Bondy v. Allen, C0-01-28.
| Decision Date | 23 October 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. C0-01-28.,C0-01-28. |
| Citation | 635 N.W.2d 244 |
| Parties | Kathryn BONDY, et al., Appellants, v. Carey ALLEN, et al., Respondents, Gold Cross Ambulance Service, Inc., Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Robert G. Benner, Michael B. Goodman, Joseph M. Guzinski, Goodman, Guzinski & Benner, P.A., Rochester, MN, for appellants.
Thomas S. Fraser, Kathleen M. Miller, Robin L. Preble, Trudi Noel Trysla (of counsel), Fredrikson & Byron, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, for respondent Gold Cross Ambulance Service, Inc.
Steven J. Hovey, Hoversten Johnson Beckmann Wellmann & Hovey, Austin, MN, for respondents Carey and Jeffrey Allen.
Considered and decided by STONEBURNER, Presiding Judge, HANSON, Judge, and LINDBERG, Judge.
Appellant Kathryn Bondy and her husband, John, sued an ambulance service that transported her to a Rochester hospital after she was struck by a car. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the ambulance service. Appellants argue that their expert testimony established a genuine issue of material fact as to causation. We affirm.
Appellant Kathryn Bondy (Bondy) was a pedestrian in a designated crosswalk when a vehicle traveling 30 to 40 miles per hour struck her in November 1994. The vehicle was owned by respondent Jeffrey Allen and driven by respondent Carey Allen. Bondy sustained multiple injuries, particularly to her left hip and pelvis.
Respondent Gold Cross Ambulance Service, Inc., was called to the accident scene to transport Bondy to the emergency room. At the accident scene, Gold Cross paramedic Kenneth Schweim assessed Bondy's physical condition and concluded she was alert and oriented to her surroundings. Schweim checked her airway, breathing, and circulation and did not observe any distortion of her limbs. He then palpated her lower torso because he knew that was a fragile area, which may have been injured. Bondy did not indicate that she experienced pain during the palpations. Bondy was rolled onto her side, placed on a backboard, and secured with safety straps. The backboard was then secured to a gurney with additional safety straps across Bondy and placed in the ambulance. Bondy's husband, John, traveled in the front of the ambulance.
In the ambulance during transport, Schweim continued to assess and treat Bondy by placing electrodes on her, monitoring her heart, administering oxygen, and attaching a pulse oximeter. Because Bondy was a multiple trauma patient, Schweim needed to do a secondary assessment to determine the nature and extent of the injuries, direct treatment in the ambulance, and expedite services upon arrival at the emergency room. He unfastened one or two safety straps around Bondy's leg and torso to remove a coat placed on her at the accident scene. Two or three straps remained fastened. At some point thereafter, the movement of the ambulance caused Bondy's left leg to slide off the backboard, allowing her foot to touch the floor below the gurney. Bondy, who had been moaning in the ambulance, screamed at this point.
Schweim immediately returned Bondy's leg to the backboard and gurney, refastened the lower straps he had previously removed, and continued the examination and treatment. When the ambulance arrived at the hospital, Bondy was turned over to the hospital's care.
The Bondys sued (1) Carey and Jeffrey Allen; (2) the City of Rochester; and (3) Gold Cross Ambulance Service. The Bondys settled with the city before the scheduled trial date. Their claims against Gold Cross for negligent training and driving were also dismissed. Gold Cross moved for summary judgment on the negligence claim for allowing Bondy's leg to slide off the gurney, arguing there was inadequate proof that the "gurney incident" caused any compensable damage. The district court initially denied summary judgment.
The Bondys and Gold Cross made several motions in limine. The district court rejected the Bondys' motion to hold Gold Cross to the standard of care applicable to common carriers, ruling that Gold Cross is subject to the standard of care applicable to professionals. The court also rejected the Bondys' motion to hold Gold Cross jointly and severally liable with Carey Allen for all of Bondy's injuries under the single-indivisible-injury rule.
The case was set for trial in November 2000. After the jury was selected and opening statements were given, the Bondys and the Allens settled. The Allens agreed to pay their insurance policy limits and Carey Allen admitted liability for striking Bondy. Gold Cross then moved to exclude all evidence relating to damage caused by Carey Allen, arguing that evidence should be limited to damage allegedly caused by Gold Cross. The district court did not rule on this motion. Instead, the court reconsidered sua sponte its earlier denial of Gold Cross's motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment against the Bondys. This appeal follows.
I. Did Dr. Davis's testimony present a material question of fact, thereby precluding the granting of summary judgment against the Bondys?
II. Do appellants' other issues entitle them to relief?
They contend that Dr. Davis's testimony established a question of fact as to causation, and that question should have been submitted to the jury, rather than being determined by the court.
An appellate court reviewing a grant of summary judgment asks whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court erred in applying the law. State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 4 (Minn.1990). The reviewing court "must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was granted." Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn.1993) (citation omitted). To defeat a summary judgment motion, the nonmoving party must demonstrate the existence of specific disputed facts that create a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Gorath v. Rockwell Int'l, Inc., 441 N.W.2d 128, 131 (Minn.App.1989), review denied (Minn. July 27, 1989).
A negligence claim requires the plaintiff to show (1) that the defendant had a legal duty, (2) the defendant breached that duty, (3) that the plaintiff suffered an injury, and (4) the breach of the duty was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. Hudson v. Snyder Body, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 149, 157 (Minn.1982). Negligence claims involve questions of fact and are generally not susceptible to summary adjudication. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Tapemark Co., 273 N.W.2d 630, 633-34 (Minn.1978). Further, issues of causation also involve questions of fact and "seldom can be disposed of on a motion for summary judgment." Moe v. Springfield Milling Corp., 394 N.W.2d 582, 585 (Minn.App.1986) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Dec. 17, 1986).
Here, when Dr. Davis was asked specifically about what harm the gurney incident did to Bondy, his answers were inconclusive and insufficient to support the Bondys' claim. When asked "whether the percentage of disability to [Bondy's] left lower extremity would be any different" if the gurney incident had never occurred, he answered, "I cannot absolutely be sure about that." The same answer followed a question about her right lower extremity. He could not identify any surgeries that would not have been required but for the gurney incident. He testified that the only medical treatment Bondy would not have received, but for the gurney incident, was that "she would have required less [blood by] transfusions." However, he could not say how much less she would have needed, nor is there any evidence that Bondy's damages are related to the amount of blood she received.
Dr. Davis's testimony does not support the Bondys' assertion of negligence against Gold Cross. He was unable to ascribe any of the claimed harm to Bondy's hip, leg, or lower extremities—beyond an unspecified increase in blood transfusions to the gurney incident in the ambulance. At best, Davis's testimony would support de minimis damages; it was clearly insufficient to support a finding of negligence by Gold Cross. The district court did not err when it concluded that the testimony was speculative and lacked foundation "to support a verdict against Gold Cross for aggravation of pre-existing injuries." We affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment.
The Bondys also argue that the Allens and Gold Cross are joint tortfeasors and that the district court erred in determining that they are not subject to the single-indivisible-injury rule. They contend that because the injuries Bondy suffered are not clearly susceptible to apportionment between the initial accident and the gurney incident, they should be subject to the single-indivisible-injury rule. The Bondys assert that...
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