Boston Rubber Shoe Co. v. City of MaLden
| Decision Date | 25 February 1914 |
| Citation | 216 Mass. 508,104 N.E. 478 |
| Parties | BOSTON RUBBER SHOE CO. v. CITY OF MALDEN. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Jos Wiggin, of Boston, for petition.
H. L Boutwell, City Sol., of Boston, for respondent.
This is a petition for an abatement of taxes assessed upon real estate of the petitioner. The assessors of the city of Malden gave seasonable notice, requiring its inhabitants to bring in true lists of their real estate subject to taxation. The petitioner filed a paper purporting to be a list which, as to real estate, contained only this: 'Land & Buildings $359,400.00.' Its real estate consisted of a considerable number of different parcels of land, some widely separated from each other, and numerous buildings. The question presented is whether this was a compliance with the statutory requirement for 'true lists,' including 'real estate * * * subject to taxation.' R. L. c. 12, § 41; St. 1909, c. 490, part I, § 41.
The statute does not define the word 'list.' Its signification must be determined on broad grounds. It has been in the tax laws of this commonwealth for many years. In Newburyport v. County Commissioners, 12 Metc. 211, at 216, it was said by Shaw, C.J., respecting its meaning, that 'the list to be given in was to embrace the enumeration and description of all the taxable property of the person giving it in'; and at page 219 that 'the return of the list of property * * * was intended to aid the assessors in ascertaining the nature, quantity and extent of the property to be valued.' In Porter v. County Commissioners, 5 Gray, 365, at 367, it was held that the lists are to be used by the assessors as a guide to the performance of their duty, and a basis in making their assessments. In Lincoln v. City of Worcester, 8 Cush. 55, at 64 it was said that the requirement of a list meant 'the enumeration, description, occupancy and other particulars of all the real estate.' In Charlestown v. County Commissioner, 1 Allen, 199, a list was attacked as insufficient because describing in somewhat comprehensive terms a tract unified as to its use and general location. In holding it sufficient, this was said at page 202: 'The description of the real estate mentioned in it is so clear and distinct that the land referred to could not be mistaken by any persons seeking to find it.' In Moors v. Street Commissioners, 134 Mass. 431, the list was referred to as an 'enumeration, description and specification of the estate' of the owner.
The inference from these decisions is irresistible that the court has treated the word 'list' as having the meaning usually ascribed to it by lexicographers and in common speech, as being the equivalent of a catalogue, inventory or schedule itemized in sufficient detail to convey a reasonable understanding of the extent and nature of the subject, to which it refers.
This interpretation of its meaning is confirmed by other considerations. A single tax levied generally upon parcels disconnected, or sharply and distinctly divided by use, cannot be made a lien upon separate tracts. A tax must be assessed upon each before the lien can attach. Hayden v. Foster, 13 Pick. 492; Jennings v. Collins, 99 Mass. 29, 96 Am. Dec. 687; Hamilton Mfg. Co. v. Lowell, 185 Mass. 114, 117, 69 N.E. 1080; By St. 1882, c. 217, § 3 (see St. 1894, c. 294; St. 1909, c. 490, pt. 1, § 42), the tax commissioner was required to prepare instructions for the lists required by law, and to prescribe forms with instructions as to filling them out. The form issued in accordance with the statute and used by the petitioner, contained above the blank for the list of real estate, this direction: 'Here give a brief description of each parcel of real estate provided the assessors in their notice under Revised Laws, chapter 12, section 41, chapter 157 of the Acts of 1903 require a return of real estate.'
Taking into account the nature of the real estate of the petitioner and the separation of certain parcels, it cannot be said that its return was a list in any proper sense within the meaning of the statute.
The case at bar is distinguishable from Great Barrington...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Old Colony R. Co. v. Assessors of Boston
...may be required of taxpayers and the measure of relief may be made dependent upon the filing of such a list. Boston Rubber Shoe Co. v. Malden, 216 Mass. 508, 104 N.E. 478;Parsons v. Lenox, 228 Mass. 231, 117 N.E. 197;Central National Bank v. Lynn, 259 Mass. 1, 156 N.E. 42;Assessors of Bosto......
-
Old Colony R. Co. v. Assessors of Boston
... ... of such a list. Boston Rubber Shoe Co. v. Malden, ... 216 Mass. 508 ... Parsons v. Lenox, 228 Mass. 231 ... 412. The importance of ... the payment of a tax to the city may to some degree depend ... upon its amount, and the difference to the ... ...
-
Boston & M.R.R. v. Town of Billerica
...c. 59, §§ 29, 61, as a condition precedent to having an abatement. The case at bar is governed on this point by Boston Rubber Shoe Co. v. Malden, 216 Mass. 508, 104 N. E. 478, where it was said at 510, that such a list is ‘the equivalent of a catalogue, inventory or schedule itemized in suf......
-
Tremont & Suffolk Mills v. City of Lowell
...detail to convey a reasonable understanding of the extent and nature of the subject to which it refers.’ Boston Rubber Shoe Co. v. Malden, 216 Mass. 508, 510, 104 N. E. 478;Boston & Maine Railroad v. Billerica, 262 Mass. 439, 450, 160 N. E. 419. It is apparent from the list that there was s......