Bombliss v. Cornelsen

Decision Date25 February 2005
Docket NumberNo. 3-04-0056.,3-04-0056.
Citation291 Ill.Dec. 925,355 Ill. App.3d 1107,824 N.E.2d 1175
PartiesRonald P. and Catherine E. BOMBLISS, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Anne and Jim CORNELSEN, Defendants-Appellees (Judy Nowland, Defendant).
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Ronald P. Bombliss, Galva, for Ronald P. Bombliss.

Karl A. Johnson, Hattery, Simpson & West, Galesburg, for Anne Cornelsen.

Daniel S. Alcorn, Stoerzbach, Morrison, Robertson, Wilcox & Alcorn, Galesburg, for Judy Nowland.

Justice McDADE delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff dog breeders, Ronald P. and Catherine E. Bombliss, filed a complaint in the circuit court alleging that the defendant dog breeders, Anne and Jim Cornelsen and Judy Nowland, committed tortious interference with prospective business advantage, defamation, false light invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Cornelsens, residents of Oklahoma, and Nowland, a resident of Washington, filed special and limited appearances and moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of in personam jurisdiction. The trial court granted their motions, and plaintiffs appeal from the order granting the Cornelsens' motion. The issue we are asked to determine is whether this state's long-arm statute permits Illinois courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over the Oklahoma defendants. We conclude that it does; accordingly, we reverse and remand this cause for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs' complaint alleges that both they and the Cornelsens are breeders of Tibetan mastiffs. Plaintiffs' business in Knox County, Illinois, is known as "Kesang Camp Tibetan Mastiffs," and defendants' business in Wellston, Oklahoma, is called "Makalu Tibetan Mastiffs." Plaintiffs alleged that defendants advertised or sold dogs in Illinois via the telephone, United States mail and the Internet.

In December 2001, Anne telephoned plaintiffs and informed them that she had two litters of Tibetan mastiff puppies. Ron said he was interested in purchasing two females of breeding quality, and Anne offered to sell plaintiffs two pick-of-the-litter females for $2,000.

Plaintiffs allege that the dam of one of the litters, Drakyi Mulan, was co-owned by Richard Eichhorn of Simi Valley, California. Eichhorn had provided a written guarantee that Mulan was free of genetic defects that would prevent breeding. Pursuant to his agreement with the Cornelsens, he was entitled to odd-numbered pups from Mulan's first two litters by a sire of Eichhorn's choice. However, in the event a genetic defect arose, Eichhorn would not take any puppies. The complaint alleges that Anne was angry with Eichhorn, because he had delivered Mulan to defendants infected with roundworms and ticks. Anne told plaintiffs that she wanted to prevent Eichhorn from getting any of Mulan's pups.

On January 9, 2002, plaintiffs traveled to Oklahoma to see the puppies. During their visit, they observed that Mulan and some of her pups appeared sick and worm-infested. They urged Anne to get the sick puppies to the veterinarian immediately. They selected one healthy female from each litter and paid the agreed price with the understanding that the Cornelsens would guarantee the puppies as breeding stock, free from genetic diseases or defects, for up to three years. According to the complaint, Anne waited until January 24, 2002, to take one of the sick pups to the veterinarian, and at that time it was confirmed that the pup had pneumonia. In March 2002, Anne posted a message in a Tibetan mastiff chat room on the Internet seeking advice as to why one of the three-month-old pups from Mulan's litter was critically ill, even though it had been wormed. She subsequently posted messages stating that she believed the puppy suffered from a genetic disease and that all of the puppies from that litter should be spayed or neutered and none should be bred. Nevertheless, in April, Anne completed American Kennel Club (AKC) registration papers for Mohanna, one of the sick puppy's littermates that had been sold to plaintiffs in January, indicating that the puppy was "for breeding." She forwarded the papers by United States mail to plaintiffs' home in Illinois.

Plaintiffs further alleged that, after learning of Anne's chat room postings in July 2002, they did blood tests on Mohanna in July 2002 and June 2003. The tests indicated that Mohanna may have suffered from environmental abuse, but the condition had cleared up, and she did not have any genetic disorders. Plaintiffs claimed that defendants knowingly published false statements about Mohanna's genetic line to retaliate against Eichhorn, and that, as a consequence, negotiations with several potential puppy customers had fallen through. Plaintiffs also claimed that they were denied membership in Internet discussion groups, and that defendants' comments impeached their integrity and impaired their good reputations.

Defendants specially appeared and moved to quash service of process and dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. In support of the motion, they filed an affidavit stating that they maintained an interactive website that allowed potential customers in foreign jurisdictions to communicate with them regarding the sale of pups, but all sales took place in Oklahoma. They further averred that none of the chat rooms mentioned in plaintiffs' complaint was set up or operated in Illinois.

Plaintiffs objected and filed an affidavit stating that defendants had used YAHOO! chat rooms and discussion groups accessible worldwide to spread unfounded rumors of a genetic defect in Mohanna. They further stated that defendants had telephoned them and used the United States postal service and e-mail to communicate directly with them at plaintiffs' residence in Illinois.

The trial court determined that plaintiffs failed to show that defendants' acts were sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction under this state's long-arm statute (735 ILCS 5/2-209 (West 2002)). Plaintiffs appeal.

ISSUE AND ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs argue that specific in personam jurisdiction is established either because the Cornelsens intentionally directed tortious activities at the Illinois plaintiffs or because the assertion of jurisdiction comports with the due process clauses of the Illinois and United States Constitutions. 735 ILCS 5/2-209(a)(2), (c) (West 2002). The cause comes to this court solely on the basis of the pleadings and supporting documents; therefore, our review is de novo. Viktron Ltd. Partnership v. Program Data Inc., 326 Ill.App.3d 111, 259 Ill.Dec. 706, 759 N.E.2d 186 (2001).

Specific jurisdiction refers to jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit arising out of or related to the defendant's contacts with the forum. RAR, Inc. v. Turner Diesel, Ltd., 107 F.3d 1272 (7th Cir.1997). Relevant to our inquiry are the following provisions of the Illinois long-arm statute:

"(a) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this State, who in person or through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated, thereby submits such person, and, if an individual, his or her personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State as to any cause of action arising from the doing of any of such acts:
* * *
(2) The commission of a tortious act within this State;
* * *
(c) A court may also exercise jurisdiction on any other basis now or hereafter permitted by the Illinois Constitution and the Constitution of the United States." 735 ILCS 5/2-209(a)(2),(c) (West 2002).

Subsection (c) has been interpreted to mean that, if contacts between the defendant and Illinois are sufficient to satisfy due process under the state and federal constitutions, no further inquiry is necessary to satisfy the statute. Zazove v. Pelikan, Inc., 326 Ill.App.3d 798, 803, 260 Ill.Dec. 412, 761 N.E.2d 256, 260 (2001), citing W.R. Grace & Co. v. CSR Ltd., 279 Ill.App.3d 1043, 216 Ill.Dec. 840, 666 N.E.2d 8 (1996). Accordingly, if the constitutional guarantees of due process are satisfied in this case, we need not determine whether plaintiffs have established jurisdiction under the alternative "tortious act" provision.

A. Federal Due Process

The assertion of specific in personam jurisdiction satisfies federal due process guarantees so long as the defendant has sufficient "minimum contacts" with the forum state, such that maintaining an action there comports with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95, 102 (1945). "Minimum contacts" must involve acts by which the defendant purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thereby invoking the benefits and protection of its laws. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958); Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102, 107 S.Ct. 1026, 94 L.Ed.2d 92 (1987). The defendant's conduct with respect to the forum state must be such that he would reasonably anticipate being haled into that state's court. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980). The factors a court must consider include (1) whether the defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state, (2) whether the cause of action arises out of these contacts, and (3) whether it is reasonable to require the defendant to litigate in the forum state. Viktron, 326 Ill.App.3d at 121, 259 Ill.Dec. 706, 759 N.E.2d at 196, (citing Autotech Controls Corp. v. K.J. Electric Corp., 256 Ill.App.3d 721, 195 Ill.Dec. 526, 628 N.E.2d 990 (1993), and Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985)). We analyze each factor in turn.

1. Minimum Contacts

When the parties have a contractual relationship, minimum contacts may be shown by the parties' negotiations preceding their agreement, the course of dealing between the parties,...

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