Booker v. City of Detroit
| Decision Date | 23 August 2002 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 219554. |
| Citation | 251 Mich. App. 167,650 N.W.2d 680 |
| Parties | Mae A. BOOKER, personal representative of the estate of Sanders S. Magee, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY OF DETROIT, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
City of Detroit Law Department (by Linda D. Fegins, Principal Assistant Corporation Counsel), Detroit, for the city of Detroit.
Before: SAAD, P.J., and BANDSTRA and SMOLENSKI, JJ.
Defendant appeals as of right from the circuit court's final order entering judgment in favor of plaintiff after a bench trial. The circuit court awarded plaintiff damages of $30,977.12 in this real property case on the basis of plaintiff's claims of promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment. Because we conclude that the circuit court erred as a matter of law in entering judgment in favor of plaintiff on those claims, we reverse.
The decedent, Sanders S. Magee, acquired the subject real property in 1979. Although he collected rental income from the property, the decedent failed to pay over the course of several years either city of Detroit or Wayne County real property taxes owing on the property. On March 20, 1984, the city filed a foreclosure action in the Wayne Circuit Court regarding the delinquent real property taxes the city had assessed against the property for 1979, 1980, and 1981. Although the city personally served the decedent with the summons and complaint, he failed to appear and defend the suit. Accordingly, the city obtained a default foreclosure judgment on May 10, 1985. That judgment provided that absolute title to the real property would vest in the city unless the decedent paid the delinquent city taxes, along with interest and penalties, within sixty days from the date of the judgment.1 When the sixty-day redemption period expired on July 10, 1985, the decedent had not come forward to pay the amount of the judgment. Therefore, the city obtained title to the property on July 10, 1985, subject only to any outstanding state or county tax liens. On September 30, 1985, the decedent tendered and the city accepted a payment of the delinquent city taxes. (Matters regarding this payment will be discussed in §§ II and III and in note 10 of this opinion.)
Simultaneously, Wayne County was also proceeding against the decedent for his failure to pay real property taxes assessed by the county. On the first Tuesday of May 1985, the county tax lien against the property was placed up for bid at the annual county tax sale. Because no individual bids were received, the tax lien was acquired by the state of Michigan. MCL 211.70. At that time, taxpayers enjoyed a lengthy redemption period during which they could pay delinquent county taxes, along with certain penalties and fees, and thereby redeem the tax lien acquired by the state.2 On October 10, 1985, the decedent redeemed the state tax lien by paying the delinquent county taxes at the Wayne County Treasurer's Office. Because he redeemed the lien within the one-year period provided in M.C.L. § 211.74, the state issued a quitclaim deed to the decedent, releasing any and all interest the state had acquired in the property.
The decedent later argued that he obtained fee simple absolute title to the property by way of the state quitclaim deed. However, that was clearly not the case. MCL 211.131c governs the procedure by which a taxpayer can redeem a state tax lien. That statute provides, in pertinent part:
A redemption deed issued under this section does not vest in the grantee named in the deed any title or interest in the property beyond that which he or she would have owned, if title to the property had not vested in this state.... The deed, except if there is redemption as owner by judgment for foreclosure by a municipality collecting its own delinquent taxes and assessments for tax and assessment liens of the municipality as provided in subsection (3), revives all titles, liens, and encumbrances, with their respective priorities, as would have existed if title to the property had not vested in this state .... [MCL 211.131c(4) (emphasis added).]
Thus, the quitclaim deed conveyed by the state to the decedent merely released the state tax lien and returned all parties with legal interest in the real property to the positions they would have been in had the state never acquired a tax lien. Because the city of Detroit had already obtained its default foreclosure judgment for delinquent city taxes, and because the redemption period on the city foreclosure had already expired, the decedent's payment of his delinquent Wayne County taxes extinguished the state tax lien and vested absolute title to the property in the city. MCL 211.131c(4).
In 1989, the decedent collaterally attacked the city's default foreclosure judgment by filing a civil suit alleging claims to quiet title and for inverse condemnation. The circuit court granted the city's motion for summary disposition on the ground that the decedent had failed to redeem the property by paying his delinquent city taxes within the sixty-day period following entry of the default foreclosure judgment. On appeal, this Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Magee v. Detroit, 203 Mich.App. 228, 233-234, 511 N.W.2d 717 (1994). In that opinion, the Magee Court concluded that "a city's sale of tax-forfeitable property [must] be carried out by means that conform as nearly as possible to the provisions set forth" in the General Property Tax Act (GPTA), M.C.L. § 211.1 et seq. Magee, supra at 233
, 511 N.W.2d 717. Further, the Magee Court concluded that Detroit charter provisions regarding the collection and foreclosure of delinquent real property taxes could not be enforced if those provisions were in "direct conflict" with the provisions of the GPTA. Id. On the basis of that premise, the Magee Court concluded that the circuit court had prematurely granted the city's motion for summary disposition, and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the Detroit charter provisions adequately complied with the provisions of the GPTA.
On remand, the circuit court conducted an extensive evidentiary hearing and concluded that the Detroit charter provisions were inconsistent with the provisions of the GPTA. Specifically, the circuit court concluded that the city did not utilize a "petition for sale" and did not pursue a "judicial sale" procedure when attempting to regain title to tax forfeitable properties. Therefore, under this Court's holding in Magee, supra, the circuit court held that the city had acted contrary to state law when it acquired title to the real property. Accordingly, the court permitted plaintiff's claims to proceed to a bench trial.3
The circuit court permitted plaintiff to amend her complaint several times, and the case finally reached trial on claims of inverse condemnation, unjust enrichment, promissory estoppel, and violation of 42 USC 1983, among other claims.4 After a lengthy bench trial, the circuit court found in plaintiff's favor on only two claims: promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment. The circuit court awarded plaintiff $27,800 in damages on the claim of promissory estoppel and $3,177.12 in damages on the claim of unjust enrichment, for a total judgment of $30,977.12. Defendant appeals as of right from entry of that judgment.
First, we address defendant's contention that the circuit court erroneously entered judgment for plaintiff on her claim of promissory estoppel. Defendant argues that plaintiff's proofs were insufficient to support a finding of liability on a theory of promissory estoppel because (1) the alleged statements of city employee Virginia Belser were insufficient to constitute a definite and clear promise, (2) the decedent did not reasonably rely on Belser's alleged statements, and (3) Belser's unauthorized statements could not bind the city. We agree.
In Marrero v. McDonnell Douglas Capital Corp., 200 Mich.App. 438, 442, 505 N.W.2d 275 (1993), this Court set forth the elements of a claim of promissory estoppel:
"(1) a promise; (2) that the promisor should reasonably have expected to induce action of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee; (3) which in fact produced reliance or forbearance of that nature; and (4) in circumstances such that the promise must be enforced if injustice is to be avoided." [Quoting Schipani v. Ford Motor Co., 102 Mich.App. 606, 612-613, 302 N.W.2d 307 (1981).]
In determining whether the requisite promise existed, this Court must objectively examine the words and actions surrounding the transaction in question as well as the nature of the relationship between the parties and the circumstances surrounding their actions. Novak v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 235 Mich.App. 675, 687, 599 N.W.2d 546 (1999). "The sine qua non of promissory estoppel is a promise that is definite and clear." Marrero, supra at 442, 505 N.W.2d 275. Further, a "promise is a manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified manner, made in a way that would justify a promisee in understanding that a commitment had been made." Schmidt v. Bretzlaff, 208 Mich.App. 376, 379, 528 N.W.2d 760 (1995). The doctrine of promissory estoppel must be cautiously applied, and only "where the facts are unquestionable and the wrong to be prevented undoubted." Novak, supra at 687, 599 N.W.2d 546; Marrero, supra at 443, 505 N.W.2d 275.
At trial, Phillip Magee, the decedent's son, testified that he accompanied the decedent on a visit to the city of Detroit offices in July or August 1985, and that he witnessed a conversation between the decedent and Belser, a sales representative in the city's Community & Economic Development Department. According to Magee, Belser told the decedent that if he paid his delinquent real property taxes, "...
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