Bonilla v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 02 March 2016
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 14–4962 (BRT)
• Citation: 149 F.Supp.3d 1135
• Parties: Lidia Bonilla, Plaintiff, v. Jeh Johnson, Leon Rodriguez, Robert M. Cowan, and Leslie Tritten, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota

149 F.Supp.3d 1135

Lidia Bonilla, Plaintiff,

v.Jeh Johnson, Leon Rodriguez, Robert M. Cowan, and Leslie Tritten, Defendants.

Civ. No. 14–4962 (BRT)

United States District Court, D. Minnesota.

Signed March 2, 2016

Anne E. Carlson, Esq., and David L. Wilson, Esq., Wilson Law Group, counsel for Plaintiff.

David W. Fuller, Esq., United States Attorney's Office, and Ubaid ul-Haq, Esq., United States Department of Justice, counsel for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

BECKY R. THORSON

, United States Magistrate Judge.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Lidia Bonilla brought this action under the Administrative Procedure Act, challenging the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services' (“USCIS”) denial of her application to adjust her status to that of a lawful permanent resident (“LPR”). The parties agree that the sole question before the Court is whether a grant of temporary protected status (“TPS”) under 8 U.S.C. § 1254a

satisfies the threshold requirement of admission under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a)

for purposes of becoming eligible for adjustment of status to a lawful permanent resident. Plaintiff argues that it is, and that she is therefore eligible to apply for adjustment of status under § 1255(a). Defendants disagree.

The parties consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by a United States Magistrate Judge over all proceedings in this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)

and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73. (Doc. Nos.16, 19.) This matter is now before the Court on Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and Defendants' cross-motion to affirm USCIS's administrative decision. (Doc. Nos.21, 27.) On October 27, 2015, the Court held a hearing on the motions and took the motions under advisement on November 6, 2015, after allowing the parties short, post-hearing briefs. (Doc. No. 36.) Based on the record, submissions, and oral arguments from counsel, and as further explained below, the Court agrees with Plaintiff's interpretation of the statutory provisions at issue and therefore grants her motion and denies Defendants' motion.

BACKGROUND

The facts of this case are undisputed. Plaintiff, a native and citizen of El Salvador, entered the United States in 1991 without inspection. The United States Attorney General designated El Salvador as a TPS country on March 9, 2001, after it experienced three consecutive earthquakes. See “Designation of El Salvador Under the Temporary Protected Status Program,” 66 Fed.Reg. 14214–01 (Mar. 1, 2001)

. On January 16, 2006, while her application for asylum was still pending, she timely applied to USCIS for TPS.¹ Plaintiff disclosed on her application that she entered the United States without inspection in 1991. Finding no bar to admission, USCIS approved Plaintiff's application and granted her TPS in the United States in 2007. Plaintiff's TPS has been continuously renewed since then. As a TPS beneficiary, she is temporarily protected from removal and eligible for employment in the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(a)(1).

Plaintiff is the mother of Nelly Anderson, a United States citizen over the age of twenty-one. On February 21, 2014, Anderson submitted to USCIS a petition for an alien relative so that her mother would be eligible to apply for an immigrant visa as an immediate relative of an American citizen. That same day, Plaintiff applied for adjustment of status to that of a lawful permanent resident (“LPR”), pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1255

.

On March 14, 2014, USCIS issued a request for evidence of Plaintiff's eligibility for adjustment of status, including “evidence of [her] lawful admission or parole into the United States.” In response, Plaintiff provided copies of her TPS approval notifications and asserted that her TPS admission made her eligible to apply for adjustment of status. On July 19, 2014, USCIS issued a second request for evidence, again asking for proof of admission, inspection, or parole. Plaintiff again responded, resubmitting documents indicating USCIS's approval of her TPS and submitting a letter brief.

The USCIS approved Anderson's petition on October 23, 2014, confirming that Plaintiff is a parent of a United States citizen, but denied Plaintiff's Form I–485 application for adjustment of status. The denial was based on Plaintiff's failure to submit evidence of her lawful admission or parole into the United States.

DISCUSSION

I. Summary Judgment Standard of Review

Summary judgment is proper if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a)

. Here, the parties agree that there are no facts in dispute; the only question is whether Plaintiff is, as a purely legal matter, eligible for adjustment of status to a lawful permanent resident.

II. Standard for Judicial Review of Administrative Agency Decision

This Court has jurisdiction over this matter under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), which authorizes judicial review of an agency's interpretation of a statute to determine whether it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)

. The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject administrative constructions that are contrary to clear congressional intent. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). Chevron deference involves a two-step inquiry. At step one, the court must determine “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue” and “unambiguously expressed its intent.” Id. at 842–43, 104 S.Ct. 2778 ; see also

U.S. v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989) (stating that where there is a dispute over the meaning of a statute, the inquiry begins “with the language of the statute itself”). “If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43, 104 S.Ct. 2778 ; see also

Friends of Boundary Waters Wilderness v. Dombeck, 164 F.3d 1115, 1121 (8th Cir.1999) (“When reviewing an agency's construction of a statute, the court first considers whether the intent of Congress is clear; if so, the court's inquiry is over[.]”). “[W]hen deciding whether the language is plain, we must read the words ‘in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.’ ” King v. Burwell, ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 2480, 2489, 192 L.Ed.2d 483 (2015) (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132, 120 S.Ct. 1291, 146 L.Ed.2d 121 (2000) ); accord

Greater Mo. Med. Pro–Care Providers, Inc. v. Perez, 812 F.3d 1132, 2015 WL 8591614, at *5 (8th Cir. Dec. 14, 2015). The court proceeds to step two to consider “whether the agency interpretation ‘is based on a permissible construction of the statute’ ” only if “the statute is silent or ambiguous on the question at issue.” Dombeck, 164 F.3d at 1121 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778 ).

III. Analysis

The issue before the Court is one of statutory interpretation. And the threshold question under Chevron

is whether the plain language of 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(f)(4) (a TPS benefits section), read in context, makes clear that when a person is granted TPS under 8 U.S.C. § 1254a, it satisfies the threshold requirement of inspection and admission to the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) for purposes of becoming eligible for adjustment to LPR status. The Court holds that it does.

Under 8 U.S.C. § 1254a

, the Attorney General may grant TPS to a national of a designated foreign state experiencing ongoing armed conflict, environmental disaster, or other “extraordinary and temporary conditions ... that prevent aliens who are nationals of the state from returning to the state in safety.” 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(a)(1), (b)(1). The Attorney General is afforded broad discretion to designate such countries and determine the duration of such designations. See generally id. § 1254a(b)

. If eligible for TPS, a foreign national is not subject to removal “from the United States during the period in which such status is in effect.” Id. § 1254a(1)(A). Once granted TPS, individuals have other benefits as well. As relevant here, section 1254a(f)(4), titled “Benefits and status during period of temporary protected status,” states:

During a period in which an alien is granted temporary protected status under this section—

....

(4) for purposes of adjustment of status under section 1255

of this title and change of status under section 1258 of this title, the alien shall be considered as being in, and maintaining, lawful status as a nonimmigrant.

8 U.S.C. § 1254a(f)(4)

. The § 1254a(f)(4) TPS benefits section therefore contemplates a situation where a person granted TPS would apply for adjustment of status under § 1255, as Plaintiff did here.

Section 1255

, in turn, provides:

The status of an alien who was inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States or the status of any other alien having an approved petition for classification as a VAWA self-petitioner may be adjusted by the Attorney General, in his discretion and under such regulations as he may prescribe, to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if (1) the alien makes an application for such adjustment, (2) the alien is eligible to receive an immigrant visa and is admissible to the United States for permanent residence, and (3) an immigrant visa is immediately available to him at the time his application is filed.

8 U.S.C. § 1255(a)

(emphasis added). Section 1255(a) therefore allows a nonimmigrant who was inspected and admitted into the United States (i.e., a nonimmigrant in lawful status for the purposes of adjustment) to become a lawful permanent resident if certain conditions are met. Section 1254a(f)(4) is clear: “for purposes of adjustment of status under section 1255,” a person granted TPS who was not “inspected and...