Bookman v. United States, 192-70.

• Decision Date: 21 January 1972
• Docket Number: No. 192-70.,192-70.
• Citation: 197 Ct. Cl. 108,453 F.2d 1263
• Parties: Herbert BOOKMAN et al. v. The UNITED STATES.
• Court: U.S. Claims Court

197 Ct. Cl. 108, 453 F.2d 1263 (1972)

Herbert BOOKMAN et al. v. The UNITED STATES.

No. 192-70.

United States Court of Claims.

January 21, 1972.

Edwin J. McDermott, Philadelphia, Pa., attorney of record, for plaintiffs.

Edward M. Jerum, Washington, D.C., with whom was Asst. Atty. Gen. L. Patrick Gray, III, for defendant. Joseph F. DiStefano, Washington, D.C., of counsel.

Before COWEN, Chief Judge, LARAMORE, Judge, DURFEE, Senior Judge, and DAVIS, COLLINS, SKELTON and NICHOLS, Judges.

ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION AND PLAINTIFFS' CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

DURFEE, Senior Judge.

Plaintiffs were employed as Supervisory Quality Control Specialists, GS-1903-13, at Defense Personnel Support Center, Defense Supply Agency, Philadelphia, Pa. During their course of employment, plaintiffs duly requested that their positions be upgraded to the GS-14 level. On November 13, 1969, the Director, Office of Civilian Personnel, Defense Supply Agency, issued a written denial of plaintiffs' request. Plaintiffs appealed this decision to the U.S. Civil Service Commission, Philadelphia Region (hereinafter Commission). After consideration of all pertinent information supplied by plaintiffs and the Defense Supply Center, the Commission determined on February 6, 1970, that the proper classification for plaintiffs' positions was at the level of GS-14. Thus, plaintiffs' appeal was sustained.

On February 20, 1970, the Commission received a written request from the Defense Supply Agency, Headquarters, to reconsider its decision. The agency stated it would present full documentation of additional material facts not previously presented, nor considered by the Commission. Upon further examination and reconsideration of its February 6 decision, the Commission issued an amended decision on May 28, 1970, reversing its original decision to upgrade plaintiffs' positions from GS-13 to GS-14.¹

On June 11, 1970, plaintiffs filed the instant petition alleging that the Commission's first decision of February 6 was final and binding on all administrative, certifying, payroll, disbursing and accounting officials of the Government. Plaintiffs' prayer is for back-pay reflecting the difference between the base pay of a grade GS-13 and GS-14 from Feb. 6, 1970 to date of judgment.

The parties, by their briefs and oral argument, have framed two issues for our consideration: (1) whether the Commission had the power to reconsider its original decision of Feb. 6; and (2) if reconsideration was proper, whether the Commission's revised decision of Feb. 20 was arbitrary, capricious or unsupported by substantial evidence.

We must first address the question whether the Commission's reconsideration of its initial decision of Feb. 6 was proper.² Plaintiffs' contention that the Feb. 6 decision was final, conclusive and binding, is based on 5 C.F.R. § 511.610 (1971) which states:

An appeal decision made by the Commission is final. There is no further right to appeal. The appeal decision shall constitute a certificate which is mandatory and binding on all administrative, certifying, payroll, disbursing, and accounting officials of the Government.

Plaintiffs contend further that the Commission's reconsideration pursuant to agency request is precluded by 5 C.F.R. § 511.611 (1971) which charges the Commission's Bureau of Inspections with the discretionary authority to reopen and reconsider any appeal decision made by a Commission's regional office. Defendant, on the other hand, argues that it is the inherent right of every tribunal to reconsider its own decision within a reasonably short period of time, absent legislation to the contrary.

Any inquiry into the reconsideration powers of an administrative agency must take full cognizance of the broad policy considerations succinctly defined by Mr. Chief Justice Warren in Civil Aeronautics Board v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 367 U.S. 316, 321, 81 S.Ct. 1611, 1617, 6 L.Ed. 2d 869 (1961):

Whenever a question concerning administrative, or judicial, reconsideration arises, two opposing policies immediately demand recognition: the desirability of finality, on the one hand, and the public interest in reaching what ultimately, appears to be the right result on the other.

It is often the case that reconsideration of a prior decision, within a reasonable period of time, is absolutely essential to the even administration of justice. For example, it may be imperative for the tribunal to consider new developments or newly discovered evidence in order to facilitate the orderly and just resolution of conflict. More frequently, reconsideration is often the sole means of correcting errors of procedure or substance. There may also be instances when unmistakable shifts in our basic judgments about law or policy necessitate the revision or amendment of previously established rules of conduct. See generally 2 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 18.09 (1958).

The importance of the right of reconsideration is dependent upon the importance of the challenged decision. That is to say, the public's interest in a "right result" is consonant with the expanding application of the decision either in terms of the number of individuals directly or presently affected, or its future precedent value.

In those instances where finality is desirable and the decision of the tribunal is to be given final and irrevocable effect, careful account must be taken of the rights of the individual and the class he represents, and the tribunals procedures must be drawn with the care, precision and procedural safeguards most commonly associated with courts of justice. Haas v. United States, 67 Ct.Cl. 437, 444 (1929); Cf. Spencer v. United States, 121 Ct.Cl. 558, 102 F.Supp. 774, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 828, 73 S.Ct. 29, 97 L.Ed. 644 (1952).

For these reasons, it is the general rule that "every tribunal, judicial or administrative, has some power to correct its own errors or otherwise appropriately to modify its judgment, decree, or order." 2 Davis, supra, at 606.

Congressional recognition of this principle has led to the establishment of a number of statutes which specifically grant the administrative agency the power to reconsider its own decisions, on its own initiative, as long as proper notice is given and the right is exercised within a reasonable time period. See, e. g., 15 U.S.C. § 717r(a) (1970) (Federal Power Commission); 49 U.S.C. § 17(5) (1970) (Interstate Commerce Commission); 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1970) (Federal Trade Commission); 29 U.S.C. § 160(d) (1970) (National Labor Relations Board).

In past years, we have been called upon to consider this important question of reconsideration in situations where there are no statutory or administrative guidelines. Quite consistently, we have held that absent contrary legislative intent or other affirmative evidence, this court will sustain the reconsidered decision of an agency, as long as the administrative action is conducted within a short and reasonable time period. Biddle v. United States, 186 Ct.Cl. 87 (1968); Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs Reservation v. United States, 177 Ct.Cl. 184 (1966); Dayley v. United States, 169 Ct.Cl. 305 (1965).

Although none of the above cited decisions deal specifically with the Civil Service Commission, we find their common principle to be entirely consistent and applicable to the facts of the instant suit. Consequently, with respect to plaintiffs' claim herein, we hold that the Commission's Philadelphia Regional Office possessed and properly exercised its inherent power to reconsider its own decision within a reasonable time period.

Having held that reconsideration was proper under the circumstances, it remains to evaluate plaintiffs' contention that the Commission's amended decision was arbitrary, capricious and not supported by substantial evidence. To do this, we must first analyze the process by which plaintiffs' grades were determined. Inasmuch as plaintiffs were organizationally classified as, and performed the functions of, full Assistant Chiefs, normal classification practice dictated that their positions be evaluated in relation to that of their respective Branch Chief.³

In other words, the duties and responsibilities of the Branch Chief were appraised, a grade was assigned, and plaintiffs, as full assistants, were assigned a grade one level lower than that of the Chief. The Branch Chiefs' positions were second-level supervisory positions with managerial responsibilities. Accordingly, they were evaluable for grade level determination by the criteria in the Commission's Supervisory Grade Evaluation Guide, Part II.

The Guide delineates four separate factors which are to be considered in determining the correct grade classification. We are concerned herein only with the first three.⁴ Factor I, entitled "Base level of work supervised," measures the difficulty and worth of the work performed by those branch employees supervised by the Chief and his assistants. Plaintiffs do not contest the Commission's determination that the base level of the work supervised in both branches of the Technical Operations Division was GS-12.

Factor II is entitled, "Nature and extent of supervisory responsibility." This is an inquiry into the Chief's involvement in directing subordinate workers, and in dealing with personnel management matters affecting such workers. Under this factor, two degrees of responsibility are defined—Degree B and Degree A. Once again, plaintiffs do not contest the Commission's determination that Degree A, the higher of the two possible designations, should be assigned to this factor with respect to the Branch Chiefs. The Guide provides for a tentative grade to be assigned for Degree A positions of two levels above the base level of the work supervised. Thus, the Chief was graded for Factors I and II as GS-14.

The controversy centers around the Commission's evaluation of Factor III, which is entitled, "Managerial aspects." According to the Guide, Factor...