Hinojos v. Janzen, Court of Appeals No. 06CA0998 (Colo. App. 10/18/2007)
| Decision Date | 18 October 2007 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals No. 06CA0998 |
| Parties | Ricky Robert Hinojos and Pamela Sue Hinojos, Plaintiffs-Appellants and Cross-Appellees, v. Roberta Janzen and Corinne M. Ocker, Defendants-Appellants and Cross-Appellees, and Arthur Lohmann, Defendant-Appellee and Cross-Appellant, and Veronica A. Lewis and Earl Grosshans, Sr., Intervenors-Appellees. |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
This quiet title case concerns property over which the Union Pacific Railroad Company once had a right-of-way. The parties submitted their claims to the district court on stipulated facts and exhibits. In an articulate, thorough, and well-reasoned order, the district court ruled that intervenor Veronica Lewis has fee simple title to all of the right-of-way property within the east half of the southwest quarter of Section 12, Township 4 North, Range 56 West of the 6th Principal Meridian (the E ½ SW ¼), in Morgan County (except a small portion owned by the County); that defendant Roberta Janzen has fee simple title to a portion of the right-of-way property within the southeast quarter of the northwest quarter of the same Section 12 (the SE ¼ NW ¼); and that Donna R. Arvizo and Earl Grosshans, Jr., as the heirs of intervenor Earl Grosshans, Sr., have fee simple title to a separate portion of the right-of-way property within the SE SE ¼ NW ¼. The Appendix to this decision is a map showing the locations of the railroad right-of-way and the parties' respective properties in relation thereto.
CROSS-APPEAL DISMISSED AND JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Anderson and Chapin, P.C., Robert B. Chapin, Brush, Colorado, for Plaintiffs-Appellants and Cross-Appellees.
Epperson and McClary, P.C., Andrew F. McClary, Fort Morgan, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellants and Cross-Appellees.
Terrence A. Johnson, L.L.C., Terrence A. Johnson, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee and Cross-Appellant and Intervenors-Appellees.
Opinion by JUDGE J. JONES.
Plaintiffs, Ricky Robert and Pamela Sue Hinojos, and defendants Janzen and Corrine M. Ocker appeal from that order, asserting that their claims to title to portions of the right-of-way property within the E ½ SW ¼(, portions between the northwest edge of the right-of-way and the centerline of the railway line) are superior to Lewis's. Defendant Arthur Lohmann cross-appeals, asserting a leasehold right in a portion of the right-of-way property within both the E ½ SW ¼ and the SE ¼ NW ¼, and challenging the claims of Janzen, Arvizo, and Earl Grosshans, Jr. to the right-of-way property in the SE ¼ NW ¼.
After reviewing the parties' respective claims to the right-of-way property de novo, we affirm the district court's order and dismiss Lohmann's cross-appeal.
The Hinojoses filed a complaint pursuant to C.R.C.P. 105 to quiet title in themselves in a parcel of land underlying an abandoned railroad right-of-way located in the E ½ SW ¼. They named as defendants Lohmann, Janzen, Ocker, Morgan County, the State of Colorado, and all unknown persons who might claim an interest in the property.
Lohmann asserted claims to property in both the E ½ SW ¼ and SE ¼ NW ¼ based on a lease from Union Pacific. Janzen likewise asserted claims to land in both section quarters, but disclaimed any interest in the specific property claimed by the Hinojoses. Ocker asserted a claim to land in the E ½ SW ¼ Morgan County claimed title to land in both section quarters over which certain county roads had been constructed. The state, acting through the Department of Transportation, initially disclaimed any interest in the property claimed by the Hinojoses.
Lewis intervened in the action. She claimed title to all the right-of-way property in the E ½ SW ¼. Earl Grosshans, Sr. also intervened in the action. He claimed title to a portion of the right-of-way property in the SE ¼ NW ¼. He subsequently quitclaimed his property to Arvizo and Earl Grosshans, Jr.
In the course of the litigation, the state entered into a stipulation with the other parties whereby the parties agreed that the state holds fee simple title to Colorado State Highway 71, which crosses the west end of the right-of-way property in the E ½ SW ¼ running roughly from north to south. The court approved that stipulation.
Similarly, shortly before trial, the county reached a settlement agreement with all other parties except Lohmann whereby the settling parties stipulated that the county should have fee simple title to the property it claimed, which included a portion of First Street in the Town of Snyder lying in the east end and along the northwest edge of the right-of-way property, almost entirely within the SE ¼ NW ¼ (a very small portion is located in the E ½ SW ¼ The court approved that stipulation and entered it as an order of the court.
The parties ultimately submitted their respective claims to the court on stipulated facts and exhibits. The court ruled as noted above, and later amended its judgment to account for the stipulation regarding the property claimed by the state.
Because the district court decided this case based on stipulated facts and exhibits, we do not defer to the district court's factual findings. Instead, "we are obligated to make an independent judgment on the merits." Bolser v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 100 P.3d 51, 53 (Colo. App. 2004); see also Jelen and Son, Inc. v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 807 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Colo. App. 1991); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. North Colorado Springs Land & Improvement Co., 659 P.2d 702, 703 (Colo. App. 1982). We review the district court's conclusions of law de novo. See Bolser, 100 P.3d at 53; Golden Lodge No. 13 v. Grand Lodge of Independent Order of Odd Fellows, 80 P.3d 857, 859 (Colo. App. 2003).
The Hinojoses, Janzen, Ocker, and Lohmann do not challenge the district court's findings of historical fact. Rather, they challenge certain conclusions the district court reached based on those historical facts. Because the historical facts provide background necessary for analyzing the issues raised on appeal, we summarize them below.
The abandoned railroad right-of-way at issue in this case is a 400-foot-wide strip of land running diagonally, roughly southwest to northeast, through both the E ½ SW ¼ and the SE ¼ NW ¼. Union Pacific, or its predecessor, obtained the right-of-way sometime in the early 1880s by a grant from the United States. That grant was made pursuant to an Act of Congress of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 482 (1875) (subsequently codified at 43 U.S.C. § 934) (the 1875 Act). By statute, the right-of-way for the railway line itself was measured from the centerline of the railway line, extending 100 feet on each side. 43 U.S.C. § 934. Apparently, the railroad also received a right-of-way for station grounds extending 200 feet from the northwest edge of the railway line right-of-way. See 43 U.S.C. § 934 ().
On February 28, 2002, Union Pacific executed a "Disclaimer" of "any right, title or interest in" the railroad right-of-way in Section 12. Union Pacific recorded that Disclaimer in the records of the Morgan County Clerk and Recorder on March 5, 2002.
On May 16, 2003, the district court entered an order in this case declaring the railroad right-of-way abandoned by Union Pacific.
On November 3, 1892, the United States issued a patent to the E ½ SW ¼ to D. Eugene Risendorph. The patent did not mention the right-of-way.
In the 1890s, the E ½ SW ¼ was conveyed a number of times; none of the deeds effecting those conveyances mentioned the railroad right-of-way. The first deed purporting to convey the E ½ SW ¼ that expressly mentioned the railroad right-of-way itself was a deed from Sarah E. Davis to T.F. Kearns dated May 25, 1901, and recorded on May 31, 1901. That deed conveyed the E ½ SW ¼, "subject to" the railroad right-of-way.
In 1905, T.F. Kearns conveyed the E ½ SW ¼ to G.D. Foy, "except," as relevant in this case, the railroad right-of-way and twenty acres on the south end of the E ½ SW ¼. From 1917 to 1919 this property was conveyed several times, culminating in the deed from Varney E. Terrill to P.V. Barth and M.E. Weir dated July 11, 1919. The granting clause in each of these deeds purported to convey the E ½ SW ¼ "save and except" the south twenty acres and "except" the railroad right-of-way.
On July 12, 1919, P.V. Barth and Weir conveyed "[a]ll land of" the E ½ SW ¼ "lying northwest of" the railroad right-of-way to Jay H. Prothero. On March 29, 1920, Weir conveyed his undivided one-half interest in that part of the E ½ SW ¼ "lying and being [s]outh of" the railroad right-of-way to Theodore Metz. That deed did not mention the south twenty acres of the E ½ SW ¼ On August 8, 1921, P.V. Barth conveyed his undivided one-half interest in the north sixty acres of the E ½ SW ¼ "except all of the land lying north and west of" the railroad right-of-way to Peter Barth, Sr. Shortly thereafter, Peter Barth, Sr. conveyed that undivided one-half interest to Metz. As with the deed from P.V. Barth to Peter Barth, Sr., the description of the conveyed property in the granting clause of the deed from Peter Barth, Sr. to Metz excluded "all of the land lying north and west of" the railroad right-of-way.
From August 1924 to July 10, 1973, the property in the E ½ SW ¼ owned by Metz was conveyed four times: from Metz to Peter H. Peterson on August 12, 1924; from Peterson to Nick Dimitroff and James Louis on June 1, 1927; from Dimitroff and Louis to Louis on October 12, 1972; and from Louis to Len E. Lewis and Veronica A. Lewis, as joint tenants, on July 10, 1973. Each of the granting clauses in the...
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