Bojila v. Shramko

• Decision Date: 16 December 2003
• Docket Number: (AC 22775).
• Citation: 80 Conn. App. 508,836 A.2d 1207
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: OLENA BOJILA v. OLGA SHRAMKO, ADMINISTRATRIX (ESTATE OF PETER HLYWA)

80 Conn. App. 508

836 A.2d 1207

OLENA BOJILA v. OLGA SHRAMKO, ADMINISTRATRIX (ESTATE OF PETER HLYWA)

(AC 22775).

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued September 9, 2003.

Officially released December 16, 2003.

West, DiPentima and Peters, Js. P. Jo Anne Burgh, with whom was Irene P. Romanelli, for the appellant (substitute plaintiff).

George J. Markley, with whom, on the brief, was Alexander Breiner, for the appellee (defendant).

Opinion

WEST, J.

The substitute plaintiff, William J. Friedberg, administrator of the estate of Olena Bojila,¹ appeals from the judgment of the trial court, denying the motion that had been filed by Bojila to open the judgment rendered in favor of the defendant, Olga Shramko, administratrix of the estate of Peter Hlywa.² On appeal, the substitute plaintiff claims, pursuant to Practice Book § 19-16, that the court abused its discretion by sustaining the defendant's objection to opening the judgment rendered pursuant to the report of an attorney trial referee (referee). More specifically, the substitute plaintiff claims that the court (1) lacked subject matter jurisdiction to render judgment on October 22, 2001, (2) lacked statutory jurisdiction to render judgment on October 22, 2001, (3) rendered a void judgment,³ (4) violated Bojila's constitutional right to procedural due process and (5) improperly found that her objection to the referee's report was untimely, conclusory and unaccompanied by transcripts. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The record discloses the following facts and procedural history. On October 19, 2001, Bojila filed an objection to the court's acceptance of an August 19, 2001 referee's report that had been mailed to the parties on October 2, 2001. On October 22, 2001, the court rendered judgment for the defendant pursuant to that report and noted what it perceived to be the absence of an objection to its being rendered.

On November 9, 2001, Bojila filed a motion to open the judgment, claiming that the October 19, 2001 objection had been seasonably filed. On November 21, 2001, the defendant filed an objection to the motion to open the judgment. The court sustained the defendant's objection on December 3, 2001, and indicated that it was then in possession of Bojila's October 19, 2001 objection. The court determined that Bojila's objection was (1) untimely under Practice Book § 19-15 because it was not filed within twenty-one days of the mailing of the referee's report, (2) conclusory because it lacked specific assertions of fact and (3) violative of Practice Book § 19-14 because no transcript of the evidence was filed with the objection.

On December 20, 2001, Bojila filed a motion to reargue, contending that her objection was timely filed. The court denied that motion on January 28, 2002, finding that, irrespective of the timeliness issue, the transcripts were not part of the court file. This appeal followed.

We first note the standard of review of a court's denial of a motion to open a judgment. "[I]n granting or denying a motion to open a judgment, the trial court is required to exercise a sound judicial discretion and its decision will be set aside only for an abuse of such discretion." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Conway v. Hartford, 60 Conn. App. 630, 634, 760 A.2d 974 (2000). "In an appeal from a denial of a motion to open a judgment, our review is limited to the issue of whether the trial court has acted unreasonably and in clear abuse of its discretion." Carlin Contracting Co. v. Dept. of Consumer Protection, 49 Conn. App. 501, 502-503, 714 A.2d 714 (1998).

I

The substitute plaintiff's first claim is that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to render judgment on October 22, 2001. He argues that pursuant to the plain language of Practice Book § 19-16, the court could not have rendered judgment on the referee's report until October 23, 2001.⁴ The substitute plaintiff argues that because of that apparent procedural irregularity, the October 22, 2001 judgment should be vacated. We disagree.

"[B]ecause [a] determination regarding a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, our review is plenary." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lawrence Brunoli, Inc. v. Branford, 247 Conn. 407, 410, 722 A.2d 271 (1999). "As we have consistently recognized, [a] lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time and cannot be waived by either party." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cohen v. Cohen, 41 Conn. App. 163, 165, 674 A.2d 869 (1996).

"A court does not truly lack subject matter jurisdiction if it has competence to entertain the action before it. . . . Lesser irregularities do not make a final judgment void." (Citation omitted.) Monroe v. Monroe, 177 Conn. 173, 185, 413 A.2d 819, appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 801, 100 S. Ct. 20, 62 L. Ed. 2d 14 (1979). "Our practice does not favor the termination of proceedings without a determination of the merits of the controversy where that can be brought about with due regard to necessary rules of procedure." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Coppola v. Coppola, 243 Conn. 657, 665, 707 A.2d 281 (1998). Practice Book § 19-16 is designed to allow a party time to file an objection. Here, Bojila filed an objection on October 19, 2001, and the court rendered judgment on October 22, 2001, one day less than the full twenty-one days afforded by Practice Book § 19-16. The court then considered Bojila's objection in its ruling on the motion to open the judgment.

Rendering of judgment one day early under Practice Book § 19-16, but after Bojila's objection was filed, when that objection was duly considered by the court during its review of the motions to open and to reargue, is clearly the type of lesser irregularity that will not strip the court of subject matter jurisdiction. See Monroe v. Monroe, supra, 177 Conn. 184-85 (absence from case file of signed order of reference mere oversight and lesser irregularity); see also Cohen v. Cohen, supra, 41 Conn. App. 167 (court's failure to consider statutory guidelines where parties privately agreed to amount of child support not defect in subject matter jurisdiction). Nowhere does the substitute plaintiff contend that Bojila would have filed another objection in addition to, or amending, the objection already filed.

We will address the substitute plaintiff's claim related to the plain language interpretation of Practice Book § 19-16 in greater detail with respect to his argument about statutory jurisdiction.

II

The substitute plaintiff's second claim is that the court committed plain error by rendering judgment before the expiration of the twenty-one day period set forth in Practice Book § 19-16, thereby exceeding its statutory authority.⁵ He construes Practice Book §§ 19-15 and 19-16 together to mean that any rendering of judgment before the expiration of the twenty-one day grace period is, regardless of the circumstances, an abuse of the authority granted to the court by those rules.⁶ We disagree.

The substitute plaintiff requests plain error review of his claim.⁷ "Pursuant to Practice Book § 60-5, [t]he [appellate] court may reverse or modify the decision of the trial court if it determines . . . that the decision is otherwise erroneous in law. The court shall not be bound to consider a claim unless it was distinctly raised at the trial or arose subsequent to the trial. The court may in the interests of justice notice plain error not brought to the attention of the trial court. . . . Plain error is restricted to extraordinary situations where the error is so obvious that it affects the fairness and integrity of and public confidence in the judicial proceedings." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ipacs v. Cranford, 65 Conn. App. 441, 446, 783 A.2d 1044 (2001).

"A charge that demonstrates that the trial court has overlooked the applicable statute justifies consideration as plain error." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. We will consider the claim that the plaintiff was prejudiced by the court's failure to follow strictly the language of Practice Book § 19-16, which he contends is mandatory. "The [plaintiff] cannot prevail under [Practice Book § 19-16], however, unless he demonstrates that the claimed error is both so clear and so harmful that a failure to reverse the judgment will result in manifest injustice." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ipacs v. Cranford, supra, 65 Conn. App. 446.

The interpretive construction of the rules of practice is governed by the same principles as those regulating statutory interpretation. State v. Pare, 253 Conn. 611, 622, 755 A.2d 180 (2000). The interpretation of a statute, as well as its applicability to a given set of facts and circumstances, involves a question of law, and our review, therefore, is plenary. See Wallingford v. Dept. of Public Health, 262 Conn. 758, 773, 817 A.2d 644 (2003). "[T]he process of statutory interpretation involves a reasoned search for the intention of the legislature.. . . In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply. In seeking to determine that meaning, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Commissioner of Social Services v. Smith, 265 Conn. 723, 734, 830 A.2d 228 (2003).

"General Statutes § 52-123 provides that [n]o writ, pleading, judgment or any kind of proceeding in court or course of justice shall be abated, suspended, set aside or reversed for any kind of circumstantial errors, mistakes or defects, if the person and the cause may be rightly understood and intended by the court. . . . It...