Boone v. Stacy
Decision Date | 18 October 1984 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 84-231-N. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
Parties | William BOONE, Jr., Petitioner, v. Superintendent E. STACY, Respondent. |
William Boone, Jr., pro se.
Robert Q. Harris, Asst. Atty. Gen., Commonwealth of Virginia, Richmond, Va., for respondent.
The petitioner, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se, brings this writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner was convicted of grand larceny (Va.Code § 18.2-95 (1982)) and possession of burglarious tools (Va.Code § 18.2-94 and 10 (1982) by the Norfolk Circuit Court in a bench trial. On March 18, 1983, the court imposed a three-year sentence on each conviction, with the burglary tool sentence suspended for six years conditioned upon good behavior. The petitioner raised the claim presented herein previously in a direct petition for appeal heard by the Supreme Court of Virginia. That court refused the petition for appeal on October 18, 1983, finding no reversible error. Therefore, the petitioner has exhausted his available state remedies as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c).
The conviction is based on insufficient evidence because the value of the stolen goods, an essential element of grand larceny, was not established.
Petitioner was convicted of grand larceny for the theft of five dresses from a Smith & Welton department store located in a Norfolk shopping mall. Mrs. Pawl, a security guard at a different store in the mall, testified at the trial that she first observed the petitioner and others in the Smith & Welton's store beside a dress rack. She was passing the store while on her lunch hour at the time. She recognized one of the co-defendants from a previous shoplifting arrest and recognized the petitioner from prior occasions. (Tr. p. 9). The security guard qualified as an expert on security matters and said that from 30 feet she observed the petitioner and others placing dresses in a "booster box" placed between the petitioner's legs. (Tr. p. 9). A "booster box" is a special box used by professional shoplifters to conceal merchandise from detection. (Tr. p. 17). Soon thereafter the petitioner and others were apprehended in a car driven by the petitioner. The dresses and the booster box were found in the car under the driver's seat, with the store price tags still attached to the dresses. (Tr. p. 28).
The sole issue raised here is whether the prosecution proved the value of the dresses was "$200 or more" to support the grand larceny conviction under Va.Code § 18.2-95 which reads in part:
(Emphasis added). The burden is upon the Commonwealth to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the value of the goods stolen equals or exceeds the statutory amount fixing the grade of the offense. Knight v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 85, 300 S.E.2d 600 (1983); Wright v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 132, 139, 82 S.E.2d 603, 607 (1954).
With respect to a habeas corpus petition, the current standard for assessing sufficiency of the evidence to withstand due process scrutiny is set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) rehearing denied, 444 U.S. 890, 100 S.Ct. 195, 62 L.Ed.2d 126 (1979). In Jackson, the United States Supreme Court established the rule that to withstand constitutional scrutiny, a state court conviction must be based on evidence sufficient to justify a rational trier of fact in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court stated that "the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 319, 99 S.Ct. at 2789. (Emphasis in original.) An applicant is entitled to relief on the ground of insufficient evidence to convict only if it is found that "upon the record evidence adduced at trial no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 324, 99 S.Ct. at 2791-92.
The petitioner asserts that the tagged selling price of the dresses is not the test of market value nor can it be the basis for testimony, but rather that fair market value must be established in some other fashion.
At trial, the Commonwealth called Mr. John Maroulis, assistant manager of this branch of Smith & Welton, a retail department store, to establish among other things the "value" of the five stolen dresses, which still had attached the Smith & Welton price tags. Mr. Maroulis testified that the cumulative tagged selling price of the five dresses was $424.00 and the cost of the dresses was $211.00 (Trial at Norfolk Circuit Court, p. 78). However, the petitioner's attorney objected to the statement as to "cost" as hearsay since Mr. Maroulis had no experience as a buyer of clothing, or direct knowledge of the cost of the dresses (Tr. pp. 78 and 81), and this colloquy ensued:
(Tr. p. 82) (emphasis added). However, on cross-examination by the petitioner's attorney as to "cost" and how Smith & Welton arrived at its retail prices, Mr. Maroulis stated:
They usually go by the cost of the dress, what they paid for the dress, and normally there is a hundred percent markup on the dress. Sometimes there may be a couple of dollars more, but that's the normal process.
(Tr. p. 87). The petitioner's attorney continued to maintain that fair market value had not been established for the dresses because the testimony was hearsay and the following dialogue took place on this issue:
Tr. pp. 88-91. Thus, the petitioner's attorney maintained that the retail price tags were insufficient evidence of value and that Mr. Maroulis was unqualified to testify as to routine mark-up procedures or value based on his store's price tags.
Market value, fairly determined, may be measured in various ways,...
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