Laramie Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. One ex rel. Bd. of Trs. of Laramie Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. One v. Kinstler

• Decision Date: 12 November 2015
• Docket Number: No. S–15–0043.,S–15–0043.
• Citation: 2015 WY 143,361 P.3d 819
• Parties: LARAMIE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NUMBER ONE EX REL. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF LARAMIE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NUMBER ONE, a Wyoming Governmental Entity, Appellant (Defendant), v. Kort KINSTLER, Appellee (Plaintiff).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

361 P.3d 819

2015 WY 143

LARAMIE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NUMBER ONE EX REL. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF LARAMIE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NUMBER ONE, a Wyoming Governmental Entity, Appellant (Defendant),

v.Kort KINSTLER, Appellee (Plaintiff).

No. S–15–0043.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

Nov. 12, 2015.

Representing Appellant: Robert C. Jaroshand Traci L. Lacockof Hirst Applegate, LLP, Cheyenne, WY.

Representing Appellee: Pro se.

Opinion

DAVIS, Justice.

[¶ 1] The Board of Trustees of Laramie County School District No. One (District)¹appeals from a summary judgment granted to a teacher, Kort Kinstler, in his suit to recover salary and the value of benefits allegedly owed to him following a decision not to reemploy him at the end of the 2011–2012 school year. We reverse and vacate the award.

ISSUE

[¶ 2] This appeal turns on a single question of statutory construction, which we restate as follows:

Do the phrases “notice of recommendation of termination” and “notice of termination” in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21–7–106refer to two separate documents to be issued by the District, or did the legislature intend those phrases to be used interchangeably to designate a single document?

FACTS

[¶ 3] During the 2011 to 2012 school year, Kinstler was a continuing contract teacher²who had worked for the District for approximately ten years. On March 30, 2012, the District Superintendent gave him written notice that he had recommended that Kinstler be terminated for “[u]nsatisfactory performance and incompetence in the area of creating an appropriate classroom environment.”³Five days later, Kinstler formally requested a hearing. During a conference call with the hearing officer on May 10, the parties waived the 45–day statutory deadline for commencing the hearing, and subsequently the initial settings for the hearing and a prehearing conference had to be continued to allow Kinstler more time to find an attorney.

[¶ 4] As a result of his attorney's participation in another conference call on June 11, 2012, the hearing officer scheduled a prehearing conference for August 6, with the hearing to begin a week later. Although the attorney Kinstler retained withdrew on or about June 25, a two-day hearing took place as scheduled on August 13 and 14, with Kinstler representing himself. On September 4, 2012, the hearing officer issued findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a recommendation that the District accept the superintendent's proposal that Kinstler be terminated.

[¶ 5] The Board of Trustees voted to accept the recommendation at a meeting on September 17, 2012, and District administration advised Kinstler of this the following day by letter. He did not seek judicial review of that decision. Kinstler was paid his normal salary from August 15, 2012 (the date he would have started to work) through the date that the Board acted on the recommendation to terminate him.

[¶ 6] Nearly a year later, on September 12, 2013, Kinstler sued the District, claiming that it failed to pay him the full salary⁴and retention bonus he was due at the time of his termination. The District filed a timely answer to his complaint, and the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment in early 2014.

[¶ 7] Kinstler's salary claim rested on the language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21–7–106, which at the end of the 2011–2012 school year⁵provided:

(a) A continuing contract teacher shall be notified of a recommendation of terminationby the superintendent or any member of the board designated by the superintendent or designated by the board pursuant to a majority vote of the board by giving the teacher written notice together with written reasons for termination on or before April 15 of any year. Upon receipt of notice, the teacher may request a hearing on the recommendation before an independent hearing officer as provided under W.S. 21–7–110.

(b) If ordered by the board under W.S. 21–7–110(g), termination under recommendation shall be effective at the end of the school year in the year in which notice of terminationis given.

(Emphasis added). Kinstler contended that the notice of recommendation of termination addressed in subsection (a) was given on March 30, 2012—during the 2011–2012 school year—but that the notice of termination addressed in subsection (b) referred to the letter announcing the District's decision to uphold the recommended termination on September 17, 2012–during the 2012–2013 school year. He argued that even though he would no longer be working for the District, he was entitled to be paid his prior annual salary for the entirety of the 2012 through 2013 school year because he began that academic year still employed as a continuing contract teacher.

[¶ 8] The District argued that the legislature used the terms interchangeably—that is, that both terms referred to the notice given by the superintendent at the end of the 2011–2012 academic year. It also pointed out that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21–7–110(g)provides that a continuing contract teacher's employment must be terminated by a “written order” of the Board.

[¶ 9] The district court agreed with Kinstler, partially granted his summary judgment motion, and on December 31, 2014 entered an order with respect to his salary and benefits claim⁶pursuant to W.R.C.P. 54(b).^7,8The District timely perfected this appeal.

DISCUSSION

[¶ 10] Courts construe statutes as a matter of law. Consequently, we review de novowith the goal of determining legislative intent. That goal is best achieved by reading any particular statute or statutory provision in harmony with related statutes with the same subject or purpose as a whole and giving appropriate effect to the plain, ordinary meaning of every word, clause and sentence. Rock v. Lankford,2013 WY 61, ¶¶ 17, 19, 301 P.3d 1075, 1080 (Wyo.2013). Courts should presume that lawmakers intend related statutes to operate consistently and harmoniously. Therefore, parts of them should not be viewed in isolation, but should be interpreted by comparing them with other parts or sections. 2A Norman Singer & Shambie Singer, Sutherland Statutory Contruction§ 46:5 (7th ed. updated November 2014).

[¶ 11] Before we begin our discussion of the issue this appeal presents, it is important to recognize an issue that is not involved. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21–7–110(d)and (g)set strict time frames for disposing of disputed recommendations for termination. Section 110(d) provides that a hearing officer “shall” set a date for hearing within five days of being selected. The same section provides that “[i]n no event shall the hearing commence on a date later than forty-five (45) days” after notice of intent to suspend, dismiss, or terminate a continuing contract teacher. Subsection (g) provides that the school board “shall” issue a written order within twenty days of receipt of the hearing officer's recommendation.

[¶ 12] In this case, Mr. Kinstler waived those time frames, and the parties did not directly address them in this appeal.⁹We are not, therefore, required to determine what impact failure to comply with these limits would have on a continuing contract teacher's right to compensation if a decision was not reached before the beginning of the next school year. We are instead required only to interpret the meaning and impact of the terms “notice of recommendation of termination” and “notice of termination.”

[¶ 13] Kinstler's salary claim rested on the notion that § 21–7–106(a)speaks of a notice of recommendation of termination, while subsection (b) of that statute refers to a notice of termination. He argued that the use of two different phrases indicated that the legislature intended to refer to two different events, the latter of which took place during the 2012–2013 school year. The district court accepted that reasoning and further differentiated the two phrases by referring to the latter as a notice of “actual” termination. The court therefore concluded that Kinstler's termination was not effective until the end of the 2012–2013 school year, and that he was entitled to be paid for that entire school year pursuant to subsection (b).

[¶ 14] That reasoning is certainly consistent with the tenet of statutory construction that when different words are used in the same or a related statute, they are usually intended to have different meanings. See In re Kite Ranch, LLC,2010 WY 83, ¶ 20, 234 P.3d 351, 359 (Wyo.2010); 2A Singer, supra,§ 46:6. However, a closer look reveals a different intent.

[¶ 15] As the United States Supreme Court framed a similar concern more than eighty years ago:

The rule that, where the statute contains no ambiguity, it must be taken literally and given effect according to its language, is a sound one not to be put aside to avoid hardships that may sometimes result from giving effect to the legislative purpose. Commr. of Immigration v. Gottlieb,265 U.S. 310, 313, 44 S.Ct. 528, 68 L.Ed. 1031[ (1924) ]; Bate Refrigerating Co. v. Sulzberger,157 U.S. 1, 37, 15 S.Ct. 508, 39 L.Ed. 601[ (1895) ]. But the expounding of a statutory provision strictly according to the letter without regard to other parts of the act and legislative history would often defeat the object intended to be accomplished. Speaking through Chief Justice Taney in Brown v. Duchesne,19 How. 183, page 194, 15 L.Ed. 595[ (1856) ], this court said: “It is well settled that, in interpreting a statute, the court will not look merely to a particular clause in which general words may be used, but will take in connection with it the whole statute (or statutes on the same subject) and the objects and policy of the law, as indicated by its various provisions, and give to it such a construction as will carry into execution the will of the Legislature, as thus ascertained, according to its true intent and meaning.”

Helvering v. New York Trust Co.,292 U.S. 455, 464, 54 S.Ct. 806, 808–09, 78 L.Ed. 1361 (1934). See also Leach v. FDIC,860 F.2d 1266, 1270 (5th Cir.1988)(“[E]ven apparently plain words, divorced from the context in which they arise and in which their creators...