Bonham v. Regions Mortg., Inc.
| Decision Date | 03 January 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. Civ.A. 99-T-1499-N.,Civ.A. 99-T-1499-N. |
| Parties | Sharon E. BONHAM, Plaintiff, v. REGIONS MORTGAGE, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
M. Wayne Sabel, Maricia B. Woodham, Sabel & Sabel, P.C., Montgomery, AL, for Sharon E. Bonham, plaintiff.
David R. Boyd, Charles B. Paterson, J. Beth Moscarelli, Balch & Bingham, Montgomery, AL, for Regions Mortgage, Inc., defendant.
Plaintiff Sharon E. Bonham filed this lawsuit, charging defendant Regions Mortgage, Inc., with discriminating against her because of her age and retaliating against her for filing a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and for filing this lawsuit. She also brings supplemental state-law tort claims. She alleges that Regions's actions violated federal law (the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended (ADEA), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621-634), and state law (the Alabama Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1997 (AADEA), 1975 Ala.Code §§ 25-1-20 through 25-1-29, and Alabama common law). The jurisdiction of this court is proper under 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331 (federal question) and 1343 (civil rights), and 29 U.S.C.A. § 626 (ADEA). Jurisdiction over Bonham's supplemental state-law claims is proper under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367.
This cause is now before the court on Regions's motion for summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, this motion is will be granted in part and denied in part.
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment is appropriate where "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Once the party seeking summary judgment has informed the court of the basis for its motion, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to demonstrate why summary judgment would be inappropriate. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); see also Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115-17 (11th Cir.1993) (). In making its determination, the court must view all evidence and any factual inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).
Bonham, age 47, has worked at Regions for 22 years and is currently a senior collections counselor in the default services department. During her employment with Regions, Bonham has also worked in many other departments. She has received consistently positive employment evaluations and has never been reprimanded. Bonham has frequently expressed an interest in promotion.
Since the fall of 1998, Regions has hired four individuals to supervisory positions, and all of the individuals are younger than Bonham:
Smart and Stallings: In October of 1998, Bonham became aware of a job vacancy for a supervisory position in her department. The job posting made no mention of prior supervisory experience as a prerequisite for the position. Bonham applied for the job with the understanding that she was also applying for a second supervisory position, and she was interviewed for both positions by the decisionmaker in her department, Rory Luther. During the interview, Luther made comments that drew attention to Bonham's age, stating that she was "getting real old" and that, because of her age, she was "going to have to watch [herself], she may have to stop stay[ing] up so late and partying at night." He never indicated, however, that prior supervisory experience was a sine qua non for the job. Bonham was not promoted to either position. Joe Smart, age 40, was hired for the first position in November 1998. Smart was not as well qualified as Bonham. Bill Stallings, age 30, was hired to the second supervisory position in December 1998. He, like Smart, was less well-qualified than Bonham.
Bodiford: In February 1999, Bonham sent a letter to the EEOC charging that she had been discriminated against by Regions. Following this action, a third supervisory position opened up, and Tim Bodiford, age 22, received it. Moreover, Bonham's supervisors began to treat her in a hostile manner and no longer socialized with her.
Hall: In June 2000, Bodiford resigned from the supervisory position to which he had been hired. Bonham examined the job posting and decided not to apply for the position because it listed one-to-two years of supervisory experience as a requirement. She claims that Regions tailored the job prerequisites for this and future supervisory positions so as to preclude her from consideration. Eventually, Bessie Hall, age 41, was promoted to the position that Bodiford vacated.
Bonham asserts the following claims: (1) Regions denied her the Smart, Stallings, Bodiford, and Hall positions because of her age, in violation of both the ADEA and AADEA; and (2) Regions denied her the Bodiford and Hall positions in retaliation for filing an EEOC charge and this lawsuit, in violation of the ADEA and the AADEA.
In support of its summary-judgment motion, Regions argues that Bonham has not offered sufficient evidence to support her claims that she was discriminated against because of her age and that she was retaliated against for engaging in protected activity. Regions also contests that Bonham has offered sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on her remaining state-law claims. The court finds that these arguments are without merit with regard to Bonham's claims that she was denied the Smart and Stallings positions because of her age. However, the court finds that summary judgment should be granted on her remaining federal and state-law claims.
The ADEA's purpose is "to promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age[, and] to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment." 29 U.S.C.A. § 621(b). To this end, the ADEA specifically prohibits discrimination in employment against persons, 40 and above, because of age. See 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 623(a)(1), 631(a).1 One form of redress for violating this prohibition is filing a lawsuit against an allegedly discriminating employer. However, an employee may file an ADEA lawsuit only if she has filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC "within 180 days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred." 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(d)(1).
This court must therefore consider whether Bonham timely filed such a charge with the EEOC. The critical dates are as follows:
December 1, 1998: Bonham received notice that she had not been selected for the supervisory position for which Smart was hired.
December 18, 1998: Bonham received notice that she had not been chosen for the second supervisory position to which Stallings had been promoted.
March 30, 1999: The EEOC received a letter, dated February 29, 1999, from Bonham.
Regardless of which date applies for jurisdictional purposes, Bonham's letter was indisputably filed within 180 days of her notification of Regions's decision not to promote her to the first supervisory position on December 1, 1998.
What remains for the court to determine is whether the letter constitutes a charge within the meaning of that term in the ADEA context. The Code of Federal Regulations delineates the requirements of a charge under the ADEA and states that a charge is sufficient if it is in writing, names the prospective respondent, and generally alleges the discriminatory acts.2 See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1626.8(b) & 1626.6. An ADEA "action may be based `not only upon the specific complaints made by the employee's initial EEOC charge, but also upon any kind of discrimination like or related to the charge's allegations, limited only by the scope of the EEOC investigation that could reasonably be expected to grow out of the initial charges of discrimination.'" Chanda v. Engelhard/ICC, 234 F.3d 1219, 1224 (11th Cir.2000) (quoting Fine v. GAF Chemical Corp., 995 F.2d 576, 578 (5th Cir.1993) (quoting Fellows v. Universal Restaurants Inc., 701 F.2d 447, 451 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 828, 104 S.Ct. 102, 78 L.Ed.2d 106 (1983))). In addition, the Code of Federal Regulations provides that the EEOC's rules are to be liberally construed so as to effectuate the purpose of their relevant statutes. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.34 & 1626.19.
Bonham's letter to the EEOC was sufficiently precise to identify the parties and the actions about which she was complaining. Although the letter alleged gender discrimination, it also explicitly referred to the fact that Bonham had been employed with the company for more than 21 years while those who were receiving promotions were of a newer clique with much less experience. It would not take much of a leap to conclude from the facts in the letter that an age bias might be in play too. Indeed, the EEOC, after reviewing Bonham's letter reached that conclusion and had her include an age-bias claim in her formal charge. Construing Bonham's letter liberally, the court concludes that a reasonable person reviewing the letter could have thought that age discrimination might be an issue and that a reasonable investigation of the EEOC charge would have encompassed age discrimination based on the factual allegations made.
Moreover, 29 C.F.R. § 1626.19(c) provides that "Whenever a charge is filed under one statute and it is subsequently believed that the alleged discrimination constitutes an unlawful employment practice under another statute administered and enforced by the Commission, the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Newman v. Career Consultants, Inc.
...principles governing the order and allocation of proof in Title VII cases, and will do so here. See Bonham v. Regions Mortg., Inc., 129 F.Supp.2d 1315, 1321-26 (M.D.Ala.2001) (Thompson, J.) (applying the Title VII framework for the order and allocation of proof to ADEA and AADEA Thus, an em......
-
Henry v. Jefferson County Personnel Bd.
...court notes that the analysis of Plaintiff's claims under the Alabama Age Act and the ADEA is the same. See, e.g., Bonham v. Mortgage Inc., 129 F.Supp.2d 1315 (M.D.Ala.2001). 15. The court notes, however, that Plaintiff's job eliminations are not garden-variety RIF claims. In both cases, Pl......
-
Morgan v. Cnty. Comm'n of Lawrence Cnty.
...Act (ADEA). See, e.g., Robinson v. Ala. Cent. Credit Union, 964 So. 2d 1225, 1228 (Ala. 2007) (citing Bonham v. Regions Mortg., Inc., 129 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1321 (M.D.Ala. 2001)); Ehrhardt v. Haddad Restaurant Group, Inc., 443 F. App'x 452, 454 (11th Cir. 2011); Perry v. Batesville Casket Co......
-
Shumate v. Selma City Bd. of Educ.
...756 F.Supp.2d at 1345.See also Howell v. Compass Group, 448 Fed.Appx. 30, 34 (11th Cir.2011); see also Bonham v. Regions Mortg., Inc., 129 F.Supp.2d 1315, 1324 (M.D.Ala.2001). It is worthwhile to note that a plaintiff's failure to apply for a position does not automatically defeat a claim o......
-
Determining the meaning of "direct evidence" in discrimination cases within the 11th Circuit: why Judge Tjoflat was (W)right.
...the "dictionary definition" even when all the requirements of the three-prong standard were met: * Bonham v. Regions Mortgage, Inc., 129 F. Supp 2d 1315 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (Thompson, J.): concluded that statement 1) by decisionmaker 2) that plaintiff was "getting real old" 3) made during plai......