Boston Housing Authority v. Garcia

• Decision Date: 17 August 2007
• Docket Number: SJC-09753.
• Citation: 449 Mass. 727,871 N.E.2d 1073
• Parties: BOSTON HOUSING AUTHORITY v. Doris GARCIA.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

871 N.E.2d 1073

449 Mass. 727

BOSTON HOUSING AUTHORITY v. Doris GARCIA.

SJC-09753.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued March 5, 2007.

Decided August 17, 2007.

James M. McCreight for the defendant.

Helene C. Maichle, Buffalo, NY, for the plaintiff.

The following submitted briefs for amici curiae:

Michael J. Sullivan, United States Attorney, Patricia M. Connolly, Assistant United States Attorney, Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, Barbara C. Biddle, & Irene M. Solet, Washington, DC, for the United States.

Susan C. Cohen, Boston, for Cambridge Housing Authority.

Present: MARSHALL, C.J., GREANEY, IRELAND, SPINA, & CORDY, JJ.

CORDY, J.

In Spence v. Gormley, 387 Mass. 258, 439 N.E.2d 741 (1982) (Gormley), we both affirmed that under Massachusetts law a housing authority cannot terminate a tenancy without "cause," G.L c. 121B, § 32,¹ and held that under the terms of leases then utilized between tenants and the Boston Housing Authority (BHA), violent acts committed by members of the tenant's household provided sufficient cause on which to terminate the lease, because, "[w]hen the wrongdoer is a household member, a fair inference exists that the tenant is aware of potential problems, and able to exercise some influence or otherwise prevent" the conduct. Id. at 265, 439 N.E.2d 741.² We further held, however, that the requirement of cause in § 32 "provides relief from termination when special circumstances indicate that the tenant could not have foreseen the misconduct or was unable to prevent it by any available means, including outside help," id. at 279, 439 N.E.2d 741. In Boston Hous. Auth. v. Bell, 428 Mass. 108, 697 N.E.2d 130 (1998) (Bell), we declined to depart from the "special circumstances" limitation on cause in our consideration of an eviction brought under a new form of BHA lease explicitly "permitting its termination if a member of the tenant's household commits `[a]ny criminal or other activity which threatens the health or safety of . . . BHA employees.'" Id. at 109, 697 N.E.2d 130. In our opinion, we noted that, "[i]f the lease alone controlled our decision, the BHA would be entitled to possession of the premises,"³ but that "[t]he terms of the lease are not . . . the sole consideration," id., and "[i]n the face of the requirement of cause in § 32 the provision in the lease permitting termination of the tenancy cannot be enforced as written," where the tenant can meet her burden to show special circumstances. Id. at 110, 697 N.E.2d 130. Notably, the BHA made no claim that Federal law preempted the cause requirement of § 32 as we had interpreted that requirement in Gormley.

In this appeal, we are again asked to consider whether the "special circumstances" limitation on the existence of cause, referred to as the "innocent tenant defense," remains viable in the termination of tenancies in federally assisted public housing projects. Our consideration is prompted by the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Department of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 130, 122 S.Ct. 1230, 152 L.Ed.2d 258 (2002) (Rucker), that Federal housing law, 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) (2000), "unambiguously" requires lease terms "that vest local public housing authorities with the discretion to evict tenants for the drug-related activity of household members and guests whether or not the tenant knew, or should have known, about the activity."⁴

In the present case, a Housing Court judge ruled that the innocent tenant defense was no longer available under Massachusetts law to Doris Garcia, a BHA tenant, in light of the Rucker decision, and declined to admit evidence that she could not have foreseen or prevented the criminal conduct of two of her sons. We agree with the Housing Court judge that Federal housing law preempts Massachusetts law that would otherwise permit a public housing tenant to defeat a lease termination based on the acts of a household member, by establishing that he or she could not have foreseen or prevented the misconduct.⁵

1. Background. Since December, 1993, Doris Garcia has resided in housing owned and managed by the BHA. The housing is federally financed and subject to regulation by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Garcia is the mother of three adult sons, Ezequiel Grajales, Geraldo Grajales, and Juan Grajales, all of whom are listed on her lease as members of her household.⁶ Garcia's lease obligates her to "[r]efrain from engaging in, and cause members of [her] household, any guest, or any other person under [her] control, to refrain from engaging in, any criminal or illegal activity including: ... Any violent or drug related criminal activity on or off BHA property." The lease further provides that the BHA may terminate the lease as a result of the "[c]ommission by [Garcia], a member of [her] household, a guest, or other person under [her] control, of: ... Any violent or drug-related criminal activity on or off BHA property."

On June 21, 2004, Juan was arrested after a police officer stopped the motor vehicle he was driving without a driver's license. While conducting an inventory search of the vehicle, officers discovered a bag containing marijuana. At the time of arrest, Juan gave his mother's address as his own. Juan was subsequently charged with possession of a class D substance.⁷

On June 25, 2004, Ezequiel was observed with a group of males carrying an aluminum baseball bat. One of the males was also armed with a knife. A police officer stopped and questioned Ezequiel, and, in searching him for other weapons, found thirteen bags of marijuana in his possession. Ezequiel was arrested and gave his mother's address as his own. He was charged with possession of a class D substance with intent to distribute in a school zone, but subsequently pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of simple possession.

On July 2, 2004, the BHA served Garcia with a notice of private conference, requesting that she attend a meeting to discuss "possible violations of your lease," including failing to "[r]efrain from engaging in, and caus[ing] members of [her] household . . . to refrain from engaging in . . . drug related criminal activity." The notice then specified the arrests of her sons for the above-described drug offenses. At the meeting, Garcia was afforded an opportunity to explain the conduct of her sons and the circumstances of their arrests. According to a report of the meeting, she told the BHA representative that the search of Juan's motor vehicle on June 21 was illegal, and that although Juan told the police that the marijuana was his, in fact it did not belong to him or his friends. With respect to the incident on June 25, Garcia said that a verbal insult directed at her led to a confrontation at which Juan and Ezequiel defended her. Also, that the man who made the insult tried to stab Ezequiel, and that Ezequiel retrieved a baseball bat and gave chase, at which point the police stopped him, and found bags of marijuana in his possession. She further explained that her "kids were going to ... smoke" the marijuana at a party.

After the meeting, the BHA decided to proceed with an eviction action, and on July 23, 2004, served Garcia with a notice of termination for cause, a summary report of the private conference, and a statement setting forth the grounds for the eviction. On March 22, 2005, the BHA filed a summary process action against Garcia in the Housing Court. The BHA asserted that Garcia violated her lease on June 21 and 25, 2004, when her sons engaged in drug-related criminal activity.⁸ Garcia filed an answer, citing as defenses that her sons did not live with her and that she had no control over the alleged behavior of her sons or any reason to know about the behavior.⁹ The case proceeded to trial.

During the trial, as Garcia was testifying about her lack of control over her sons, she was interrupted by the judge, who explained that whether she could control or had knowledge of her sons' illegal activity was not germane, because he was bound by the Supreme Court's opinion in Rucker. He further explained the ruling in that case as follows:

"[A]s a matter of federal law with respect to public housing authorities that are . . . federally funded, there is no such thing as an innocent tenant defense. Meaning, if someone is a member of your household you are strictly responsible under the terms of your lease for their conduct, whether or not you knew about it and whether or not you could have controlled them had you known about it."

The judge then limited the evidence to whether Juan and Ezequiel were members of Garcia's household in June, 2004. He found that they were and, accordingly, entered judgment for the BHA.¹⁰ Garcia appealed from the ruling, and we granted her application for direct appellate review.

2. Discussion. The BHA argues that the Rucker decision requires a finding that 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) preempts G.L. c. 121B, § 32, with respect to federally funded housing tenancies, because the special circumstances defense that we have held it incorporates conflicts with and frustrates the goals and objectives of Congress. See Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 885, 120 S.Ct. 1913, 146 L.Ed.2d 914 (2000).

The tenants in Rucker filed suit in Federal court, claiming that 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) did not require lease terms allowing a local public housing authority to evict a tenant when a member of the tenant's household (or a guest) engages in drug-related criminal activity, regardless whether the tenant knew or had reason to know of the activity. The tenants also challenged HUD's interpretation of the statute to the contrary, and in the alternative, the constitutionality of the statute. The Rucker Court disagreed and held unanimously that 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) "unambiguously" required that the leases at issue contain "lease terms that vest local public housing authorities with the discretion...