Bollin v. Graydon

• Decision Date: 10 September 1935
• Docket Number: 14138.
• Citation: 181 S.E. 467,177 S.C. 374
• Parties: BOLLIN v. GRAYDON et al.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

181 S.E. 467

177 S.C. 374

BOLLIN v. GRAYDON et al.

No. 14138.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

September 10, 1935

Original proceeding by John H. Bollin against C. T. Graydon and others, as the Richland County Court House Building Committee, and H. H. Hinnant and others, as the Richland County Board of County Commissioners, to enjoin the defendants from carrying out a certain lease and from issuing proposed bonds.

Injunction denied.

Charles I. Dial, of Columbia, for petitioner.

William Elliott, Jr., of Columbia, for respondents.

BONHAM Justice.

At the 1935 session of the General Assembly of South Carolina an Act, No. 540 approved June 5, 1935, was passed which provided for the erection of a courthouse for Richland county. To that end a commission was created, the members of which were to be elected by the majority of the Richland county legislative delegation. This has been done and those so elected are properly made parties respondents in this proceeding, along with the duly elected board of county commissioners for Richland county, to whom are delegated certain powers and functions by the said act. This act amended the Act No. 299, approved May 8, 1933, 38 St. at Large, p. 411, by making the provisions of that act applicable to buildings of the nature provided for in Act No 540. Among the powers thus conferred upon the courthouse commission is authority to issue bonds payable solely from the revenues to be derived from the building to be erected.

The building commission, under the authority granted to it by the two named acts, is preparing to apply to the public works administration for a grant of 45 per cent. of the cost of the courthouse to be built, and proposes to supplement that sum by issuing bonds for 55 per cent. of the cost, under the terms and conditions of the Revenue Bond Act of 1933, as amended by the Act No. 540, supra.

The building commission estimates that the cost of the courthouse will be approximately $300,000, and it proposes to issue bonds in the sum of $165,000.

The building commission has entered into a written contract with the Richland county board of county commissioners whereby it has leased the courthouse to said board of county commissioners for the term of the life of the bonds, at an annual rental of $10,000, which it is estimated to be sufficient to retire them. By resolutions, duly and properly adopted by the building commission in accordance with the provisions of said two acts, the building commission has recognized the validity of the statutory lien upon the courthouse, and the appurtenances thereto created and granted by said acts as amended; and the building commission has pledged the revenues derived from the building, and the entire income and revenues from fees charged by said Richland county officers, or so much thereof as may be necessary to pay the principal and interest of said bonds.

These several actions of the building commission are adopted ratified, and confirmed by the Richland county board of county commissioners.

The petitioner, John H. Bollin, has filed his petition in the original jurisdiction of this court against the building commission and the board of county commissioners challenging "the validity of these procedures under the Revenue Bond Act of 1933, as amended, Act No. 540, Acts of 1935, and the Constitution of 1895, and he also questions the term of office of the Commission."

He prays for an order enjoining the respondents from carrying out said lease, and from issuing the proposed bonds.

Mr Chief Justice STABLER issued a rule requiring the respondents to show cause, if any they have, why the injunction prayed for should not be granted.

In due time respondents made return to the rule, and the matter was heard upon an agreed statement of facts.

Counsel for petitioner submits as the questions for determination the following:

1. Can the Richland county courthouse commission and the Richland county board of county commissioners enter into a lease or rental agreement and pledge for the payment of the rent thereunder the fees collected by the county officers of Richland county?

2. Can the Richland county courthouse commission and the Richland county board of county commissioners issue bonds and pledge for the payment of the same the fees collected by the county officers of Richland county?

3. Can the Richland county courthouse building commission and the Richland county board of county commissioners issue bonds in violation of the constitutional limitations which require that the question of the issuance of such bonds be submitted to the qualified electors of Richland county?

Petitioner apparently assumes by his first propounded question that the Richland county courthouse building commission and the Richland county board of county commissioners are identical bodies, corporate or political. The fallacy of the assumption is patent. The Richland county courthouse commission is a body specially created for the purpose of building a courthouse for Richland county, or a combination courthouse and office building and/or a combination courthouse and jail. Whereas the county board of county commissioners consists of a supervisor and commissioners elected and/or appointed, with general supervision of various departments, interests and agencies of the county. It is true that the Act No. 540 devolves upon the county board of county commissioners certain offices and duties in connection with the building of the courthouse, but it does not thereby make it a co-ordinate branch, or part, of the Richland county courthouse building commission. Section 4 of Act No. 540 makes it the duty of all county officials, agents, employees, attorneys, and engineers to render such services as they may be called on to do by the commission, but this does not make them parts and parcels of the commission.

It would seem that so much of question 1 as challenges the power of the building commission and the county board of county commissioners is specifically answered by the provisions of section 6 of Act 540, in this manner: "The Board of County Commissioners for Richland County and the Court House Building Commission are authorized subject to the approval of a majority of the Richland County Legislative Delegation to enter into a contract providing for the payment by Richland County of a fair rental for the portion of the Court House Building occupied by the County."

The building commission has leased the courthouse building to the county board of commissioners at a fixed rental, and the contract has been approved by the Richland county legislative delegation.

Section 5952 and other sections of the Code of 1932 provide that the highway department may enter into reimbursement agreements with the highway districts and counties, and these provisions have been held to be constitutional. See State v. Moorer, 152 S.C. 455, 150 S.E. 269.

The contention of question 1 that the building commission and the Richland county board of county commissioners could not enter into the rental agreement is untenable.

We will later consider, in connection with a similar issue made by question 2, whether the building commission and the Richland county board of county commissioners could pledge the fees collected by the county officers of Richland county.

We may consider together the issues made by questions 2 and 3, whether the building commission and the board of county commissioners could legally issue bonds, and especially whether they could do so without submitting the matter to the qualified electors of Richland county.

Section 3 of Act 540, Acts 1935, which creates the building commission, provides that: "This Commission, for the purposes set out above, may exercise in the name of the County all the powers granted to the counties in the Revenue Bond Act of 1933, approved May 8, 1933, XXXIV [XXXVIII] Stat. 411, as amended. Among other powers, they are authorized to issue bonds payable solely from the revenues derived from the building to be erected."

It is to be noted that the Act gives the Building Commission the discretionary power to erect "a Court House or a Court House and Jail Combined, or a Court House and Office Building Combined, Prescribing the Powers and Duties of the Court House Commission, Authorizing the County to Issue Revenue Bonds, Payable Solely from the Revenues Derived from the Operation of Such Court House and Office Building." Clearly then the provision for issuing bonds (so italicized by us) is applicable only in case a combined courthouse and office building are erected. But the building commission has elected to erect only a courthouse. Evidently, in anticipation of such decision, the act further provides that the courthouse commission may "Issue Bonds under the Provisions of the Revenue Bond Act of 1933, Approved the 8th day of May, 1933, XXXIV [XXXVIII] Stat. 411, as Amended."

Here then is the specific authority given to the courthouse building commission, not to the county, to issue bonds. It carries ample power and authority for the issuance of the bonds, unless such grant of power be contrary to some statute or constitutional provision.

Petitioner contends that the commission cannot issue bonds without submitting the question of such issuance to the qualified electors of Richland county.

It would seem that this question was set at rest by the case of Briggs v. Greenville County, 137 S.C. 288, 135 S.E 153, 154, and various decisions of this court following that case. There the issues arose out of the construction of acts of the General Assembly providing for reimbursement agreements. The issue in that case is thus stated: "For the purpose of raising the moneys required by these reimbursement agreements, to be advanced to the state...