Deceased v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corp.., Nos. A09-2212, A09-2213, A09-2214, A09-2215.

• Decision Date: 14 September 2010
• Docket Number: Nos. A09-2212, A09-2213, A09-2214, A09-2215.
• Citation: 788 N.W.2d 770
• Parties: Michael D. FRAZIER, as Trustee for the Next-of-Kin of Brian L. Frazier, deceased, Respondent (A09-2212), Harry James Rhoades, Sr., as Trustee for the Next-of-Kin of Harry James Rhoades, Jr., deceased, Respondent (A09-2213), Denise Renee Shannon, as Trustee for the Next-of-Kin of Bridgette Marie Shannon, deceased, Respondent (A09-2214), Elizabeth Chase, as Trustee for the Next-of-Kin of Corey Everett Chase, deceased, Respondent (A09-2215), v. BURLINGTON NORTHERN SANTA FE CORPORATION, et al., Appellants, Richard P. Wright, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Corey E. Chase, deceased, Respondent (A09-2212), Cristy Y. Frazier, as Special Administrator for the Estate of Brian Frazier, deceased, Respondent (A09-2213, A09-2214, A09-2215), and BNSF Railway Company, third party plaintiff, Appellant (A09-2213, A09-2214, A09-2215), v. Richard P. Wright, as Special Administrator for the Estate of Corey Everett Chase, deceased, third party defendant, Respondent (A09-2213, A09-2214, A09-2215).
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals

788 N.W.2d 770

Michael D. FRAZIER, as Trustee for the Next-of-Kin of Brian L. Frazier, deceased, Respondent (A09-2212),

Harry James Rhoades, Sr., as Trustee for the Next-of-Kin of Harry James Rhoades, Jr., deceased, Respondent (A09-2213),

Denise Renee Shannon, as Trustee for the Next-of-Kin of Bridgette Marie Shannon, deceased, Respondent (A09-2214),

Elizabeth Chase, as Trustee for the Next-of-Kin of Corey Everett Chase, deceased, Respondent (A09-2215),

v.BURLINGTON NORTHERN SANTA FE CORPORATION, et al., Appellants,Richard P. Wright, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Corey E. Chase, deceased, Respondent (A09-2212),Cristy Y. Frazier, as Special Administrator for the Estate of Brian Frazier, deceased, Respondent (A09-2213, A09-2214, A09-2215),

and

BNSF Railway Company, third party plaintiff, Appellant (A09-2213, A09-2214, A09-2215),

v.Richard P. Wright, as Special Administrator for the Estate of Corey Everett Chase, deceased, third party defendant, Respondent (A09-2213, A09-2214, A09-2215).

Nos. A09-2212, A09-2213, A09-2214, A09-2215.

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

Sept. 14, 2010.

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Syllabus by the Court

When an error of fundamental law in a jury instruction affects a party's substantial right to a fair trial, the party is entitled to a new trial even if the party offered or acquiesced in the erroneous instruction.

Robert L. Pottroff (pro hac vice), Pottroff Law Office, P.A., Manhatttan, KS; and Mark R. Bradford, Patrick J. Sauter, Bassford Remele, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, for respondents, Michael Frazier and Cristy Frazier.

William O. Bongard, Sieben, Grose, Von Holtum & Carey, Ltd., Minneapolis, MN, for respondent, Harry James Rhoades Sr.

Allan F. Shapiro, Finn Shapiro, St. Louis Park, MN, for respondent, Denise Renee Shannon.

Sharon L. Van Dyck, St. Louis Park, MN; and Paul E. Godlewski, Schwebel, Goetz & Sieben, Minneapolis, MN, for respondent, Elizabeth Chase.

Timothy R. Thornton, Sam Hanson, Jonathan P. Schmidt, Tara Reese Duginske, Briggs & Morgan, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, for appellants.

Burke J. Ellingson, Brendel & Zinn, Lake Elmo, MN, for respondent, Richard Wright.

Considered and decided by KALITOWSKI, Presiding Judge; MINGE, Judge; and COLLINS, Judge.

OPINION

COLLINS, Judge. ^*

Respondents, the trustees for the next of kin of four individuals killed when a train collided with their car, brought these actions against appellants, the company that owned and operated the train and its parent corporation. The actions were consolidated and the trial was bifurcated. At the close of evidence in the liability trial, appellants moved for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) on the ground of preemption, and the district court denied the motion. The jury found that appellants had been negligent and attributed 90 percent of the causal fault for the accident to appellants. Following the trial on damages, the jury found that each respondent was entitled to damages. Respondents moved for conduct-based sanctions against appellants on various grounds, and the district court granted the motion in part. Appellants moved unsuccessfully for (1) JMOL or a new trial on liability on the ground of preemption, (2) a new trial on liability on grounds of newly discovered evidence and various alleged trial errors, and (3) a new trial on damages or remittitur. Appellants challenge the district court's denial of these motions and the sanctions award.

Because we conclude that appellants are not entitled to JMOL on the ground of preemption but are entitled to a new liability trial on the basis of an error of fundamental law in the jury instruction relative to preemption, we affirm the denial of JMOL but reverse and remand for a new trial on liability. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial on damages or for remittitur, we affirm in part. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding sanctions, we affirm in part, but we remand those sanctions calculated as a percentage of appellants' liability for possible recalculation after the new liability trial. Finally, because granting a new liability trial renders moot the district court's denials of new-trial motions based on newly discovered evidence and alleged trial errors, we decline to address these issues.

FACTS

On September 26, 2003, shortly after 10 p.m., a southbound car containing Corey Chase, 20, Brian Frazier, 20, Harry Rhodes, 19, and Bridgette Shannon, 17, was struck at a railway crossing by a westbound freight train operated by appellant Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Company, a wholly owned subsidiary of appellant Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corporation (collectively, BNSF). The car's four occupants were killed. Respondents, trustees for the decedents' next of kin, brought actions against BNSF.

The liability trial began on May 8, 2008. The only witnesses to the accident who testified were BNSF employees, one of whom testified that, when the train moved through the crossing, he saw signal lights flashing and the crossing gate down. Respondents' own expert testified that he had no basis to dispute that the track inspections required by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) were done in a timely fashion or that the required signal tests were all done according to FRA requirements; he also testified that he agreed that BNSF did the required monthly and quarterly signal inspections. Relying on circumstantial evidence, respondents contended that the signal lights were not flashing, the gates were not down, and nothing warned motorists of the approaching train. On June 10, 2008, the jury delivered its verdict attributing 90 percent of the causal negligence to BNSF and 10 percent to the driver of the car. The trial on damages began the next day, and on June 13, 2008, the jury returned its verdicts awarding $6,000,000 to the next of kin of each decedent.

After hearings on respondents' motions for sanctions against BNSF and BNSF's posttrial motions, the district court denied BNSF's motions and granted respondents' motions in part, awarding respondents $4,180,398.90 in sanctions against BNSF for specified instances of misconduct. This appeal followed.

ISSUES

1. Is BNSF entitled to JMOL on the ground of preemption?

2. Is BNSF entitled to a new liability trial on the basis of an error of fundamental law in the jury instruction relative to preemption?

3. Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying BNSF's motion for a new damages trial or remittitur?

4. Did the district court abuse its discretion in granting in part respondents' motion for sanctions against BNSF?

ANALYSIS

1. JMOL on the ground of preemption ¹

Whether federal law preempts state law is subject to de novo review. In re Estate of Barg, 752 N.W.2d 52, 63 (Minn.2008); In re Speed Limit for Union Pac. R.R., 610 N.W.2d 677, 682 (Minn.App.2000), review dismissed (Minn. July 7, 2000). At the close of evidence and again after the trial, BNSF moved for JMOL on the ground that the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA), 49 U.S.C. §§ 20101-21311 (2006 & Supp. II 2008), preempted respondents' state common-law claims. Appellate courts “apply de novo review to the district court's denial of a Rule 50 [i.e., JMOL] motion.” Bahr v. Boise Cascade Corp., 766 N.W.2d 910, 919 (Minn.2009).

The FRSA provides, “Laws, regulations, and orders related to railroad safety ... shall be nationally uniform to the extent practicable.” 49 U.S.C. § 20106(a)(1) (Supp. II 2008). FRA regulations cover the track, signals, and all other aspects of railway crossings. See 49 C.F.R. §§ 234.201-.274 (2009). “Under 49 U.S.C. § 20106 ... issuance of these regulations preempts any State law, rule, regulation, order, or standard covering the same subject matter....” 49 C.F.R. § 234.4 (2009).

The Supreme Court has twice concluded that federal regulations concerning railroad crossings preempt state laws and common-law standards. “According to [45 U.S.C.] § 434 [predecessor of 49 U.S.C. § 20106], applicable federal regulations may pre-empt any state law, rule, regulation, order, or standard relating to railroad safety. Legal duties imposed on railroads by the common law fall within the scope of these broad phrases.” CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664, 113 S.Ct. 1732, 1737, 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993) (quotation omitted). The pertinent federal regulations “cover the subject matter of state law which, like the tort law on which [the decedent's representative] relies, seeks to impose an independent duty on a railroad to identify and/or repair dangerous crossings.” Id. at 671, 113 S.Ct. at 1741. ²

In another crossing-accident case, the Supreme Court again concluded that

the FRSA pre-empts [the decedent's representative]'s state tort claim that the advance warning signs and reflectorized crossbucks installed at the ... crossing were inadequate.... Once ... the signs were installed using federal funds, the federal standard for adequacy displaced [state] statutory and common law addressing the same subject, thereby pre-empting [the decedent's representative's] claim.

Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344, 358-59, 120 S.Ct. 1467, 1477, 146 L.Ed.2d 374 (2000).

Respondents rely on 49 U.S.C. § 20106 (Supp. II 2008), which provides:

(b) Clarification regarding State law causes of action. (1) Nothing in this section shall be construed to preempt an action under State law seeking damages for personal injury, death, or property damage alleging that a party

(A) has failed to comply with the Federal standard of care established by a regulation or order ... covering the subject matter as provided in subsection (a) of this section;

(B) has failed to comply with its own plan, rule, or standard that it created pursuant to a regulation or order ...; or

(C) has failed to comply with a State law, regulation, or order that is not incompatible with subsection (a)(2) [providing that a state may have an additional...