Boright v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company
| Decision Date | 04 April 1930 |
| Docket Number | 27,700 |
| Parties | H. N. BORIGHT v. CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND & PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action in the district court for Steele county to recover for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff in Kansas while employed by defendant in interstate commerce. From a judgment of dismissal, Senn, J. plaintiff appealed. Reversed.
Federal employers liability act -- jurisdiction of state court.
1. The court has jurisdiction of an action for personal injuries under the federal employers liability act, though the plaintiff is a citizen and resident of another state and the defendant is a nonresident railway corporation doing business and operating its railway in Minnesota, when service is made as provided by statute upon one of its ticket agents in a county through which its railway line runs and in which the action is brought.
When trial does not unreasonably burden interstate commerce.
2. The trial of such an action does not unreasonably burden interstate commerce when the defendant railroad is of the character and does the business indicated in the opinion and no more definite showing of an undue burdening is made than stated in the opinion.
Right of nonresidents to maintain transitory actions in Minnesota courts.
3. It is the law of the state that it will not deny to citizens of sister states the right to maintain in its courts such actions as its own citizens may maintain; that its courts will not discriminate between resident plaintiffs and nonresident plaintiffs nor resident defendants and nonresident defendants; and that transitory actions, whether founded on a common law liability or a liability created by a sister state statute, or when created by the federal government, are triable if jurisdiction of the defendant is acquired though the plaintiff be a noncitizen or nonresident and the defendant be likewise so but be doing business within the state.
Trial of such actions in state courts not forbidden by federal statutes.
4. Though it be held that the federal employers liability act does not impose a duty upon a state court to try an action arising under that act, the courts of this state are open to the trial of such actions and nothing in the federal statutes forbids them.
Courts 15 C.J. § 86 p. 792 n. 97; § 634 p. 1156 n. 4.
See note in 40 L.R.A.(N.S.) 684; 47 L.R.A.(N.S.) 72; L.R.A 1915C, 75; L.R.A. 1918E, 917.
See note in 47 L.R.A.(N.S.) 67; L.R.A. 1915C, 75.
Davis, Michel & Yaeger and Leach & Leach, for appellant.
O'Brien, Horn & Stringer and F. A. Alexander, for respondent.
Tom J. McGrath, for the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen; Thomas Stevenson, for the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen; Oscar J. Horn, for the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers; Grimm, Wheeler, Elliott & Shuttleworth, for the Order of Railway Conductors of America; and Frederick M. Miner and Tautges, Wilder & McDonald, amici curiae, filed briefs in support of the contention of appellant.
Harold S. Nelson, County Attorney of Steele County; F. W. Root, C. O. Newcomb, A. C. Erdall, and Sawyer, Lord & Munck, for the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Company; Samuel H. Cady, for the Chicago & North Western Railway Company; Walter H. Jacobs, for the Chicago, Great Western Railroad Company; J. C. James and Denegre, Mc Dermott, Stearns, Stone & Mackey, for the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company; and Edward C. Craig, Charles A. Helsell, and Edwin C. Brown, for the Illinois Central Railroad Company, amici curiae, filed briefs in support of the contention of respondent.
Action in the district court of Rice county in the fifth judicial district to recover for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff in Kansas while employed by the defendant railway company in interstate commerce. By stipulation the venue was changed to Steele county in the same district. The railway company moved that the action be dismissed upon the ground that a trial of it in Steele county would unreasonably burden interstate commerce and so violate the commerce clause of the constitution; and further it alleged that the ends of convenience would be served if the case were dismissed and the trial were not had in Minnesota; and that it was within the power and discretion of the Minnesota courts to refuse jurisdiction and dismiss the case. The motion was granted sought to review the judgment upon mandamus issued from this court. Upon hearing it was held that mandamus was not the sought to review the judgment upon mandamus was not the proper remedy, and the writ was quashed and judgment of dismissal was entered. State ex rel. Boright v. District Court, 178 Minn. 236, 226 N.W. 569. The plaintiff appeals from the judgment.
In discussing the matters presented it is convenient to consider (1) whether the court had jurisdiction; (2) whether, if so, it should refuse to try the action in Minnesota because such trial would unreasonably burden interstate commerce; (3) whether jurisdiction should be refused because thereby the ends of convenience would be served; and (4) the effect of the federal employers liability act assuming to give concurrent jurisdiction to the state courts. There are no other questions.
1. The plaintiff is a citizen and resident of Kansas. The defendant is organized under the law of Illinois and Iowa. It was a line of railway and does a general interstate and intrastate railway business in Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, South Dakota, Missouri, Kansas, and other states. Summons was served on the defendant's ticket agent in Rice county, through which its line runs, pursuant to G.S. 1923 (2 Mason, 1927) § 8009, § 9231 and § 9233. The defendant appeared and answered. It denied liability under the federal employers liability act and alleged that the plaintiff's injury occurred in intrastate commerce and that it and the plaintiff were subject to the workmen's compensation act of Kansas.
The district court had jurisdiction of the parties. It could proceed to judgment, unless because of the claimed unreasonable burden imposed upon interstate commerce; and it should do so unless it ought to refuse to entertain jurisdiction for reasons of convenience and leave it to the plaintiff to bring suit elsewhere.
2. The cases upon which the defendant mainly relies in support of its claim that a trial in Minnesota will unreasonably burden interstate commerce are Davis v. Farmers Co-op. Equity Co. 262 U.S. 312, 43 S.Ct. 556, 67 L.Ed. 996, and A.T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Wells, 265 U.S. 101, 44 S.Ct. 469, 68 L.Ed. 928. In neither of these cases did the defendant have a line of railway or do a railway business in the state where suit was brought, except that in the Davis case it solicited freight; nor did the cause of action upon which suit was brought arise in such state; nor was the plaintiff a resident there; nor, while unimportant here but mentioned because of what is said in paragraph four, was the action under the federal liability act. In each of them the facts stated in support of the claim of unreasonably burdening interstate commerce were more persuasive than here, for in this case the affidavit on which the motion for a dismissal is based merely states that a burden will result. To these cases may now be added Michigan Cent. R. Co. v. Mix, 278 U.S. 492, 49 S.Ct. 207, 73 L.Ed. 470. There an accident resulting in death occurred in Michigan, where the deceased resided and was employed by the defendant in interstate commerce and under the laws of which the defendant was incorporated. The widow of the deceased employe moved to Missouri, where suit was brought. The defendant had no line of railway in Missouri and did no business there except as it solicited freight. The maintenance of the action in Missouri was held to impose an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce within the Davis case, 262 U.S. 312, 43 S.Ct. 556, 67 L.Ed. 996.
The defendant railway company has 280 miles of railroad in Minnesota. It runs through trains from the Twin Cities to Kansas City and farther to the southwest. It runs through trains to Chicago from the Twin Cities. It has a branch or two in Minnesota, and a line extends from Iowa through the southwest of Minnesota northwesterly into South Dakota, connecting that region with its lines in Iowa and other places. It travels a fertile and prosperous region of Minnesota. There are no waste places. It is one of the large railway systems of the country, and the portion in Minnesota is an important part of it.
We have many times held that the trial of a cause of action against a railroad company which is so definitely and materially a part of the railroad business of the state, under conditions comparable with those shown in this case, does not unconstitutionally burden interstate commerce. State ex rel. Schendel v. District Court, 156 Minn. 380, 194 N.W. 780; Erving v. C. & N.W. Ry. Co. 171 Minn. 87, 214 N.W. 12; Kobbe v. C. & N.W. Ry. Co. 173 Minn. 79, 216 N.W. 543; Gegere v. C. & N.W. Ry. Co. 175 Minn. 96, 220 N.W. 429; Winders v. I.C.R. Co. 177 Minn. 1, 223 N.W. 291, 226 N.W. 213; Phillips v. C. & N.W. Ry. Co. 177 Minn. 233, 225 N.W. 106; Witort v. C. & N.W. Ry. Co. 178 Minn. 261, 226 N.W. 934.
That the interstate carrier has a considerable mileage and is active in the railroad business of the state is a factor in determining whether an unreasonable burden is imposed upon interstate commerce. This is noted in a number of the cases cited. The case of Hoffman v. Missouri ex rel Foraker, 274 U.S. 21, 47 S. St. 485, 71 L.Ed. 905, supports our view that under the facts of the case it should not be held that there is an unreasonable burden cast upon interstate commerce. There the action involved was under the federal...
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