Bokori v. Martinoski

• Citation: 70 N.E.3d 441
• Decision Date: 15 February 2017
• Docket Number: Court of Appeals Case No. 45A03-1603-SC-519
• Parties: Jason BOKORI, Appellant-Defendant, v. Jasmina MARTINOSKI, Appellee-Plaintiff.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana

70 N.E.3d 441

Jason BOKORI, Appellant-Defendant,

v.Jasmina MARTINOSKI, Appellee-Plaintiff.

Court of Appeals Case No. 45A03-1603-SC-519

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

February 15, 2017

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT : Brian R. Gates, Jones Obenchain, LLP, South Bend, Indiana.

Bailey, Judge.

Statement of the Case

[1] Jason Bokori ("Bokori") collided with Jasmina Martinoski's ("Martinoski") leased car, totaling it. Insurance payments covered Martinoski's medical expenses and a portion of the cost of her totaled vehicle, but a balance remained on the lease. Martinoski sued Bokori for the balance in small claims court, and the court entered judgment in her favor. Bokori now appeals.

[2] We affirm.

Issue

[3] Bokori presents one issue for our review, whether the small claims court committed clear error in determining fair market value and awarding damages.

Facts and Procedural History

[4] On December 22, 2013, Bokori and Martinoski, driving separate vehicles, were involved in a collision. Martinoski's leased 2013 Toyota Corolla was totaled in the accident.

[5] Martinoski had leased the vehicle with financing through Toyota Financial Services ("Toyota Financial") just five months prior to the collision. The balance on the financing agreement was $22,676.52 at the time of the collision. Martinoski's insurer, Nationwide Mutual Insurance ("Nationwide"), paid Toyota Financial $17,530.44 to purchase the totaled vehicle. After that payment, Martinoski still owed $5,146.08 under her vehicle financing agreement, an amount Martinoski believed would be paid by Bokori's insurer, Progressive Insurance ("Progressive"). However, Toyota Financial pursued collection of that amount and late fee charges against Martinoski when Progressive did not pay the difference.

[6] Martinoski sued Bokori and Progressive in small claims court to recover the amount she still owed under the lease agreement plus the late fee charges and court costs. In her notice of claim, Martinoski alleged that Bokori was responsible for the accident, and that he and Progressive owed her the balance remaining on her lease plus late fees and court costs totaling $6,000.00.

[7] During cross-examination of Martinoski, Progressive's attorney tendered Nationwide's market report prepared by C.C.C. Valuescope Claims Services. However, there was no proponent for the document, and Martinoski did not recognize it. The small claims court, while acknowledging there was no proponent for the exhibit, admitted the document without objection. The report shows the date of the accident, that Martinoski was the lessee of the totaled vehicle, and correctly identifies the vehicle identification number for the Corolla. The report, which was used in negotiation between Progressive and Nationwide in reaching a settlement on what would be paid to Toyota for Martinoski's car, concludes that after conducting research into the local market, the fair market value of the vehicle at the time of the accident was $17,312.00.

[8] The small claims court entered judgment in favor of Progressive because there was no contractual relationship between it and Martinoski, and, as such, Martinoski could not sue Progressive directly. The court then found Bokori was completely responsible for the accident. The trial court recognized that it had admitted into evidence the report used by Progressive and Nationwide in their negotiations as to the value of Martinoski's vehicle. However, the trial court concluded that "with no proponent for it, I'm not satisfied that it's sufficient to [establish fair market value]." Tr. pp. 30-31. Having also determined that Bokori failed to establish any affirmative defense, the trial court entered judgment against him in the amount of $5,446.08—the balance of Martinoski's indebtedness on the lease, her late fees, and court costs.

[9] This appeal ensued.

Analysis and Decision

[10] Bokori brings his appeal after a negative judgment against him in the small claims court. We review a small claims court's judgment for clear error.

Bonecutter v. Discover Bank , 953 N.E.2d 1165, 1171 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied . "[E]xpeditious resolution is essential to the efficacy and attractiveness of the optional small claims process." Fortner v. Farm Valley - Applewood Apartments , 898 N.E.2d 393, 398 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).

[11] Here, Martinoski did not file an appellee's brief, and thus we may reverse upon a prima facie showing of reversible error—but even so, we still may not reweigh evidence or reassess witness credibility. Heartland Crossing Found., Inc. v. Dotlich , 976 N.E.2d 760, 762 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). In his appeal, Bokori argues that Martinoski's claim rests on a "mistaken legal theory" (Appellant's Br. at 5), that Martinoski's proper remedy for loss of the vehicle had already been provided, and that the trial court erred when it found otherwise.

[12] "It is a well-established principle that damages are awarded to fairly and adequately compensate an injured party for her loss, and the proper measure of damages must be flexible enough to fit the circumstances." Bader v. Johnson , 732 N.E.2d 1212, 1220 (Ind. 2000). "In tort actions generally, all damages directly related to the wrong and arising without an intervening agency are recoverable." Id.

[13] The general rule is that a plaintiff's compensatory damages for property destroyed by a tortfeasor shall be the fair market value of the property at the time of loss. Ridenour v. Furness , 546 N.E.2d 322, 325 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989). "Fair market value is defined as the value a willing seller will accept from a willing buyer for a good." Warrick Cty. v. Waste Mgmt. of Evansville , 732 N.E.2d 1255, 1258 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). A plaintiff must bear the burden of proving the fair market value of the property. Campins v. Capels , 461 N.E.2d 712, 719 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984). Evidence of fair market value may include the plaintiff's testimony, the price paid upon purchase, testimony from skilled witnesses, and other competent forms of evidence. See, e.g. , City of Carmel v. Leeper Elec. Servs . , Inc. , 805 N.E.2d 389, 394-95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (accepting as competent but not dispositive evidence testimony concerning the purchase price of land taken in a condemnation), trans. denied ; Wiese - GMC, Inc. v. Wells , 626 N.E.2d 595, 599–600 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (remanding to the trial court for recalculation of damages from evidence properly before the trial court), trans. denied . Nevertheless, a plaintiff should not receive a recovery that constitutes a windfall. Dado v. Jeeninga , 743 N.E.2d 291, 294 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). However, the plaintiff need not bear the burden of negating the possibility of a windfall; that burden falls on the defendant. Id. at 295.

[14] Here, Bokori argues that the trial court erred in awarding Martinoski compensation of $5,446.08, representing the difference between the total purchase price of the car, which was less than six months old at the time of the accident, and what Bokori argues is the fair market value¹ : the amount of money Bokori's insurer and Martinoski's insurer negotiated between themselves as a suitable measure of compensation to be paid to Toyota Financial Services for the destruction of the car. Put another way, Bokori argues what the fair market value is and which evidence the trial court should have relied upon, though he couches it as a legal issue.

[15] The trial court was presented with several items of evidence: Martinoski's testimony about the recent purchase price of the vehicle in a retail transactional setting, documentation to that effect in the form of an acceleration statement from Toyota Financial Services, and a market value report used in settlement negotiations between the parties' insurers. Assessing the evidence at the end of the trial, the court stated: "At the end of the day the question is whether or not the affirmative defense of free market value or fair market value's been established; it hasn't. Not under the case law I've seen.... I, I admitted it [the insurance valuation], but with no proponent for it, I'm not satisfied that it's sufficient to get there."² (Tr. at 30 -31.)

[16] Thus, the trial court heard evidence of fair market value and, acting within its role as fact-finder, weighed the evidence before it. The trial court concluded that Martinoski's evidence of fair market value—taking the form of her testimony and the acceleration statement from Toyota Financial Services—was more credible than Bokori's proffered evidence, which took the form of the valuation report used in settlement discussions by the parties' insurers. The court's determination of damages was within the range of evidence presented at trial, and whether Bokori's evidence was worthy of credit was a matter within the trial court's purview. That Bokori characterizes his position as a question of law is not determinative: his argument at bottom requests that we reweigh the trial court's assessment of the weight and credibility of the evidence before it. We are not at liberty to do so. See Heartland Crossing Found. , 976 N.E.2d at 762.

[17] The dissent sees this differently. Noting that Martinoski leased the vehicle and accepted a personal injury-related settlement, the dissent would hold that Martinoski incorrectly sought compensation for property damage to a car for which she was not entitled to receive any kind of payment. The dissent also argues that the negotiated amount Toyota Financial received was the fair market value for the destroyed vehicle.

[18] We might agree with the dissent were the evidence and arguments in this case other than what they are. The dissent's argument that Martinoski cannot recover for damages related to a leasehold—something apparently akin to arguing that Martinoski lacks a claim for which relief can be granted under Trial Rule 12(B)(6) —is not an argument Bokori made at trial. And, because it is outside our role to advocate for a party, issues not raised by a party are waived. Perry v....