Bomeisler v. Forster

• Decision Date: 23 November 1897
• Citation: 48 N.E. 534,154 N.Y. 229
• Parties: BOMEISLER v. FORSTER.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

154 N.Y. 229

48 N.E. 534

BOMEISLER

v.FORSTER.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Nov. 23, 1897.

Appeal from supreme court, appellate division, First department.

Action by Louis E. Bomeisler, as executor, against Elsa Forster. From a judgment of the appellate division (46 N. Y. Supp. 118) reversing a decree in favor of plaintiff, he appeals. Reversed.

William B. Hornblower, for appellant.

Samuel H. Randall, for respondent.

GRAY, J.

The plaintiff's testator sought in this action to obtain a decree which should restrain the defendant from prosecuting an action at law then pending in the superior court of the city of New York, wherein she was the plaintiff and he was the defendant, or from bringing any other action for the same cause, and which should compel her specifically to perform her agreement not to harass the plaintiff by suits upon any claims of the nature of those described in her complaint. It appears that prior to May 21, 1892, the defendant had charged that Cantoni was the father of certain of her children; that he had promised to marry her, and that they had lived together as man and wife; that he had promised to pay her sums of money, and to make a substantial provision for her in case of his death; and, also, that she had rendered services to him as his housekeeper for the period of about seven years. Upon claims of this nature she had threatened to sue him. On the date above mentioned, she executed an instrument whereby she released Cantoni from all claims and demands that she had or might have against him, and particularly from claims based upon her charge that he was the father of her children. A few days later, however, an action was commenced in her name against Cantoni, to recover the sum of $250,000, on substantially the same claims. Thereupon, and on June 2, 1892, a further settlement was made between them; and at that time, after swearing, in the form of an affidavit, to the effect that her previous release was freely and consciously made, that her charges against Cantoni were false, and that she had no claims against him, she orally agreed, in consideration of $6,000, to discontinue the then pending action, to relinquish all claims she might have, and that she would ‘not thereafter in any manner communicate with, harass, or annoy the plaintiff by suing him at law or in equity, in person, by procurement, or otherwise, by virtue of any claims she might have,’ etc. Two years later, the action which is now sought to be enjoined was commenced by her, upon substantially the old claims, to recover damages in the sum of $175,000. The making of the release of May 21, 1892, and of the agreement of June 2, 1892, above mentioned, were decided to be proven by the trial judge. His decision was in the form of a concise statement of the grounds upon which the issues were decided (section 1022 of the Code); and, upon the issue made as to the validity of the release and agreement, he decided that they were upon a valuable consideration, voluntarily and intelligently entered into, and not the result of any fraudulent practices or coercion. The decree of the court at special term awarded to the plaintiff the equitable relief demanded; but, upon appeal, the appellate division ordered its reversal, and that judgment should be entered for the defendant, dismissing the complaint upon the merits.

The order is silent as to the grounds for the reversal or upon which judgment is given for the defendant. Authority is conferred by section 1022 of the Code of Civil Procedure upon the appellate division to review all questions of fact and of law upon an appeal from a judgment upon a decision which does not state separately the facts found, and to grant to either party the judgment which the facts warrant. Where the appellate division, as here, upon reversing a judgment, grants a judgment upon the merits to the appealing party, it might seem as though the case came before this court, upon an appeal, upon its questions of fact as well as of law, despite the absence of any statement in the body of the order that the reversal and direction for judgment were upon the facts. But we are not disposed to believe that the legislature intended any exception to the provisions of section 1338, which require the presumption at our hands that a reversal was not upon a question of fact, unless the contrary clearly appears in the body of the judgment or order appealed from. That section and section 1338 have reference to trials before the court or before a referee, and we do not think that we can enlarge our province of review beyond the limits set by section 1338. The grounds of the decision of the issues, which section 1022 authorizes to be concisely stated, as a substitute for separate findings of fact, must be regarded as containing statements of those facts which the trial judge or referee deems to be established by the evidence, and his decision has the support of the same presumptions which go to the support of a general verdict. Amherst College v. Ritch, 151 N. Y. 282, 45 N. E. 876. A general exception to the decision imposes upon the appellate division the duty to review all the questions of fact and of law; and where it reverses, and orders a new trial, or grants a final judgment, and its order is silent as to its grounds, we are bound to presume that it was made upon the questions of law presented by the case. Our review is therefore confined to the consideration of whether, upon the decision made by the trial court upon the facts, the legal conclusion followed that the plaintiff was entitled to the equitable relief awarded him, and, if there was no error in that respect, whether there were errors of law committed in the rulings upon the trial, which would, in any event, have justified a reversal of the judgment, and rendered a new trial necessary.

Upon reference to the opinion of the appellate division, it appears that the learned justices thought that as there was a perfect defense to the pending action at law, in the release which the defendant had executed to the plaintiff, that general rule in equity should control which forbids the interference by the court to enjoin a pending suit at law, to which there exists a perfect legal defense, or where the ground for relief is as equally available at law as in equity. In our judgment, however, this case presents those exceptional features which make the interference of a court of equity necessary in order that the plaintiff may have the full benefit of the contractwhich, as the court has decided, was made between him and this defendant. Every case must necessarily be governed in its disposition by its facts and circumstances, and the discretion of the court must be influenced in its exercise by a...