Booth v. State
| Decision Date | 18 August 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. A-5126,A-5126 |
| Citation | 903 P.2d 1079 |
| Parties | Lester W. BOOTH, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee. |
| Court | Alaska Court of Appeals |
Barbara E. Kissner, Assistant Public Defender, Ketchikan, and John B. Salemi, Public Defender, Anchorage, for appellant.
Stephen R. West, Assistant District Attorney, Ketchikan, and Bruce M. Bothelo, Attorney General, Juneau, for appellee.
Before BRYNER, C.J., and COATS and MANNHEIMER, JJ.
On January 22, 1993, on the Annette Islands Reserve, Lester W. Booth, Jr., kicked Debbie Booth in the stomach and the face. He was subsequently charged with the offense of fourth-degree assault under the laws of the State of Alaska, AS 11.41.230(a). Simultaneously, Booth was charged with the offenses of assault, battery, and threat or intimidation under the laws of the Metlakatla Indian Community, Ordinance No. 86-735a, §§ 5, 7, & 19.
On January 25th, Booth appeared in the Metlakatla court and pleaded not guilty to the three Metlakatla charges. Later that same day, Booth appeared in the Alaska district court in Ketchikan and pleaded no contest to the state charge. However, when District Court Judge George L. Gucker learned that there was also a Metlakatla prosecution pending against Booth, he deferred Booth's sentencing and directed the prosecutor to find out about the Metlakatla charges. While the state prosecution was on hold, Booth pleaded guilty to the Metlakatla criminal charges. The Metlakatla court fined him a total of $710 with $310 suspended ($400 to pay).
On April 28, 1993, Booth again appeared in the Ketchikan district court, this time represented by an attorney. Booth asked the district court to dismiss the fourth-degree assault charge. He argued that the State of Alaska did not have jurisdiction over criminal offenses occurring on the Annette Islands Reserve. In the alternative, Booth argued that his conviction in the Metlakatla court barred any continued prosecution under state law for the same conduct.
A few weeks later, Booth asked the district court to allow him to withdraw his no contest plea to the state charge. Judge Gucker granted Booth's request to withdraw his plea, and he scheduled a hearing on Booth's motion to dismiss. Following this hearing, Judge Gucker denied Booth's motion. Booth then pleaded no contest to the charge of fourth-degree assault, reserving the right to appeal his conviction on the ground that the State was legally barred from prosecuting him--either because the State lacked jurisdiction over the offense, or because the Metlakatla court had already entered judgement against Booth. See Cooksey v. State, 524 P.2d 1251, 1255-57 (Alaska 1974).
As explained in more detail below, we hold that the State of Alaska had jurisdiction to prosecute Booth for his assault on his wife, but we also hold that AS 12.20.010 barred the State from prosecuting Booth after judgement was entered against him by the Metlakatla court.
Does the State of Alaska Have Jurisdiction Over Crimes Committed in the Annette Islands Reserve?
In 1887, following a dispute with the government of British Columbia, about eight hundred Indians migrated to Alaska, where they established the Metlakatla Community. In 1891, Congress set aside the Annette Islands as a reserve for the Metlakatlans. 1 See Metlakatla Indian Community, Annette Islands Reserve v. Egan, 369 U.S. 45, 48-54, 82 S.Ct. 552, 556-59, 7 L.Ed.2d 562, 566-69 (1962); Atkinson v. Haldane, 569 P.2d 151, 153-56 (Alaska 1977). In 1915, the Secretary of the Interior authorized the Metlakatla Community to pass local ordinances to govern itself; however, the Secretary "subjected self-government of Metlakatla not only to federal oversight but to territorial laws as well". Metlakatla Indian Community, 369 U.S. at 54, 82 S.Ct. at 558-59, 7 L.Ed.2d at 569. In 1944, the Secretary approved a constitution and by-laws drafted by the Metlakatla Indian Community, establishing a local government that includes a judiciary. See Metlakatla Indian Community Ordinance No. 653, establishing a magistrate's court and setting procedures for the trial of offenses.
The question presented in Booth's case is whether the State of Alaska exercises concurrent jurisdiction over crimes committed within the Annette Islands Reserve. This is a question of federal law, and the answer is given by 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a). The pertinent portion of this federal statute reads:
Each of the States or Territories listed in the following table shall have jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against Indians in the areas of Indian country listed opposite the name of the State or Territory to the same extent that such State or Territory has jurisdiction over offenses committed elsewhere within the State or Territory, and the criminal laws of such State or Territory shall have the same force and effect within such Indian country as they have elsewhere within the State or Territory:
State or Indian Country Affected
Territory of
Alaska ............ All Indian country within the State, except
that on Annette Islands, the Metlakatla
Indian Community may exercise jurisdiction
over offenses committed by Indians in the
same manner in which such jurisdiction may
be exercised by Indian tribes in Indian
country over which State jurisdiction has
not been extended.
The crucial language of this statute, for purposes of Booth's appeal, is the exception clause pertaining to the Metlakatla Community. The federal statute states that the Metlakatla Community "may exercise jurisdiction over offenses committed by Indians in the same manner [as] such jurisdiction [is] exercised by Indian tribes in Indian country over which State jurisdiction has not been extended". Booth contends that this language means that the Metlakatla Community exercises sole jurisdiction over crimes committed by Indians within the Annette Islands Reserve. However, both the language of the statute itself and its legislative history support the conclusion that the Metlakatla Community and the State of Alaska exercise concurrent jurisdiction over crimes committed by Indians within the Annette Islands Reserve.
The federal statute begins by giving the State of Alaska jurisdiction over offenses committed in "all Indian country within the State", and then provides the exception for the Metlakatla Community. The language of the exception does not explicitly give the Metlakatla Community exclusive jurisdiction over such offenses; rather, the statutory language only empowers the Metlakatlans to exercise jurisdiction. While the statute authorizes the Metlakatlans to exercise criminal jurisdiction "in the same manner" as other Indian tribes who have exclusive jurisdiction within their reservations, this is not necessarily the same as a grant of exclusive jurisdiction. It can also mean that the Metlakatlans have undiminished concurrent jurisdiction over offenses committed by Indians within the Reserve. Compare Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 67-71, 82 S.Ct. 562, 566-69, 7 L.Ed.2d 573, 579-81 (1962), in which the United States Supreme Court construed language in the Alaska Statehood Act directing that the federal government should retain "absolute jurisdiction and control" over federally owned lands within Alaska. The Supreme Court interpreted this provision of the Statehood Act to mean that the federal government's control over federal lands within Alaska would remain "undiminished" (but concurrent) rather than "exclusive".
We note that the wording of the Metlakatla exception does not follow the pattern Congress used when it created enclaves of exclusive Indian jurisdiction in other states. See, for example, the listings in 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) for Minnesota ("All Indian country within the State, except the Red Lake Reservation") and for Oregon ("All Indian country within the State, except the Warm Springs Reservation"). This difference in the wording of the Metlakatla exception suggests that Congress intended for the Metlakatla Community's jurisdiction to be concurrent with the State of Alaska's jurisdiction rather than exclusive.
Congress did not enact the disputed language involving the Metlakatla Community until 1970; the prior version of the Alaska paragraph of the statute simply gave the Territory of Alaska criminal jurisdiction over "[a]ll Indian country within the Territory". Public Law No. 85-615, § 1, 72 Stat. 545 (1958). One Alaska commentator describes the rationale of the 1970 amendment as follows:
The Metlakatla residents belatedly learned that [under the 1958 version of the statute] they no longer retained previously exercised criminal jurisdiction over minor offenses. Because no state troopers or magistrates worked in Metlakatla, inadequate law enforcement on the reservation resulted under P[ublic] L[aw] 280. Consequently, in 1970, Congress passed an exception to PL 280's criminal jurisdictional grant that conferred concurrent criminal jurisdiction on the Metlakatla Community.
Susanne Di Pietro, Tribal Court Jurisdiction and Public Law 280: What Role for Tribal Courts in Alaska?, 10 Alaska Law Rev. 335, 354 n. 112 (1993) (citations omitted).
This construction of the statute is amply supported by the statute's legislative history. The House of Representatives Report, the Interior Department Report, the Justice Department Report, and statements from Representatives Donohue and Pollock all repeatedly and specifically state that, under the 1970 amendment, the Metlakatla Community would be granted "concurrent" criminal jurisdiction with the State of Alaska. In particular, the House Report states:
The language of the bill makes a specific reference to the exercise of similar jurisdiction under the law now applicable in the case of other Indian tribes. It would be provided that the [Metlakatla] community may exercise jurisdiction over offenses committed by Indians "in the same manner" in...
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