Borman v. Sweetwater County School Dist. No. 2
| Decision Date | 12 May 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 5367,5367 |
| Citation | 627 P.2d 1364 |
| Parties | Arnola BORMAN, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. SWEETWATER COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 2, Louise Ryckman, Albert Wilde, Sue Scott, Allen West, William Thoman, John Bernard, and David Ortega, in their official capacities, Appellees (Defendants). |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Bernard Q. Phelan, of Patrick E. Hacker & Associates, Cheyenne, for appellant.
Ford T. Bussart, of Greenhalgh, Bussart, West & Rosetti, P.C., Rock Springs, for appellees.
Before ROSE, C. J., and McCLINTOCK *, RAPER, THOMAS and ROONEY, JJ.
Appellant-plaintiff instituted this action to recover damages for breach of contract in that she was not given notice of termination of her initial contract teaching status pursuant to § 21-7-105, W.S.1977. The trial court found generally for appellees-defendants and made findings of fact and conclusions of law with reference thereto.
The required notice is set forth in § 21-7-105:
"An initial contract teacher who has taught in the system continuously for a period of at least ninety (90) days shall be hired on an annual basis and shall be notified in writing of termination, if such is the case, no later than March 15 of each year."
The word "termination" as used therein is defined in § 21-7-102(a)(viii), W.S.1977:
Appellant words the issues on appeal as follows:
There is no dispute over the fact that appellant was an initial contract teacher. 1 She had taught in appellee school district during part of the 1976-77 school year and was employed to teach during the 1977-78 school year. This action was predicated upon termination of her employment at the end of this second year. Issue number 1 is answered in the affirmative.
We also answer issue number 5 in the affirmative inasmuch as we agree with the trial court that appellant received adequate notice of termination pursuant to § 21-7-105.
Thus, we affirm, and need not address issues numbered 2, 3 and 4 concerning special classifications and waiver since answers to them, either way, would not change the result in this matter.
Appellant was employed by appellee to replace a teacher given one year maternity leave during the school year 1977-78. The contract given appellant recited that it was for "one year only." Before appellant signed the contract, she was given a detailed explanation of her status as a substitute replacing a teacher on maternity leave, and that the contract was for one year only. She was specifically told that she would not have any expectation of continued employment, but would be required to reapply and be interviewed for a position if one was desired in a subsequent year.
During the school year (on January 17, 1978), appellant was given a written evaluation which was signed by her. It reflected that she was performing under "a one-year replacement contract."
In April, 1978, appellant indicated by means of a letter to the assistant superintendent of her understanding that she was on notice of her termination at the end of the school year. She there said that she would like to teach under a "regular contract" in the next year. Her understanding of such is further evidenced by the fact that she taught during the school year 1976-77 as a substitute teacher under a contract similar to the 1977-78 one. She was not then given additional notice of termination, but she recognized the fact of termination and reapplied for a position the next year. With notice, an initial contract teacher does not have an expectation of reemployment. O'Melia v. Sweetwater County School District No. 1, Wyo., 497 P.2d 540 (1972); Bertot v. School District No. 1, Albany County, Wyoming, 522 F.2d 1171 (10th Cir. 1975).
The statutory time for notification of termination is "no later than March 15 of each year." The time is not designated as "in March," or "between January 1 and March 15," or as any specific time prior to March 15. If a one-year provision were placed in every initial teacher contract, substitute or otherwise, in an effort to circumvent the intent of § 21-7-105, supra, we would agree that its purpose was thwarted and hold the notice to be inadequate. Such universal and general notice could be no more than recognition that the contracts were initial teacher contracts and subject to a subsequent statutory notice of termination. But that is not here the situation. The evidence is substantial that both parties intended the contract to end in one year without further notice.
In construing contracts, our primary interest is to give effect to the intention of the parties. Marathon Oil Company v. Kleppe, 556 F.2d 982 (10th Cir. 1977); Amoco Production Company v. Stauffer Chemical Company of Wyoming, Wyo., 612 P.2d 463 (1980).
The purpose of the statutory notice prior to March 15 of the school year is to give the teacher time to seek employment elsewhere in the next school year. Bonar v. City of Boston, 369 Mass. 579, 341 N.E.2d 684 (1976). In this instance, appellant was well advised of the one-year notice of the employment, and the notice was not a universal notice placed in the contracts of all initial contract teachers. Rather, appellant received specific notice of the year-end termination, and she was able to prepare for employment elsewhere in the next school year. The purpose of § 21-7-105, supra, was properly fulfilled.
The problem here presented to us could have been avoided by giving appellant an additional notice during the first two weeks of March, but with the specific notifications given in this case, there was compliance with the statutory notice requirement.
Affirmed.
Because I cannot agree with the majority's conclusion that plaintiff received notice of termination as required by § 21-7-105, W.S.1977, I must dissent.
The facts are undisputed. In November of 1976, it became necessary for defendants to create an additional fourth grade class because of an increased number of students due to "impact." Plaintiff was interviewed and hired to teach this newly created fourth grade class. At the time plaintiff accepted the teaching position, the assistant superintendent explained to plaintiff that the contract was for "one year only" and that the position would not be available the next academic year. However, plaintiff was also assured that because of the growth of the school district, there were always openings and that plaintiff would be "highly considered" for future employment. The contract signed by plaintiff was a regular contract that also contained the following statement: "This contract is for the Remainder of the 1976-77 School Year Only."
While plaintiff was not given notice of termination prior to March 15, 1977, she was eventually interviewed and hired to teach first grade for the academic year of 1977-1978. Once again, plaintiff was told that this position was a one-year position because the position that she would be filling was created by a maternity leave. The words "one year only" appear in the bottom left-hand corner of the 1977-1978 employment contract.
During the academic year of 1977-1978, plaintiff received two low evaluations from her principal. Plaintiff indicated that these low evaluations were the result of a personality conflict and did not accurately reflect her teaching ability. After receiving the first low evaluation, plaintiff requested and had a conference with the assistant superintendent regarding plaintiff's low evaluations. Subsequently, the assistant superintendent, the superintendent and plaintiff's principal discussed the low evaluations. During this conference, the superintendent stated that because plaintiff had a "one year replacement contract" there was no need to further discuss the situation.
Plaintiff did not receive a written notice of termination prior to March 15, 1978. She did write to the assistant superintendent on April 11, 1978, requesting that she be considered for employment for the following academic year. After she made this formal request, she was interviewed by two principals. On April 26, 1978, the assistant superintendent told plaintiff's husband that plaintiff would not be receiving a contract for the following year.
School districts and school boards are created by the legislature and, therefore, their powers are limited to those powers conferred upon them by statute. Perry v. Independent School District No. 696, 297 Minn. 197, 210 N.W.2d 283, 286 (1973). Section 21-3-111, W.S.1977, authorizes the board of trustees in each school district, among other things, to:
The legislature has set forth specific guidelines for teacher employment and termination in the...
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