Boothe v. State

Decision Date18 March 2020
Docket NumberNo. CR-19-482,CR-19-482
Citation2020 Ark. App. 193,598 S.W.3d 546
Parties Spencer Adam BOOTHE, Appellant v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee
CourtArkansas Court of Appeals

Robinson & Zakrzewski, P.A., by: Luke Zakrzewski, for appellant.

Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: David L. Eanes, Jr., Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.

PHILLIP T. WHITEAKER, Judge

Spencer Adam Boothe appeals a sentencing order entered by the Jefferson County Circuit Court. He argues that the court erred in approving the prosecutor’s short report of circumstances that listed "Jury Sentence" as an aggravating factor in his sentence. Because Boothe has failed to demonstrate any prejudice from the circuit court’s action, we affirm.

In October 2018, a Jefferson County jury found Boothe guilty of one count of delivery of methamphetamine. The jury recommended a fifteen-year sentence as a habitual offender,1 which the court accepted.

The court entered a sentencing order reflecting the fifteen-year sentence on November 7, 2018. As required by statute,2 the office of the prosecuting attorney completed and attached to the sentencing order a "prosecutor’s short report of circumstances," which did not list any mitigating factors but noted one aggravating factor—"Jury Sentence." The circuit court approved the short report.

For his sole point on appeal, Boothe argues that the circuit court committed reversible error by approving the prosecutor’s short report as written. More specifically, Boothe argues that the court should not have penalized him for exercising his right to a jury trial and asserts that he will be further prejudiced by its inclusion because the report could potentially be used to his detriment by the Arkansas Parole Board. We find no error.

Boothe was convicted of delivery of methamphetamine, a Class C felony. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-64-422(b)(1) (Repl. 2016). He was sentenced as a habitual offender. As a habitual offender having committed a Class C felony, Boothe could have been sentenced to an extended term of imprisonment of not less than three years nor more than twenty years. See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-501(a)(2)(D). He received a fifteen-year sentence. Thus, his actual term of imprisonment is within the statutory range. A defendant who has received a sentence within the statutory range short of the maximum sentence cannot show prejudice from the sentence itself. Buckley v. State , 349 Ark. 53, 76 S.W.3d 825 (2002). Because his sentence was within the statutory range, Booth has failed to demonstrate any prejudice from the imposition of the fifteen-year sentence.

Despite this, Boothe argues that by listing "Jury Sentence" as an aggravating factor on the sentencing order he was penalized for exercising his constitutional right to a trial by jury. Taking it one step further, he then concludes that the trial court erred by approving a report that penalizes the exercise of a constitutional right. Boothe fails to cite any proof in the record that the circuit court improperly considered the information contained therein in affixing his sentence. In fact, we see no indication in the record that it was used by the circuit court to increase Boothe’s sentence or that it was used in any other way to his detriment in the sentencing process. The court merely imposed the very sentence recommended by the jury—a sentence within the statutory range. Admittedly, the sentencing order does contain the short...

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2 cases
  • Thomas v. State
    • United States
    • Arkansas Court of Appeals
    • August 26, 2020
    ...a sentence within the statutory range short of the maximum sentence cannot show prejudice from the sentence itself. Boothe v. State , 2020 Ark. App. 193, 598 S.W.3d 546. Aggravated robbery is a Class Y felony with a sentencing range of ten to forty years or life. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-401(a)......
  • Edwards v. Hart
    • United States
    • Arkansas Court of Appeals
    • March 18, 2020
    ... ... property, the will of a nonresident which has been admitted to probate in another appropriate jurisdiction may be admitted to probate in this state without regard to the time limit imposed by this section.(2) However, rights and interests in the real property which, after the death of the ... ...

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