Bonney v. Granger, 1444
| Decision Date | 11 December 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 1444,1444 |
| Citation | 387 S.E.2d 720,300 S.C. 362 |
| Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Donna Hale BONNEY, Respondent, v. John D. GRANGER, as Executor under the will of Hilda Hale Granger, Hilda Hale Granger (Deceased), individually and as trustee under written declaration of trust executed by W.R. Hale on 30 September 1927, Keith S. Bonney, Jr., Laura Ann Bonney, John Hale Granger, Individually and as executor under will of Hilda Hale Granger, Deceased, David Granger, William Randolph Hale, III, William Randolph Hale, IV, Thomas Michael Hale, Leslie Suzzanne Hale Hubbard, Mark Alan Hale, Nancy Ann Hale Riley, Edward Patterson Riley, III, Elizabeth Anne Riley Boswell, Jack McKee Hale and Marjorie Hale Ellmore, Jayne Hale Armstrong, Jeffrey Paul Ellmore, Polly Lynn Ellmore, Philip Benjamin Ellmore and Leigh Erin Hubbard, Amber Rae Hale, McClain Monroe Hubbard, Lauren Dawn Hale and Jennifer Granger, Minors and as representatives of all unborn great-great grandchildren of W.R. Hale, Deceased, Of Whom William Randolph Hale, III is, Appellant, and Marjorie Hale Ellmore, John Hale Granger, Jack McKee Hale and Nancy Ann Hale Riley are also, Respondents. Appeal of William Randolph HALE, III. . Heard |
W.R. Hale, III, Greenville, pro se.
William E. Walsh, Spartanburg, James R. Gilreath, W. Lindsey Smith, E.P. Riley, Jr., W.H. Arnold and Ben G. Leaphart, Greenville, and George F. Townes, Pickens, for respondents.
Appellant, William Randolph Hale, III, appeals from an order of the Master-In-Equity for Greenville County accepting a bid to purchase a tract of land. Mr. Hale owned an interest in the land as a beneficiary of a trust. We affirm.
This matter was initially before this court in the case of Bonney v. Granger, 292 S.C. 308, 356 S.E.2d 138 (Ct.App.1987). That case appealed an order of the Master-In-Equity for Greenville County. In that opinion, we approved the general manner in which the master proposed to sell the property and remanded the matter to the master to conduct the sale.
On remand the master advertised the property for sale in a local newspaper on thirteen different occasions. The advertisement provided that the master would receive sealed bids for a period of approximately one month. On September 8, 1987, the bids were opened and, thereafter, a hearing was held to determine if any of the bids would be accepted by the master.
One of the bids, identified as the "Riva Real Estate" bid, had several contingencies. This bid was tentatively accepted by the master with the understanding that the parties would attempt to remove any of these contingencies repugnant to them. Apparently, these contingencies were cleared up to the satisfaction of the master. After the bid was tentatively accepted, the parties were given approximately six months to solicit additional bids but no other bids were presented to the master. By order dated March 18, 1988, the master finally accepted the "Riva Real Estate" bid. The appellant appeals from the acceptance of the bid.
We have reviewed the appellant's brief and would be justified in dismissing his appeal for failure to comply with the Supreme Court Rules. We choose, however, to attempt to determine what appellant's objections are to the master's actions and dispose of those objections on their merits.
The appellant's initial argument appears to be that the master was without authority to accept a bid with contingencies because the Notice of Sale did not expressly provide for such contingencies. The Notice of Sale does not set forth the conditions of sale, but refers to the prior order authorizing the sale. A review of that order shows it does not prohibit the contingencies and, in fact, gives the master sole discretion to accept or reject all bids. We find no abuse of discretion and there is clearly no merit to this argument.
The appellant next appears to argue in paragraphs 2 and 3 of his brief that the...
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