Bouie v. State
Decision Date | 17 May 1978 |
Docket Number | No. 54711,54711 |
Citation | 565 S.W.2d 543 |
Parties | John Elson BOUIE, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. |
Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
This is an appeal from a conviction for robbery by assault. Art. 1408, V.A.P.C. Punishment was enhanced on allegations and proof of two prior convictions. See Art. 63, V.A.P.C. and V.T.C.A., Penal Code Sec. 12.42(d).
Appellant first contends the trial court erred in allowing him to be retried as an habitual criminal after his first conviction in which he received ten years, was reversed. On appellant's first conviction for this crime he pleaded guilty and received a ten year sentence. That conviction was reversed on appeal. Bouie v. State, 528 S.W.2d 587. Subsequently he was reindicted for this same crime, and the new indictment alleged two prior convictions for enhancement. Appellant again entered a plea of guilty to the offense, but pleaded not true to the enhancement allegations. His motion to dismiss the enhancement allegations was denied, and on finding the allegations true the court fixed his punishment at life.
Appellant relies on North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656, in which the court wrote:
In Alvarez v. State, 536 S.W.2d 357, 364, cert. denied 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 325, 50 L.Ed.2d 292, this Court wrote:
"Vindictiveness is the evil object of North Carolina v. Pearce, and it is equally impermissible whether flowing from a judge or from a prosecutor."
See also Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 94 S.Ct. 2098, 40 L.Ed.2d 628. In Alvarez, supra, we also stated that where the penalty is fixed by law, as it was here, the increase may not be attributed to possible vindictiveness on the part of the judge. The focus of this issue, therefore, as in Alvarez, must turn to the prosecutor's acts.
In Alvarez the controlling facts were these:
The facts in this case are entirely different from those presented in Alvarez. Here appellant entered pleas of guilty to the primary offense under both the first indictment and the second indictment. Also, the second indictment here alleged two prior convictions, whereas the first alleged one, and it was dismissed on the state's motion.
In cases such as this one and Alvarez, where a conviction on a guilty plea is reversed on appeal and the State adds enhancement allegations on retrial, the constitutionality of the increased punishment so obtained turns on whether the prosecutor's acts may have been the product of vindictive retaliation for the prior exercise of the accused's right to appeal. In Alvarez we found no such indication of prosecutorial vindictiveness:
(Emphasis added.)
Prosecutorial vindictiveness is retaliation and distinguishable from trial strategy that is a matter of the defendant's free choice with full knowledge of the consequences. This is precisely the distinction relied on by the United States Supreme Court in its recent decision in Bordenkircher v. Hayes, --- U.S. ----, 98 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978). The court there said:
If the prosecutor may increase the sought for punishment from five years to life because the defendant refuses to plead guilty at the first trial, as the court held permissible in Bordenkircher v. Hayes, supra, he certainly can do the same when the defendant changes his plea from guilty to not guilty at the second trial, as was done in Alvarez v. State, supra, so long as the defendant is presented with and aware of the alternatives when he makes his choice, as was expressed in both Hayes and Alvarez.
It was also stated in Bordenkircher v. Hayes, supra:
If a defendant withdraws on retrial from a plea bargain obtained at the first trial, an increased punishment would be a legitimate response of the State to the defendant's rejection of that agreement. This is based on the teaching of Bordenkircher v. Hayes, supra. On the other hand, if the defendant enters the same plea on retrial as on the first trial, the use of the enhancement statute cannot be said to be the legitimate response approved in Bordenkircher v. Hayes. The possibility of prosecutorial vindictiveness in retaliation for the exercise of the right to appeal again arises, and the burden shifts, as in this case, to the State to show "objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding." Pearce, supra. The record before us is devoid of any such objective information. At the hearing on the motion for new trial the prosecutor testified to the contrary:
In view of the absence of objective information about identifiable conduct by appellant occurring after the first trial, and in view of the prosecutor's admission that no such conduct was the basis for enhancing appellant's punishment, we hold that due process was violated by use of the enhancement paragraphs of the indictment, and that the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion to dismiss the enhancement paragraphs. Accordingly, we will set aside the punishment, and remand the cause with orders that the enhancement allegations be dismissed and that the court assess punishment within the principles of North Carolina v. Pearce, supra.
In his second ground...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Palm v. State, 67133
...facts reflected by the record before us. We first observe that the essence of Ehl is embodied in Texas law already. See Bouie v. State, 565 S.W.2d 543 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); and Alvarez v. State, 536 S.W.2d 357 (Tex.Cr.App.1976). Indeed the logic of Ehl's exegesis can hardly be assailed with fe......
-
Lyles v. State
...the vindictive action of the State but to appellant's own choice. See Ronk v. State, 578 S.W.2d 120 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Bouie v. State, 565 S.W.2d 543 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 98 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978). Appellant was not denied due process of Appella......
-
Raetzsch v. State, 13-85-094-CR
...not cited us to a Texas case involving facts similar to those before us, and we have found none. Appellant relies on Bouie v. State, 565 S.W.2d 543 (Tex.Crim.App.1978), in which the original trial was for robbery by assault. The conviction and ten-year sentence was reversed on appeal. The d......
-
Hood v. State
...his legal right to appeal,"7 and is, therefore, sufficient to rebut a presumption of vindictiveness. Relying on this Court's decision in Bouie v. State, appellant claims that the prosecutor did not rebut a presumption of vindictiveness with Bouie's requirement of "identifiable conduct by ap......