Bonner v. Jackson

• Decision Date: 07 May 1923
• Docket Number: 351
• Citation: 251 S.W. 1,158 Ark. 526
• Parties: BONNER v. JACKSON
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

251 S.W. 1

158 Ark. 526

BONNER v. JACKSON

No. 351

Supreme Court of Arkansas

May 7, 1923

Appeal from Woodruff Chancery Court, Northern District; A. L Hutchins, Chancellor; affirmed.

Decree affirmed.

Carl E. Bailey, W. J. Dungan, R. M. Hutchins, Jonas F. Dyson, Harry M. Woods, and J. F. Summers, for appellant.

The legislative intent may be shown by the act itself, by other official record of like character, and by other facts of which courts are bound to take judicial notice. Act No. 166 should be construed together with act challenged. 28 Ark 328; 135 Ark. 301; 45 Ark. 387; 47 Ark. 388; 3 Ark. 56; 5 Ark. 349; 40 Ark. 448; 48 Ark. 308; 25 R. C. L. 1060-62; 36 Cyc. 1147-1151; 66 S.W. 979; 35 Ark. 56. Acts so construed in conflict with sec. 2, art. 3, Constitution. Courts are bound to take judicial notice of the public laws of the State. 7 Enc. of Evidence, 947, 881; 6 R. C. L. 76-79; 181 U.S. 283. Act is void on its face; violates the Constitution by dividing townships and destroying the appellate jurisdiction and superintending control of circuit courts. Art. 7, sec 14, Constitution; 68 Ark. 561; 102 Ark. 266; 66 Ark. 180; 6 R. C. L. 82, par. 80. Construction of law not affected by county court's power to remedy defect, which would require time and deprive litigants of guaranty of sec. 13 art. 6, Constitution. Boundary of Central District insufficiently described. 36 Ark. 331; 106 Ark. 517. Courts cannot supply legislative defects and omissions. 104 Ark. 583; 36 Cyc. 1113; Lewis' Sutherland, Stat. Constr. par. 411; 61 N.J.L. 107, 38 A. 685; 3 A. L. R. 398; 122 Ark. 491. The act is a patent absurdity.

Roy D. Campbell and Ross Mathis, for appellees.

Rule for construction of statute, when challenged as unconstitutional. 27 Ark. 352; 6 R. C. L. 75; 76 Ark. 199. Act 111, creating the Central District of the county, followed well-established lines. Sec. 12, art. 7, Const. Acts dividing county into districts invariably upheld. 35 Ark. 380; 80 Ark. 150; 55 Ark. 323; 56 Ark. 4; 42 Ark. 34; 46 Ark. 229; 60 Ark. 343; 35 Ark. 389, conclusive of this question. Intention of the act must be derived from law itself. 35 Ark. 59; 140 Ark. 479. Appellate and supervisory jurisdiction of the circuit court not impaired by act. Makes no difference that certain political townships are divided by lines of district. 35 Ark. 60; 135 Ark. 304; 28 Ark. 378. County court has plenary power to remedy any defect caused by division of townships. Sec. 10288, Crawford & Moses' Digest. See also §§ 6403 and 10293, C. & M. Digest; 26 R. C. L. 790; 142 Ark. 454. No insufficient description of boundaries of the district. Appellant has an adequate remedy at law by appeal. 73 Ark. 527; 102 Ark. 287; 135 Ark. 111; 122 Ark. 557; 118 Ark. 334. No absurdity about the act. None of the court's business that the Legislature saw fit to divide the county into three districts. Little Rock v. North Little Rock, 72 Ark. 195.

Carl E. Bailey, W. J. Dungan, R. M. Hutchins, Jonas F. Dyson, Harry M. Woods, and J. F. Summers, in reply.

Court of equity had jurisdiction. 34 Ark. 310; 130 Ark. 116. It is proper to consider the two acts together. 35 Ark. 59. Endl. Inter. Statutes, §§ 43-52; 93 S.W. 436; Sutherland, Statutory Constr., § 238.

MCCULLOCH C. J. HART, J., dissenting.

OPINION

MCCULLOCH, C. J.

Appellant is a citizen and taxpayer of Woodruff County, and he instituted this action in the chancery court challenging the validity of a statute enacted by the General Assembly of 1923 (act No. 111, approved February 12, 1923), creating another court district for that county, designated as the Central Judicial District of Woodruff County, and seeking to restrain the county clerk and clerk of the circuit court from purchasing supplies and establishing their offices in accordance with the directions of said statute.

Prior to the enactment of the challenged statute there were two court districts in Woodruff County, one designated as the Northern District, with Augusta, the county seat, designated as the place for holding the courts, and the other designated as the Southern District, with Cotton Plant as the place designated for holding the courts and maintaining the offices. The two districts were divided by a line running east and west through the county, near the center. The following named townships comprise the Northern District: Dent, Pumpkin Bend, Barnes, Devue, White River, Augusta, and Point townships; and the following townships comprise the Southern District, namely: Franks, Caney, Cache, Cotton Plant, Freeman and Garden townships.

In the new statute, now under consideration, Central District of Woodruff County is described by metes and bounds, and covers the northeastern portion of the county, the eastern line running through the middle of some of the townships comprising, in part, the Northern District, and also running through the middle of some of the townships comprising, in part, the Southern District.

The chancery court sustained a demurrer to appellant's complaint, and dismissed the complaint for want of equity.

It is contended that the description of the territory embraced in Central District is so vague and uncertain that it cannot be definitely determined what was meant by the language used, and that for this reason the statute must fail for the want of sufficient description of the boundaries of the district.

It will be observed, from examination of the map of the State, of which we are, under settled rules, permitted to take cognizance, that White River forms the west boundary line of Woodruff County, and that the north boundary line is irregular in that the whole of a congressional township (9 north, range 3 west) is included in the county, and the north boundary of that township forms, in part, the north boundary line of the county, but that the north boundary line then drops down to township 8 north and runs along the north boundary line of township 8 north, range 1 west and range 2 west. The description of the area to be included is, in part, as follows:

"Beginning at the northwest corner of section 2, township 8 north, range 3 west, and running thence east on the boundary line of Woodruff County to the northeast corner of said county," etc.

Now the contention is that the northwest corner of section 2, township 8 north, range 3 west, is not on the boundary line of the county, and that this makes the words of description so indefinite that it is impossible to give any effect to them. It will be observed, however, that the northwest corner of said section 2 is in line with the north boundary, and it seems reasonably clear, from a consideration of the language used, that what the framers of the statute meant was that the description was to begin at that point and run east in line with the north boundary. It requires no strained construction of the language used to see clearly that the framers of the act meant to draw a line as the north boundary of the Central District due east from the northwest corner of section 2 in township 8 north, range 3 west, to the northeast corner of the county, which is at the northeast corner of township 8 north, range 1 west. It is not necessary to read anything into the statute to reach this conclusion, for a mere inspection of the map reveals very clearly, we think, what was meant by the use of the language in the descriptive part of the statute.

It is further argued that the act is void on its face for the reason that it inevitably leads to absurd results, in that it reduces one of the districts (the Northern District) in which the county seat is situated, to an area so small that it will seriously interfere with the enforcement of the law, and that if this act be upheld the Legislature may continue to create other districts in that county to suit the pleasure and convenience of every locality in the county. The substance of this attack is that the court should be the judge of the feasibility of the statute and the convenience or inconvenience to result therefrom, and that we should declare the act void because it is an improvident piece of legislation. Statutes creating court districts have been repeatedly upheld as valid by this court, and we do not feel at liberty to substitute our judgment for that of the lawmakers upon the question of convenience of the people of a county with respect to the creation of separate districts. Walker v. State, 35 Ark. 386; Pryor v. Murphy, 80 Ark. 150, 96 S.W. 445.

Our attention is called to the fact that the General Assembly, at the session of 1923, a few days after the approval of the statute now under consideration, also enacted a statute (Act No. 166), authorizing the removal of the county seat of Woodruff County from Augusta to McCrory, upon a vote of the electors of the county, and that this statute should be considered along with the other for the purpose of determining its validity, and that, when so considered, it shows that the two statutes were passed merely for the purpose of coercing the people of the Northern District into voting for the removal of the county seat. It may be conceded that it is proper for us to consider both of the statutes for the reason that they deal with somewhat kindred subjects, but we see no reason why a consideration of both the statutes would lead to any absurd or illegal results. As before stated, we are not at liberty to substitute our judgment for that of the lawmakers as to the best way to serve the people of a county with respect to their court facilities, and neither of the statutes, upon its face, affords any reason why we should hold the statute now under consideration to be void. Of course, we are not considering now any question relating to the validity of the removal statute, for that is not before us, except so far...