Borden, Inc. v. Brower
Decision Date | 10 October 1973 |
Docket Number | No. 1,1 |
Citation | 284 N.C. 54,199 S.E.2d 414 |
Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Parties | BORDEN, INCORPORATED v. James C. BROWER, t/a Harvest Milling Company. |
H. Wade Yates, Asheboro, for defendant appellant.
LeRoy, Wells, Shaw, Hornthal & Riley by L. P. Hornthal, Jr., Elizabeth City, for plaintiff-appellee.
This appeal poses the sole question: Was defendant's evidence in support of his defenses and counterclaim admissible?
Plaintiff's evidence establishes a prima facie case for an unpaid balance on a promissory note under seal. Plaintiff contends that the material facts set forth in defendant's answer, deposition, and affidavits offered by defendant in opposition to plaintiff's motion for summary judgment were inadmissible in evidence because of the parol evidence rule, and that the trial court properly granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.
Affidavits filed in opposition to a motion for summary judgment 'shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence.' G.S. § 1A--1, Rule 56(e). If the pleadings, affidavits, and deposition offered by defendant do not set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence because of the parol evidence rule, then such evidence was properly stricken, and since there remained no genuine issue as to any material fact, the court correctly rendered summary judgment for plaintiff. Singleton v. Stewart, 280 N.C. 460, 186 S.E.2d 400 (1972); Kessing v. Mortgage Corp., 278 N.C. 523, 180 S.E.2d 823 (1971).
The parol evidence rule in North Carolina was stated by Chief Justice Stacy in Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co. v. Morehead, 209 N.C. 174, 183 S.E. 606 (1936), as follows:
. . .
Chief Justice Stacy then sets out eight exceptions to the rule, citing numerous North Carolina cases for each exception. The third exception is that the parol evidence rule is not violated:
The sixth exception is:
Two excellent law review articles, one by Chadbourn and McCormick entitled 'The Parol Evidence Rule in North Carolina,' 9 N.C.L.Rev. 151 (1931), and a sequel by Dalzell, 'Twenty-five Years of Parol Evidence in North Carolina,' 33 N.C.L.Rev. 420 (1955), examine in depth this rule as applied in North Carolina. Chadbourn and McCormick offer the following as a concise and accurate statement of the rule: 'Any or all parts of a transaction prior to or contemporaneous with a writing intended to record them finally are superseded and made legally ineffective by the writing.' 9 N.C.L.Rev. at 152. Professor Stansbury, who is in accord with this statement of the rule, also notes:
rights and obligations with respect to the particular transaction or the part thereof intended to be covered by it.
2 Stansbury's N.C. Evidence, Brandis Rev. §§ 251--52 (1973).
Although Professor Dalzell in his law review article is somewhat critical of the North Carolina rule as being too liberal, he does state that while some courts emphasize the protection of the written instrument from invasion, the emphasis in North Carolina is rather in the direction of giving the proponent of the oral agreement a chance to prove that it was made if he can, and that by so doing the North Carolina decisions may sometimes come closer to enforcing the contract that should be enforced than do the more conservative authorities.
Promissory notes are not generally subject to the parol evidence rule to the same extent as other contracts. Parties drawing such instruments tend to follow a rather definitely standardized form. If collateral terms and conditions had been agreed upon, they may be omitted from the note itself to insure its negotiability. Accordingly, it is rather common for a promissory note to be intended as only a partial integration of the agreement in pursuance of which it was given, and parol evidence as between the original parties may well be admissible so far as it is not inconsistent with the express terms of the note. See 3 Corbin on Contracts § 587, at 510 (1960); 2 Stansbury's N.C. Evidence, Brandis Rev. § 256 (1973); Dalzell, Twenty-five Years of Parol Evidence in North Carolina, 33 N.C.L.Rev. at 432--33 (1955).
The North Carolina rule in such cases was stated in Evans v. Freeman, 142 N.C. 61, 54 S.E. 847 (1906)--an often-cited case in which parol evidence was admitted to show that a promissory note was to be paid only to the extent of proceeds received from the sale of patent rights in the maker's stockfeeder--as follows:
'. . .
Other promissory note cases involving the North Carolina method of payment and discharge exception to the parol evidence rule include: Carroll v. Brown, 228 N.C. 636, 46 S.E.2d 715 (1948) ( ); Ripple v. Stevenson, 223 N.C. 284, 25 S.E.2d 836 (1943) ( ); Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Guin, 215 N.C. 92, 1 S.E.2d 123 (1939) ( ); Bank of Chapel Hill v. Rosenstein, 207 N.C. 529, 177 S.E. 643 (1935) ( ); Galloway v. Thrash, 207 N.C. 165, 176 S.E. 303 (1934) ( ); Willmington Trust Co. v. Wilder, 206 N.C. 124, 172 S.E. 884 (1934) ( ); Kindler v. Trust Co., 204 N.C. 198, 169 S.E. 811 (1933) ( ); Wilson v. Allsbrook, 203 N.C. 498, 166 S.E. 313 (1932) ( ); Stack v. Stack, 202 N.C. 461, 163 S.E. 589 (1932) ( ); National Bank v. Winslow, 193 N.C. 470, 137 S.E. 320 (1927) ( ); Quin v. Sexton, 125 N.C. 447, 34 S.E. 542 (1899) ( ); Kerchner v. McRae, 80 N.C. 219 (1877) ( ). See 12 Am.Jur.2d, Bills and Notes § 1264 (1964); 30 Am.Jur.2d, Evidence § 1061 (1967); Annot. 71 A.L.R. 548, 570--75 (1931); 2 Stansbury's N.C. Evidence, Brandis Rev. § 256 (1973); 3 Strong, N.C.Index 2d, Evidence § 32, at 651 (1967).
In the present case, according to defendant's evidence, customers Parrish and Scott executed notes to plaintiff for merchandise sold by plaintiff's agent to them. At the request of plaintiff's agent, a note from defendant to plaintiff included, for bookkeeping purposes only, the amount of...
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