Boulware v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.

Decision Date07 July 2022
Docket Number19-ALJ-30-0224-AP
PartiesAdriane Boulware, Appellant, v. South Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, Respondent. South Carolina Department of Administration/Division of Human Resources, Intervenor Respondent.
CourtSouth Carolina Court of Appeals

ORDER ON MOTION FOR REHEARING

MILTON G. KIMPSON, JUDGE

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This matter is before the South Carolina Administrative Law Court (ALC or Court) in its appellate jurisdiction pursuant to an appeal filed by Adriane Boulware (Appellant) from a June 13 2019 Final Administrative Decision (Final Decision) issued by the State Human Resources Director (Director) finding the Appellant failed to file a grievance within fourteen (14) calendar days from the date she left employment with the South Carolina Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS or Respondent). Appellant filed her appeal to the ALC on July 12, 2019. On September 24, 2021, this Court issued an Order (September 2021 Order) reversing the Director's decision and remanding the case for further proceedings in accordance with the South Carolina State Employee Grievance Act, SC Code Ann. § 8-17-310, et seq, (Grievance Act).

On October 4, 2021, DHHS filed a Motion for Rehearing (Motion) arguing that the Court had misinterpreted the statutes governing this matter. Appellant filed a responsive memorandum opposing rehearing on October 13, 2021. On October 8, 2021, the South Carolina Department of Administration/Division of Human Resources, on behalf of the Director, [1] moved to intervene pursuant to subsection 8-17-340(F) (2019), which provides, in pertinent part, that the Director is "entitled to make a motion in the Administrative Law Court to be allowed to intervene to participate in the appeal for appropriate reasons including [its] interest in defending [its] policies." The Court granted the Motion to Intervene on November 22, 2021 and further extended the opportunity to the Appellant and DHHS to submit additional briefing in response to the substantive arguments made by the Director.[2] The Court now grants DHHS' Motion withdraws its September 2021 Order and substitutes the following.

BACKGROUND

Appellant was formerly employed with DHHS. In 2017, while still an employee of the agency, Appellant sued DHHS in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina alleging discrimination claims. On October 4, 2017 Appellant's federal lawsuit was dismissed. Subsequently, on July 16, 2018, Appellant resigned her position with DHHS to accept employment with another state agency. She did not file an internal grievance within fourteen (14) days of leaving DHHS. Following her departure, Appellant filed a second lawsuit in state court against DHHS for breach of contract and breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act. Because punitive damages are not recoverable against a state agency, Appellant's claim for breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act was dismissed with prejudice.

As for her breach of contract claim, the Honorable Doyet A. Early, III, the presiding Circuit Court Judge, ordered that Appellant must fully exhaust her administrative remedies prior to seeking judicial review. Judge Early then dismissed Appellant's breach of contract claim without prejudice in order to give Appellant an opportunity to file a grievance and exhaust her remedies under the Grievance Act. In his Order, Judge Early explicitly wrote that "DHHS's counsel agreed that DHHS would not raise a timeliness objection to Plaintiff's filing a grievance over her alleged wrongful termination." He further observed, however, that "[t]he Court understands that the Grievance Act makes the State Human Resources Director the 'gate-keeper' over grievance appeals to the State Employee Grievance Committee, see S.C. Code Ann. § 8-17-350, and that DHHS's agreement not to raise a timeliness objection to a grievance filed by the Plaintiff is not binding on the State Human Resources Director."

On March 13, 2019, approximately seven months after her resignation, Appellant filed a grievance with DHHS alleging she had been constructively terminated. By letter dated March 15, 2019, DHHS confirmed its commitment to not raise an objection to timeliness. [3] On April 12, 2019, DHHS issued a First Step Grievance Decision on the merits, which found that Appellant had voluntarily resigned her employment and denied her grievance. On May 2, 2019, DHHS affirmed the First Step Grievance Decision. Appellant appealed the DHHS ruling to the Director as provided by the Grievance Act on May 9, 2019.[4] Upon presenting its case to the Director, DHHS again did not raise an objection to timeliness. On June 13, 2019, the Director issued a Final Decision, ruling that Appellant did not file her internal grievance within fourteen (14) days of leaving DHHS and dismissing her grievance. Appellant filed her Notice of Appeal to the ALC on July 12, 2019.

ISSUE ON APPEAL

I. Whether, after the Respondent has waived all timeliness objections based upon the fourteen-day calendar deadline pursuant to the Order of a Circuit Court Judge and determined that a grievance is ripe to be considered on its merits, the Department of Administration Office of Human Resources is subsequently constrained from hearing the grievance on its merits based upon timeliness grounds. [5]

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This case is before the Court as an appeal of an agency action pursuant to subsection 1-23-600(D) (Supp. 2021) of the South Carolina Administrative Procedures Act (APA) upon appeal from a final order of the Department. As such, the Administrative Law Judge sits in an appellate capacity under the APA rather than as an independent finder of fact. Subsection 1-23380(5) of the Act governs the circumstances in which an appellate body may reverse or modify an agency decision:

The court may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are:
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(c) made upon unlawful procedure;
(d) affected by other error of law;
(e) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or
(f) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.

S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(5) (Supp. 2021).

A decision is supported by "substantial evidence" when the record as a whole allows reasonable minds to reach the same conclusion reached by the agency. Bilton v. Best Western Royal Motor Lodge, 282 S.C. 634, 641, 321 S.E.2d 63, 68 (Ct. App. 1984). The well-settled case law in this state has also interpreted the "substantial evidence" rule to mean that a decision will not be set aside simply because reasonable minds may differ on the judgment. Lark v. Bi-Lo, 276 S.C. 130, 136, 276 S.E.2d 304, 307 (1981). The fact that the record, when considered as a whole, presents the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent the agency's finding from being supported by substantial evidence. Waters v. South Carolina Land Resources Conservation Comm'n, 321 S.C. 219, 226, 467 S.E.2d 913, 917 (1996).

In applying the substantial evidence rule, the factual findings of the administrative agency are presumed to be correct. Rodney v. Michelin Tire Co., 320 S.C. 515, 519, 466 S.E.2d 357, 359 (1996), citing Kearse v. State Health and Human Services Finance Comm'n, 318 S.C. 198, 456 S.E.2d 892 (1995). Furthermore, the reviewing court is prohibited from substituting its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. Grant v. S.C. Coastal Council, 319 S.C. 348, 353, 461 S.E.2d 388, 391 (1995), citing Gibson v. Florence Country Club, 282 S.C. 384, 318 S.E.2d 365 (1984). Finally, the party challenging an agency action on appeal has the burden of proving convincingly that the agency's decision is unsupported by substantial evidence. Waters, citing Hamm v. AT&T, 302 S.C. 210, 394 S.E.2d 842 (1990).

Nevertheless, a reviewing court is not so constrained when deciding questions of law. See Gibson v. Ameris Bank, 420 S.C. 536, 542, 804 S.E.2d 276, 279 (Ct. App. 2017) ("[Q]uestions of law may be decided with no particular deference to the trial courts.") (quoting U.S. Bank Trust Nat'l Ass'n v. Bell, 385 S.C. 364, 373, 684 S.E.2d 199, 204 (Ct. App. 2009)); see also Flexon v. PHC-Jasper, Inc., 413 S.C. 561, 569, 776 S.E.2d 397, 402 (Ct. App. 2015) ("This court [Court of Appeals] reviews questions of law de novo.") (quoting Proctor v. Steedley, 398 S.C. 561, 573, 730 S.E.2d 357, 363 (Ct. App. 2012)). However, "[t]he construction of a statute by the agency charged with its administration will be accorded the most respectful consideration and will not be overruled absent compelling reasons." Dunton v. S.C. Bd. of Exam'rs In Optometry, 291 S.C. 221, 223, 353 S.E.2d 132, 133 (1987) citing Emerson Electric Co. v. Wasson, 287 S.C. 394, 339 S.E.2d 118 (1986).

DISCUSSION

The Grievance Act provides a procedure for covered state employees to grieve certain employment actions. S.C. Code Ann. § 8-17-310 et seq. (2019). The Act prescribes time limits for initiating a grievance and for appealing an agency's decision. The Act assigns the State Human Resources Director "gatekeeper-like" functions relative to such appeals:

The statutory scheme regarding appeals in state employee grievance matters provides for an initial determination by the Personnel [State Human Resources] Director whether the action is "grievable." If the Personnel [State Human Resources] Director finds there has been full compliance with established
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