Flanagan v. State
| Decision Date | 30 November 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. CR 06-88.,CR 06-88. |
| Citation | 243 S.W.3d 866,368 Ark. 143 |
| Parties | Judy Ann FLANAGAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee. |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Teri Chambers, Arkansas Public Defender Comm'n, Little Rock, AR, for appellant.
Mike Beebe, Att'y Gen., by: Karen Virginia Wallace, Ass't Att'y Gen., Little Rock, AR, for appellee.
A Craighead County jury convicted appellant Judy Flanagan of the capital murder of Dennis Coats, and she was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment without parole. On appeal, she argues that the circuit court erred by refusing to suppress statements she made to law-enforcement officers; by refusing to allow her to call Beverly Coats, the victim's wife, as a witness; by allowing the jury to replay her recorded statements during deliberations, and by refusing to grant a mistrial based on cumulative error. As this is a criminal appeal in which a term of life imprisonment has been imposed, our jurisdiction is pursuant to Ark. Sup.Ct. R. 1— 2(a)(2). We find no error and, accordingly, we affirm.
On the morning of June 12, 2004, Flanagan and Beverly Coats went to the home of Officer Chris Kelems to report that Dennis Coats, Beverly's husband, was missing. Flanagan informed Kelems that she had last seen Dennis the previous evening as he got into a light-colored van with occupants unknown to her. Flanagan said that, at the time, Dennis had been giving her a ride home in his truck, and when he got into the van, he asked Flanagan to drive his truck back home to his "old lady." At 11:06 the same morning, Officer Johnny Williams received a dispatch and responded to Hatchie Coon Island, otherwise known as the sunken lands, in reference to a report of a body found. Upon his arrival, Williams observed Flanagan and Christy Wood at the crime scene standing near Wood's green van. Williams told Flanagan and Wood to get into Wood's van and proceed behind him to a different area. Williams then instructed Game and Fish. Officer Butch Wilkins to "keep an eye on them and not let them go anywhere."
Officer John Varner arrived at the scene at 12:08 p.m. Shortly after his arrival, he spoke to Flanagan and asked her to accompany him to the Caraway Police Department. Once at the police station, Varner and Sheriff Jack McCann conducted a taped interview, in which Flanagan described the events of the previous evening. Flanagan was not advised of her Miranda rights prior to making the statement. Later that day, Flanagan gave another statement and, again, she was not Mirandized.
On August 24, Dale Roach, Flanagan's brother, made contact with Officer Justin Rolland to advise that Flanagan wanted to speak with him. Rolland and Officer Dwaine Malone traveled to the home of Flanagan's parents in Poinsett County. Flanagan and Rolland sat in Rolland's vehicle and spoke for a period of time, during which Flanagan stated that she was starting to remember things about the homicide. According to Rolland, Flanagan wanted to go elsewhere to talk, and she chose Lake City among the several options he gave her. At Lake City, Rolland took an audio tape-recorded statement from Flanagan at 12:15 a.m. on August 25. Flanagan was advised of her Miranda rights at the beginning of the tape. In that statement, Flanagan said that Beverly coats killed Dennis, and Flanagan claimed that she "raked" a knife across Dennis's neck, g. Beverly's direction, after he was dead. After this statement, Rolland arrested Flanagan for Dennis Coats's murder, and she was transported to the jail in Jonesboro by Sheriff McCann and Officer Malone.
At approximately 8:30-9:00 a.m. on August 25, in a videotaped statement, Flanagan admitted" that she alone stabbed Dennis and then Beverly helped her move the body out of Dennis's truck. Flanagan was charged with capital murder on October 4, 2004.
Prior to trial, Flanagan filed a motion to suppress the statements she had made to police. The following statements are at issue:
1. Flanagan's spontaneous and voluntary remarks to Officer Wilkins at the scene where the body was found on June 12, 2004 (not specifically discussed, on appeal);
2. Her audio tape-recorded statement to Sheriff McCann and Officer Varner, June 12, 2004, at 1:15 p.m.;
3. Her, statement to Officers Varner and Thomas, June 12, 2004, at 8:00 P.m.;
4. Her statement to Officers Elliot and Thomas during her polygraph test on June 14, 2004 (not specifically discussed on appeal);
5. Her statement to Officer Varner immediately after her polygraph test (not specifically discussed on appeal);
6. Her statement to Officer Rolland, August 24, 2004, at her residence;
7. Her audio tape-recorded statement to Officer Rolland, August 25, 2004, 12:15 a.m., at Lake City;
8. Her spontaneous and voluntary statement to Sheriff McCann, August 25, 2004, during transport, that she did not murder Dennis Coats and that he was already dead when she cut his throat (not specifically discussed on appeal);
9. Her videotaped statement to Officer Rolland, August 25, 2004, at the Craighead County jail; and
10. Statements she made over "the telephone in the presence of Officer Metcalf, September 10, 2004 (not specifically discussed on appeal).1
Flanagan begins by arguing that all statements made at the police station on June 12, 2004, and all statements made subsequently, should suppressed because she was unlawfully seized and unreasonably detained in violation of the Fourth Amendment and Ark. R.Crim. P. 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 3.1, and 3.5. Flanagan states she was unreasonably seized when Officer Williams asked her to remain at the crime scene. Further, Flanagan states that, even if she was not immediately seized by Officer Williams, she was certainly seized by Officer Wilkins of the Game and Fish Commission when he denied her request to leave. Wilkins, who had been on the scene directing traffic, testified that Flanagan asked him if she could leave to go tell Beverly Coats that they had found her husband's body. He stated that he told her she could not leave because she was at the scene when the officers first arrived and she would need to stay to talk to investigators. Flanagan contends that she was seized because a reasonable person would not believe she was free to leave. In United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980), the Supreme Court stated:
We adhere to the view that a person is "seized" only when, by means of physical force or a show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained. Only when such restraint is imposed is there any foundation whatever for invoking constitutional safeguards. The purpose of the Fourth Amendment is not to eliminate all contact between the police and the citizenry, but "to prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy and personal security of individuals." United. States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 3081, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976). As long as the person to whom questions are put remains free to disregard the questions and walk away, there has been no intrusion upon that person's liberty or privacy as would under the Constitution require some particularized and objective justification.
....
We conclude that a person has been "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.
We first note that we agree with the State's contention that Flanagan was not seized or unreasonably detained simply because officers who initially arrived and found her, and Christy Wood on the scene asked them to move the van back from the crime scene and stay and talk to investigators. Officer Williams, the first to arrive at the scene, testified that he asked Flanagan to stay, and that she agreed. However, when Flanagan asked Wilkins if she could leave and was told that she could not, it was reasonable for her to believe that she was not free to go. At that point, Flanagan was "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Still, while we agree that Flanagan was seized when she was told she could not leave, we do not believe that the seizure was unreasonable such that it requires suppression of her statements. The circuit court found that "[i]n light of the remoteness of the crime scene and the circumstances existing at the time, requesting the defendant to remain at the crime scene was reasonable." Further, Flanagan's statements at the crime scene were not incriminating. According to Wilkins, Flanagan said that she had last seen the victim the night before when he got into a van with some other people to go and drink beer.
Next, Flanagan turns to statements she made after officers requested that she go to the police station. She states that the fact that she complied at the time when Officer Varner requested that she go to the police station does not render these encounters voluntary. Further, she argues that Varner had a duty to make clear that she was not obligated to go to the police station. Pursuant to Rule 2.3 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure:
If a law enforcement officer acting pursuant to this rule requests any person to come to or remain at the police station ... he shall take such steps as are reasonable to make clear that there is no legal obligation to comply with such a request.
The rule "does not require an explicit statement that one is not required to accompany the police; rather, the police only need to take such steps as are `reasonable to make clear that there is no legal obligation to comply' with the request to come to, the police station." Shields v. State, 348 Ark. 7, 14, 70 S.W.3d 392, 395 (2002). The circuit court found that there was no indication that upon Flanagan's refusal of Varner's request, compliance would be...
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