Bolser v. BOARD OF COM'RS OF GILPIN

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Citation: Bolser v. BOARD OF COM'RS OF GILPIN, 100 P.3d 51 (Colo. App. 2004)
• Decision Date: 12 August 2004
• Docket Number: 03CA0178
• Parties: Clark M. BOLSER, in his capacity as trustee for Eugene Mines, Inc., a dissolved Colorado corporation, and Eugene Mines, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR the COUNTY OF GILPIN, State of Colorado, Anchor Coin, Inc., CCSC/Black Hawk, Inc., Colorado Department of Transportation, and Burton Materials, Inc., Defendants-Appellees.

100 P.3d 51

Clark M. BOLSER, in his capacity as trustee for Eugene Mines, Inc., a dissolved Colorado corporation, and Eugene Mines, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR the COUNTY OF GILPIN, State of Colorado, Anchor Coin, Inc., CCSC/Black Hawk, Inc., Colorado Department of Transportation, and Burton Materials, Inc., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 03CA0178.

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. IV.

August 12, 2004.

Trauernicht, Evans & Kneisel, LLC, Ted W. Trauernicht, Jan Kneisel, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Petrock & Fendel, PC, James J. Petrock, William L. Downey, Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees Board of Commissioners for the County of Gilpin, State of Colorado, Anchor Coin, Inc. and CCSC/Black Hawk, Inc.

Ken Salazar, Attorney General, Jennifer Lyn Mele, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee Colorado Department of Transportation.

Opinion by Judge LOEB.

In this action to quiet title to property subject to right-of-way easements, plaintiffs, Eugene Mines, Inc. and Clark M. Bolser, as its trustee (together EMI), appeal the trial court's judgment in favor of defendants, the Board of County Commissioners for Gilpin County; Anchor Coin, Inc.; CCSC/ Black Hawk, Inc.; and the Colorado Department of Transportation. We affirm.

The parties proceeded to trial on stipulated facts and exhibits showing the following.

EMI owned a fee simple interest in property in Gilpin County. In 1938 and 1939, EMI deeded rights-of-way over some of the property to Gilpin County and the State of Colorado for construction of a highway. The 1938 and 1939 right-of-way deeds granted to Gilpin County an easement for highway purposes and granted to the State of Colorado the right to adopt and improve the easement as a state highway.

EMI became delinquent on its real property taxes, and, in 1949, a treasurer's deed conveyed EMI's Gilpin County property to the county.

The parties stipulated that the total acres encumbered by the easements granted in the 1938 and 1939 right-of-way deeds were fully accounted for in the 1949 treasurer's deed and were referenced in the treasurer's deed by the language contained in one paragraph, "less [number of] acres deeded to County of Gilpin for Highway Purposes as described in Deed recorded in ... Gilpin County Records," and similar language in four other paragraphs. The land referenced in those paragraphs thus matched the land described in the 1938 and 1939 right-of-way deeds. The treasurer's deed also conveyed to the county EMI's remaining interest in other Gilpin County property not burdened by the 1938 and 1939 right-of-way deeds and not at issue here.

Defendants Anchor Coin and CCSC/Black Hawk are subsequent transferees of the property conveyed to the county in the 1949 treasurer's deed.

EMI contends on appeal, as it did in the trial court, that the word "less" in the treasurer's deed means that it retained fee simple ownership of the acres described therein, subject only to the county's right to use those acres for highway purposes. The trial court disagreed, finding that the treasurer's deed conveyed a fee simple interest in the entirety of EMI's real property in Gilpin County, subject only to the easements granted in the 1938 and 1939 right-of-way deeds and that EMI did not retain any fee simple interest in the subject property. We agree with the trial court.

Interpretation of a written document presents a question of law subject to de novo appellate review. See Collins v. Colo. Mountain Coll., 56 P.3d 1132, 1135 (Colo. App.2002). Further, because the judgment here was entered based upon stipulated facts and documentary evidence, we are obligated to make an independent judgment on the merits. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. State, 768 P.2d 733, 734 (Colo.App.1988).

In construing a deed, a court's paramount purpose is to ascertain the parties' intent. Notch Mountain Corp. v. Elliott, 898 P.2d 550, 557 (Colo.1995). "We must not ascertain intent from `portions presented in isolated sentences and clauses,' but from the deed as a whole." Michaelson v. Michaelson, 939 P.2d 835, 839 (Colo.1997)(quoting Notch Mountain Corp. v. Elliott, supra, 898 P.2d at 557); see Percifield v. Rosa, 122 Colo. 167, 177, 220 P.2d 546, 551 (1950).

We conclude that the language of the 1949 treasurer's deed indicates an intent to grant fee simple title to Gilpin County, subject to the easements granted by the 1938 and 1939 right-of-way deeds. EMI contends that the word "less" applies to the "acres," indicating an intent to exclude the entire fee simple interest in those acres from the grant in the 1949 deed. However, reading the language in the treasurer's deed as a whole, the word "less" applies to the "acres deeded to the County ... as described in Deed recorded in Gilpin County Records," and to the interest conveyed "for Highway Purposes." Thus, "less" applies to the easement interest described in the previously recorded 1938 and 1939 right-of-way deeds. Indeed, if we were to accept EMI's argument, the reference in the treasurer's deed to the 1938 and 1939 deeds would be meaningless.

EMI relies on the holding in Lincoln Savings & Loan Ass'n v. State, supra, that the word "less" used in a deed was not intended to reserve only an easement that was previously conveyed by the grantor, but reserved the entire fee simple in the acreage upon which the easement was situated. However, under the circumstances here, we conclude that Lincoln Savings is distinguishable and that its holding, based on the facts of that case, is not applicable here.

In Lincoln Savings, the state granted to a railway a right-of-way easement through state lands. The state subsequently granted the lands to two transferees, "less" a certain number of acres deducted for the previously granted easement and "subject to any and all easements or rights-of-way heretofore legally obtained." The transferees' parcels were eventually acquired by Lincoln Savings, and when the easement was abandoned, Lincoln Savings claimed fee simple title to...