Boone v. State, 4938
Decision Date | 14 September 1959 |
Docket Number | No. 4938,4938 |
Citation | 230 Ark. 821,327 S.W.2d 87 |
Parties | Rogers BOONE, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee. |
Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
W. Harold Flowers, Pine Bluff, for appellant.
Bruce Bennett, Atty. Gen., by Thorp Thomas, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
On an information charging the crime of murder in the first degree, appellant, Rogers Boone, a Negro, was found guilty of the murder of M. R. Hamm, a white man 76 years of age, and his punishment fixed at death. This appeal followed.
For reversal appellant relies on the following points:
Appellant, in apt time, filed motion to quash the information alleging that Amendment 21 of the Arkansas Constitution violated the provisions of Amendment Fourteen of the Constitution of the United States. This identical question has been settled against appellant's contention by this court in Washington v. State, 213 Ark. 218, 210 S.W.2d 307, 308, wherein we said: '* * * appellant claims that prosecuting him by information is violative of his rights under both the State and Federal Constitutions. Amendment 21 of the State Constitution reads: 'That all offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment may be prosecuted either by indictment by a grand jury or information filed by the Prosecuting Attorney.'
Next appellant says that, 'The trial court, in communicating with the jury by entering the jury room without the defendant or his counsel was improper and constitutes reversible error.' We do not agree. The record reflects that while the jury was deliberating on the case, it appeared that some of the jurors were having difficulty in deciding whether appellant should be sentenced to life imprisonment or death and, says appellant, 'Upon being informed of a request for permission to ask the court a question, and upon agreement of counsel for the State and appellant, the court and the reporter went into the jury room', whereupon the following occurred:
'And there followed in concluding the first appearance before the jury in the jury room:
'And, again the court and reporter returned to the jury room to find that the jury was deliberating on the matter of punishment, and here follows the unusual question:
'By Mr. Rowland: The maximum penalty. There is some doubt in a few--at least one person's mind--which would be worse, life or death.
'And there followed the question:
'And, now we come to the report of the return of the court for the last jury room conference, by agreement of counsel for the State and the defendant, which ended as the point of no return:
It thus appears undisputed that appellant agreed to the court's entering the jury room, as indicated, and he points to no evidence in the record tending to show that anything was said or done prejudicial to the rights of appellant. Our statute, 43-2139 Ark.Stats. (1947), on this question provides: Here the trial judge, after conferring with both counsel for the State and defendant and with their approval, went into the jury room with the court reporter and instructed the jury, as indicated. He then returned to the court room and with the assistance and agreement of both counsel for appellant and counsel for the State, drafted additional instructions, returned to the jury room and read it to them. We are convinced, that on the record here, appellant, by agreeing to the actions of the court, waived his right to challenge such actions unless such acts were shown to be so harmful or prejudicial to his rights as to constitute error and, as indicated, we hold, in the circumstances, that the court did nothing prejudicial. What we said in Aydelotte v. State, 177 Ark. 595, 281 S.W. 369, 372, in a somewhat similar situation, applies with equal force here. There this court said: '* * * The most serious question in this case is whether or not the court erred in telling the foreman of the jury in the hall of the courthouse, apart from his fellows, in answer to a question propounded to the judge by the foreman, that the jury could give less than one year for the lowest degree of homicide according to the instruction twice given to the jury. If this were all the record showed, it would undoubtedly be reversible error, because contrary to Sec. 3192, C. & M. Digest, which...
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