL 23A-26-12.5 applied to Bohlmann's transfer request, stated:

Okay, I'm going to dismiss the Writ because I don't think it is a proper procedure. I think he has to comply with [SDCL 23A-26-12.5]. And you can't, according to this, you can't just come into court without some kind of certification by the administrator, so he has to go through that procedure. So this will be dismissed. ³

¶8 As noted earlier, Bohlmann requested only that he be transferred to a less restrictive ward within the facility, not that he be released from the HSC's custody. ⁴ SDCL 23A-26-12.5 does not provide for intra-facility transfers at the direction of the court. The statute only provides authority for the court to grant a complete or conditional release from the custody of the HSC upon completion of the statutory conditions. ⁵ Therefore, we conclude the procedural requirements of SDCL 23A-26-12.5 are inapplicable to Bohlmann's transfer request and the habeas court's application of SDCL 23A-26-12.5 was in error.

¶9 The habeas court's dismissal of Bohlmann's writ of habeas corpus, though for the wrong reason, reached the right result. See Kehn v. Hoeksema, 524 N.W.2d 879, 881 (S.D.1994); Sommervold v. Grevlos, 518 N.W.2d 733, 740 (S.D.1994); Cowell v. Leapley, 458 N.W.2d 514, 519 (S.D.1990).

¶10 Jurisdiction may be raised by this Court sua sponte. See Lehr v. Dep't of Labor, 391 N.W.2d 205, 206 (S.D.1986); State v. Huftile, 367 N.W.2d 193, 195 (S.D.1985); Long v. Knight Constr. Co., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 207, 209 (S.D.1978). "[A]lthough a jurisdictional issue was not raised below or on appeal, we are required to address the issue." State v. Waldner, 381 N.W.2d 273, 275 (S.D.1986) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Because we conclude the habeas court is without jurisdiction to hear Bohlmann's transfer request at this time, we affirm the dismissal of the writ.

¶11 The HSC is an administrative agency within the Department of Human Services, an executive department. SDCL 1-36A-1.3. "Under the doctrine of separation of powers, an administrative agency, a branch of the executive department[,] is empowered to determine its own jurisdiction." Rapid City Area School Dist. No. 51-4 v. de Hueck, 324 N.W.2d 421, 422 (S.D.1982) (citing Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 58 S.Ct. 459, 82 L.Ed. 638 (1938)). The Department's jurisdiction specifically includes the authority and responsibility for treatment and case management of persons committed to the HSC. See SDCL 1-36A-1.26; SDCL 27A-12-3.6; ARSD title 46:20 to 46:21.

¶12 We have consistently held that "once an offender is within the jurisdiction of the executive branch of government, the judicial branch--the circuit court--loses jurisdiction and control." State v. Hurst, 507 N.W.2d 918, 923 (S.D.1993); State v. Wolff, 438 N.W.2d 199, 201 (S.D.1989); State v. Oban, 372 N.W.2d 125, 129 (S.D.1985); Huftile, 367 N.W.2d at 197. The judiciary's relinquishment of jurisdiction to the executive branch upon commitment of a defendant to an executive agency avoids the chaos and confusion that would result from simultaneous jurisdiction. State v. Wooley, 461 N.W.2d 117, 121 (S.D.1990) (noting chaos would result if a parolee was required to satisfy supervisors in both the executive and judicial branches); Huftile, 367 N.W.2d at 196, (stating a defendant has an expectation of certainty concerning the process and requirements of his incarceration). This well-established principle is consistent with the concept of separation of powers, Oban, 372 N.W.2d at 128-29, and clearly delineates which authority has jurisdiction over the defendant during all stages of his commitment or incarceration.

¶13 In the instant case, the HSC assumed jurisdiction and control of Bohlmann when he was committed to the facility pursuant to his acquittal by reason of insanity. The HSC is statutorily charged with the treatment and care of Bohlmann while he is committed to the facility. SDCL 1-36A-1.26. The plan of treatment prescribed, including the appropriate level of security for Bohlmann and his assignment to a ward, directly relates to the level of care and supervision that he requires. See ARSD title 46:20 to 46:21. Analogous to the placement of a prisoner within the Department of Corrections following sentencing, the HSC is in the best...