Botter v. American Dental Ass'n

• Decision Date: 18 December 2003
• Docket Number: No. 03-03-00314-CV.,03-03-00314-CV.
• Citation: 124 S.W.3d 856
• Parties: Kirk Lee BOTTER and Darla Botter, Individually and as Next Friend of Cody Wyatt Botter, a Minor Child, Appellants, v. AMERICAN DENTAL ASSOCIATION, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

124 S.W.3d 856

Kirk Lee BOTTER and Darla Botter, Individually and as Next Friend of Cody Wyatt Botter, a Minor Child, Appellants, v. AMERICAN DENTAL ASSOCIATION, Appellee.

No. 03-03-00314-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Austin.

December 18, 2003.

Scott M. Hendler, Maria Luisa Flores, Ketan U. Kharod, Hendler Law Firm, P.C., Austin, for appellants.

Scott P. Baker, Patton G. Lochridge, William H. Bingham, Shannon Lamm, McGinnis, Lochridge & Kilgore, LLP, Austin, for appellee.

Before Justices KIDD, B.A. SMITH and DAVID PURYEAR.

OPINION

DAVID PURYEAR, Justice.

Appellants, Kirk Lee Botter and Darla Botter, individually and as next friend of Cody Wyatt Botter, a minor child, bring this interlocutory appeal challenging the district court's grant of special appearance to appellee, the American Dental Association (the "ADA"), a not-for-profit, voluntary, professional organization. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & REM.CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(8) (West Supp.2003); see also Tex.R. Civ. P. 120(a). The district court found that it did not have personal jurisdiction over the ADA and issued findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting its decision. We affirm the district court's order granting the ADA's special appearance.

BACKGROUND

The Botters sued the ADA, various other dental associations, her dentist, and dental product companies alleging that Cody Botter had suffered birth defects arising from four amalgam fillings placed in his mother's mouth during her pregnancy with him. The Botters alleged that the fillings contained mercury, and that while pregnant with Cody, Darla Botter breathed mercury gases that emanated from the fillings. The Botters alleged that these gases caused Cody various medical problems. The Botters further alleged that the ADA sold and supported the use of amalgam fillings, through its seal of approval program and its publications, and that in fact the ADA prohibited dentists from warning patients about amalgam fillings through its code of ethics. The ADA filed a special appearance pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 120(a), asserting that the Botters had failed to sufficiently plead allegations to assert either specific or general personal jurisdiction over it. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 120(a). The ADA is not a resident of Texas—its offices are located in Chicago, Illinois. It contends that the Botters have not shown that it had sufficient contacts with Texas to support personal jurisdiction. The district court granted the ADA's special appearance. See id. The Botters brought this interlocutory appeal challenging the district court's grant of special appearance. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(8).

The Botters assert that the district court erred in granting the special appearance because the ADA is subject to both specific and general jurisdiction due to its substantial contacts with this state.¹

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The existence of personal jurisdiction is a question of law, but proper exercise of that jurisdiction must sometimes be preceded by the resolution of underlying factual disputes. Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft v. Olson, 21 S.W.3d 707, 715 (Tex.App.-Austin 2000, pet. dism'd w.o.j.). We determine the appropriateness of the district court's resolution of those disputes by an ordinary sufficiency-of-the-evidence review based on the entire record. Conner v. ContiCarriers & Terminals, Inc., 944 S.W.2d 405, 411 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no writ). We will set aside a finding of the trial court only if it is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly erroneous or unjust. In re King's Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660, 661 (1951); Runnells v. Firestone, 746 S.W.2d 845, 849 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied). In reviewing such a point of error, we must consider and weigh all of the evidence, both the evidence that tends to prove the existence of a vital fact as well as evidence that tends to disprove its existence. Ames v. Ames, 776 S.W.2d 154, 158-59 (Tex.1989); Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex.1986). In considering the evidence, if a finding is so contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust, the finding should be set aside, regardless of whether some evidence supports it. Watson v. Prewitt, 159 Tex. 305, 320 S.W.2d 815, 816 (1959); King's Estate, 244 S.W.2d at 661.

If evidence supports the implied findings of fact, we must uphold the trial court's judgment on any legal theory supported by the findings. Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex.1990); Point Lookout West, Inc. v. Whorton, 742 S.W.2d 277, 278 (Tex.1987); Runnells, 746 S.W.2d at 848. This is so regardless of whether the trial court articulates the correct legal reason for the judgment. Harrington v. Railroad Comm'n, 375 S.W.2d 892, 895 (Tex.1964); Fish v. Tandy Corp., 948 S.W.2d 886, 891-92 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1997, writ denied). We review the legal conclusions supporting the judgment to determine whether they are correct as a matter of law. Lawrence v. Kohl, 853 S.W.2d 697, 699 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ).

DISCUSSION

Personal Jurisdiction

A Texas court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if (1) jurisdiction is authorized by the Texas long-arm statute and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with federal and state due process standards. See Guardian Royal Exch. Assurance, Ltd. v. English China Clays, P.L.C., 815 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex.1991); Transportacion Especial Autorizada, S.A. v. Seguros Comercial America, S.A., 978 S.W.2d 716, 719 (Tex.App.-Austin 1998, no pet.). The Texas long-arm statute grants Texas courts jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the United States Constitution. See Guardian Royal, 815 S.W.2d at 226. Thus, the only limitations on Texas courts in asserting personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant are those imposed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 413-14, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984). Due process requires a showing that the nonresident defendant has purposefully established "minimum contacts" with Texas and that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945); Guardian Royal, 815 S.W.2d at 230-31.

Although the jurisdiction of Texas courts is always dependent on the defendant's having some minimum contacts with Texas, the requisite extent of those contacts varies depending on the type of in personam jurisdiction sought to be imposed. Thus, the United States Supreme Court has refined the minimum-contacts analysis into specific and general jurisdiction. See Guardian Royal, 815 S.W.2d at 227 (citing Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414-16, 104 S.Ct. 1868).

To establish specific jurisdiction, the cause of action must arise out of or relate to the nonresident defendant's contact with the forum state and the conduct must have resulted from that defendant's purposeful conduct, not the unilateral conduct of the plaintiff or others. See id. (citing Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 n. 8, 417, 104 S.Ct. 1868; World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293-94, 298, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980)). Thus, in analyzing minimum contacts for purposes of Texas courts' specific jurisdiction, we focus on the relationship among the nonresident defendant, the forum, and the litigation. See id. (citing Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414, 104 S.Ct. 1868; Schlobohm v. Schapiro, 784 S.W.2d 355, 357 (Tex.1990)). In an effort to ensure compliance with the federal constitutional standard, the Texas Supreme Court has designed its own formula for specific jurisdiction:

(1) The nonresident defendant or foreign corporation must purposefully do some act or consummate some transaction in the forum state;

(2) The cause of action must arise from, or be connected with, such act or transaction; and

(3) The assumption of jurisdiction by the forum state must not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, consideration being given to the quality, nature, and extent of the activity in the forum state, the relative convenience of the parties, the benefits and protection of the laws of the forum state afforded the respective parties, and the basic equities of the situation.

Schlobohm, 784 S.W.2d at 358 (citing O'Brien v. Lanpar Co., 399 S.W.2d 340, 342 (Tex.1966)).

An assertion of general jurisdiction compels a more demanding minimum-contacts analysis than an assertion of specific jurisdiction and requires a showing of substantial activities within the forum state. Id. at 357. The cause of action need not arise from or relate to the nonresident defendant's purposeful conduct within the forum state, but there must be "continuous and systematic contacts" between the nonresident defendant and the forum state. See id. (citing Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414-16, 104 S.Ct. 1868). The ultimate test of minimum contacts for both general and specific jurisdiction is whether the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in Texas, thereby invoking the benefit and protection of Texas laws. Id. at 357-58. This requirement ensures that a nonresident defendant will be haled into court only as a result of its intentional activities, so that it is reasonable for the nonresident defendant to expect the call of a Texas court. Guardian Royal, 815 S.W.2d at 226; Schlobohm, 784 S.W.2d at 357-58.

Burden of proof

In Texas, a plaintiff bears the initial burden of pleading allegations sufficient to bring a nonresident defendant within the provisions of the long-arm statute—allegations sufficient to show the requisite minimum contacts with the forum state. BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d at 793 (citing McKanna v. Edgar, 388 S.W.2d 927, 930 (Tex.19...