Booker v. Groat
Decision Date | 16 October 1967 |
Docket Number | 3053,Docket Nos. 3314,No. 1,1 |
Citation | 153 N.W.2d 178,7 Mich.App. 705 |
Parties | Theodore BOOKER, Plaintiff, v. Honorable Gerald L. GROAT, Judge of the Recorder's Court of Detroit, Defendant. PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Julius 'Buddy' WOMACK, Defendant-Appellant |
Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Theodore Booker, in pro. per.
Julius Womack, in pro. per.
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol.Gen., Lansing, William L. Cahalan, Pros.Atty., Wayne County, Samuel J. Torina, Chief Appellate Lawyer, Wayne County, Detroit, for appellee.
Before QUINN, P.J., and GILLIS and McGREGOR, JJ.
Plaintiff Booker filed complaint for writ of superintending control to compel defendant to credit plaintiff with jail time served prior to sentence.1In response to this Court's order to show cause why the writ should not issue, defendant filed answer and brief in support thereof.On leave granted, defendant Womack appealed from the reasons that he was not given similar credit and because the sentencing judge failed to credit defendant with and reduce his statutory maximum sentence by time served on a prior void sentence.2Both cases are considered on the merits.
June 6, 1966, plaintiff Booker was sentenced to a term of 2 to 4 years for larceny in a building.3He spent 8 months in jail prior to sentence.Following pronouncement of sentence, the following appears in the transcript:
June 3, 1964, defendant Womack was sentenced to a term of 8 to 10 years for assault with intent to commit rape.4December 30, 1965, his motion for new trial was granted, and on April 21, 1966, he pleaded guilty to a lesser offense of felonious assault.5On the same day, he was sentenced to a term of 3 years and 112 days to 4 years and the order of sentence stated defendant was to be given credit for 1 year and 7 months served under the previous sentence and for 112 days spent in jail prior to retrial.July 21, 1966, the sentence of April 21, 1966 was amended to show a term of 1 to 4 years and that defendant had been given credit for time served on a void sentence and for time spent in jail prior to retrial.This amendment was made retroactive to April 21, 1966.
Since the sentence involved in each case was subsequent to March 31, 1966, there is no doubt that the provisions of P.A.1965, No. 73, supra, apply.The language of the act is clear and unambiguous and states, '* * * the trial court in imposing sentence Shall specifically grant credit against the sentence for such time served in jail prior to sentencing.'The required specific grant of credit cannot be accomplished by the trial court stating he has considered the time spent in jail in arriving at the sentence pronounced nor by a statement that defendant has been given credit for such time.It must appear from the record that such specific grant of credit was made and the manner in which it was made.For example, the sentence of Booker would comply with the act if the trial judge had fixed the date of commencement of sentence as the date Booker was jailed for the offense which led to that sentence, or if after pronouncing sentence, the trial court had stated defendant was to receive 8 months credit against the sentence.In neither of the cases before us was P.A.1965, No. 73, supra, complied with.
The credit required is against the sentence.Sentence is defined as, 'the judgment formally pronounced by the court or judge upon the defendant after his conviction in a criminal prosecution, awarding the punishment to be inflicted.'(Black's Law Dictionary4th ed.)If the sentence contains a minimum term and a maximum term, the credit required applies to both.
P.A.1965, No. 67, supra, provides, 'the trial court * * * shall in imposing sentence specifically grant or allow the defendant credit against and by reduction of the statutory maximum by the time already served by such defendant on the sentence imposed for the prior erroneous conviction.'The act was in effect at the time Womack was sentenced April 21, 1966.Its language is clear and unambiguous.In order for the record to indicate compliance with the act, the record should show the...
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People v. Crenshaw
...769.34(12). In short, the credit to which defendant is entitled was reflected in the facts that May 20, 2010 was selected as the "date sentence begins" and that he was given credit for the 274 days served before that date. See
Booker v Groat, 7 Mich App 705, 709; 153 NW2d 178 (1967)(stating that a trial court could afford a defendant sentencing credit by giving a defendant credit for time served or by fixing the "date of commencement of sentence"). Although it is true that the trial court... -
People v. Chattaway
...statutory provision is remedial and should be liberally construed to effectuate the salutary purposes sought to be achieved by the legislature in its enactment. People v. Havey (1968), 11 Mich.App. 69, 160 N.W.2d 629. 4 Cf.
Booker v. Judge of Recorder's Court, Supra. The construction of the statute which the people seek is in conflict with the legislative purpose as that construction would chill exercise of the right to trial by an accused person who, like the defendant, facesthe date (the defendant) was jailed for the offense which led to that sentence, or if after pronouncing sentence, the trial court had stated defendant was to receive 8 months credit against the sentence.' Booker v. Judge of Recorder's Court, Supra, 7 Mich.App. p. 709, 153 N.W.2d p. 180. In Michigan, with exceptions not here relevant, 2 a sentence may not be imposed to commence upon completion or expiration of another sentence. In re Carey (1964), 372 Mich. 378, 380, 126 N.W.2d In thestatement by a trial judge while sentencing a convicted person that he took into consideration the time the convicted person spent in jail awaiting trial does not comply with the requirements of this statute. Booker v. Judge of Recorder's Court (1967), 7 Mich.App. 705, 709, 153 N.W.2d 178; People v. Grandahl (1969), 16 Mich.App. 221, 224, 225, 167 N.W.2d 'The required specific grant of credit cannot be accomplished by the trial court stating he has considered the time spent in jail... -
People v. Donkers
...effect given such credit.' GCR 1963, 785.8(3) requires the trial court at the sentencing to state 'any credit for time served to which the defendant may be entitled'. As to this credit, the court in
Booker v. Judge of Recorder's Court, 7 Mich.App. 705, 709, 153 N.W.2d 178, 180 (1967), 'The required specific grant of credit cannot be accomplished by the trial court stating he has considered the time spent in jail in arriving at the sentence pronounced nor by a statement that defendantarriving at the sentence pronounced nor by a statement that defendant has been given credit for such time. It must appear from the record that such specific grant of credit was made and the manner in which it was made.' Under Booker v. Judge of Recorder's Court, supra, it is apparent the trial court in the instant case failed to comply with the mandate of GCR 1963, 785.8(3). It is not sufficient to 'in effect' give credit by stating the minimum sentence. The trial court must specifically... -
People v. Grandahl
...the record that a specific grant of credit was made and the manner in which it was made. In the cited case we set aside the sentence and remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing pursuant to the provisions of the statute (
p. 709, 153 N.W.2d p. 180): 'The required specific grant of credit cannot be accomplished by the trial court stating he has considered the time spent in jail in arriving at the sentence pronounced nor by a statement that defendant has been given creditthe time you had spent in the Wayne county jail awaiting disposition of your matter when it imposed the minimum sentence that it did.' Such a statement does not comply with the requirements of the statute. In Booker v. Recorder's Judge (1967), 7 Mich.App. 705, 153 N.W.2d 178, our Court held that it must appear from the record that a specific grant of credit was made and the manner in which it was made. In the cited case we set aside the sentence and remanded the case to the trial court...