Hodges v. Dawdy
Decision Date | 08 July 1912 |
Citation | 149 S.W. 656,104 Ark. 583 |
Parties | HODGES v. DAWDY |
Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Appeal from Pulaski Circuit Court; F. Guy Fulk, Judge; reversed.
Judgment reversed and petitions for mandamus dismissed.
Hal L Norwood, Attorney General, and Wm. H. Rector, Assistant, for appellant; Callaway & Huie, Cravens & Cravens, Gibson Witt and Morton & Morton, of counsel.
It was incumbent on appellees to show in this complaint that they had a legal right to have appellant certify the petitions out to be voted on by the people of the respective counties, and failing in that, the demurrers should have been sustained and the complaints dismissed. 1 Ark. 11; Id. 121; 6 Ark. 9; Id. 437; 26 Ark. 482; Id. 100; 27 Ark. 382; 45 Ark. 122; 48 Ark. 80; 87 Ark. 379. The office of Secretary of State is not to be made the dumping ground for petitions of every nature and character which do not fall within the purview of the Initiative Amendment. 139 Am. St. Rep. 656. The proposed local measures are inconsistent with the general laws of the State. Art. 7, § 28, Const. 1874, and chap. 38, Kirby's Dig. The legislative power was originally in the people of the whole State. 33 Ark. 497; 92 U.S. 307.
Any construction should be discarded which would lead to absurd consequences. 40 Ark. 431; 100 S.W. 239; Sedgwick on Constitutional and Statutory Construction, 196. Where general provisions are inconsistent with more specific provisions in another part of a statute or Constitution, the particular provisions will be given effect as clearer or more definite expressions of the people's will. 22 Mich. 332; 12 Ga. 526; 132 Ill.App. 376; 106 Wis. 411; 185 U.S. 83. The county court has jurisdiction of all county seat matters. Sec. 28, art. 7. Const.; 33 Ark. 191; 43 Ark. 62; 5 Ark. 21; 55 Ark. 323. It is proposed to change the county seat by a majority of the votes cast on the question. The general law prohibits such change except on the consent of a majority of qualified voters in the county. Sec. 3, art. 13, Const. 1874.
Amendment No. 10 is to be read in connection with the whole Constitution, and, if possible, harmonized with the general terms, tenor and spirit thereof. 93 Ark. 228; 27 Ark. 648; 51 Ark. 534; 60 Ark. 343; 12 Ark. 101; 2 Ark. 98; 4 Ark. 473; 24 Cal. 518.
Miles & Wade, Dan W. Jones, Walker S. Danaher, Sam M. Wassell, I. L. Autrey, Geo. A. McConnell, Jessie A. Harp, and Chas. Jacobson, for appellees.
A county can exercise power of legislation granted to it by the Legislature. 143 Ky. 422. The proposed acts are not in conflict with the Constitution. 26 Okla. 403; 203 Mo. 408; 45 Ark. 400; 54 Ark. 658; 145 S.W. 892. The existing law provides the necessary machinery for the submission of the proposed acts to the people of their respective counties. Mandamus is the proper remedy. 26 Okla. 403. The people of a municipality, may, under Amendment No. 10, initiate an ordinance, the effect of which would be to exempt them from the provisions of § 2041, Kirby's Digest. 59 Ark. 530; 75 Ark. 125; 80 Ark. 337; 35 Ark. 69; 92 Ark. 4.
The Legislature has the right to set aside or suspend a law at pleasure. Sec. 12, art. 2, Const. The defendant, being a ministerial officer, can not raise the question as to whether the proposed laws are unconstitutional, in a mandamus proceeding. 16 S.C. 39; 30 S.C. 524; 43 S.C. 11; 64 S.C. 564; 47 L. R. A. 512.
The plaintiffs, J. M. Dawdy and other citizens of Dallas County, presented to the Secretary of State their petition to initiate a local or special statute directing the removal of the county seat of that county from Fordyce, its present location, to Princeton. The petition contained the signatures of 8 per cent. of the qualified electors of Dallas County, and they claim the right to initiate said statute, and the right of the people of the county to enact it, under the recent amendment to the Constitution known as the Initiative and Referendum, which was adopted by the people of the State in the year 1910, and which reads as follows:
The General Assembly of 1911 enacted a statute, approved June 30, 1911, pursuant to said constitutional amendment, providing means for carrying the same into full effect. It contains certain provisions concerning the initiation or reference of local legislation for counties and municipalities. It provides that "5 per cent. of the legal voters of any county, city or incorporated town may, by petition, order such referendum upon any law * * * applicable only to such county or municipality;" and that 5 per cent. of the legal voters of any municipality may, by petition, order the reference of any ordinance passed by the council. It also provides that "8 per cent. of the legal voters of any county or of any city or incorporated town may, at any time more than four months before any regular general election, propose any measure, not inconsistent with the general laws or Constitution of the State, applicable only to such county or municipality," and that "when any measure proposed of local application only to any county or municipality shall have received a majority of the legal votes cast upon such proposed measure at the election at which the same shall have been voted upon and the result of the vote legally proclaimed, as hereinafter provided, the same shall be and become a law for such county or municipality."
The Secretary of State, acting upon the advice of the Attorney General, declined to certify out the proposed law, so that it may be voted on by the people of Dallas County; and the plaintiffs instituted this action in the circuit court of Pulaski County to compel that officer, by writ of peremptory mandamus, to do so. The Attorney General appeared for the Secretary of State and demurred to the complaint. The demurrer was overruled, and, upon refusal of the defendant to plead further, final judgment was rendered awarding the writ of mandamus as prayed for.
Other petitions were presented to the Secretary of State for the initiation of other local statutes, and a like course was pursued as to each of them. An appeal has been prosecuted in each case, and all of them have been argued together in this court. One of the petitions was to initiate a local statute directing the removal of the county seat of Montgomery County; another a statute fixing the salaries of the officers of Sebastian County; another a statute to regulate horse-racing and to permit betting on horse-races in Garland County; and another to initiate an ordinance of the council of the city of Little Rock permitting games of baseball to be played on any day of the week, including Sunday. The conclusion which we reach in the first case is decisive of them all, and all of them will be disposed of in one opinion.
It is contended by learned counsel for plaintiffs that, aside from the main question as to the right of 8 per cent. of the voters of a county or municipality to initiate a local measure, the Secretary of State can not refuse to certify out an initiated bill because, in his opinion, the same is not subject to the...
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