Boutwell v. State
| Decision Date | 10 June 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 43350,43350 |
| Citation | 256 Ga. 63,344 S.E.2d 222 |
| Parties | BOUTWELL v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
H. Haywood Turner III, Columbus, for Robert D. Boutwell.
William J. Smith, Dist. Atty., Columbus, Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Dennis R. Dunn, Staff Asst. Atty. Gen., for State.
Robert Douglas Boutwell was convicted of the murder of Todd Allen Wells and sentenced to life imprisonment. 1 At the time of the murder both men were inmates at the Jack T. Rutledge Correctional Institute in Columbus, Georgia.
The jury was authorized to find from the evidence offered at trial that the defendant, along with co-indictee Steven Terry Grover, 2 planned the victim's murder several days before the crime as punishment for information they believed the victim had provided prison officials concerning a home-made knife in the defendant's possession. James Daniell, another inmate, testified the defendant told him in detail of the plan to murder the victim. Daniell also testified that the defendant disliked the victim because the victim had made homosexual advances toward him. 3 The plan, as testified to by inmates Daniell and Grover, involved the strangulation of the victim by Grover in the dormitory shower while the defendant was in the prison courtyard establishing an alibi. Grover would then join the defendant in the prison yard and they would converse with the guards in order to establish an alibi for Grover. Grover testified the defendant planned to blame the murder "on a couple of blacks." 4 According to Grover's testimony he strangled the victim with his forearm, but because of recent shoulder surgery did not have the strength to kill him. When Grover did not appear in the courtyard as scheduled, the defendant returned to the dormitory shower. Finding the victim alive, the defendant choked him until he was no longer breathing, then ordered Grover to step on the victim's neck. While obtaining a pass to get a haircut, the defendant reported to a correctional officer that there was "something" in the shower which ought to be investigated. Moments later the victim was found dead. Medical evidence indicated he died of strangulation. Grover confessed the crime to GBI agents the following day. Grover testified that he, like the victim, had a prison reputation for being a "snitch", and that he participated in the defendant's plan because he was fearful of the defendant and of what could happen to prison informants. The defendant took the witness stand and denied participation in the crime, testifying that Grover had acted alone in murdering the victim.
1. The evidence, when viewed most favorably to the prosecution, would authorize a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
2. The defendant argues the State inpermissibly placed his character in evidence when a witness was permitted to testify the defendant was a member of the prison Ku Klux Klan. Testimony indicated that part of the defendant's plan was to blame the murder on "a couple of blacks." Additional inmate testimony demonstrated the defendant's racial biases. Steven Grover testified that the defendant was " 'two-faced' with blacks," pretending to be a friend to them while making racially derisive remarks about them to others. On cross-examination by the defendant a black inmate testified that the defendant had never exhibited "any type hatred" toward him and he had no knowledge of the defendant's alleged prejudices. To rebut this the State was permitted to offer the testimony of the prison superintendent that the defendant was a member of the Ku Klux Klan. This evidence was relevant to the State's contention that the defendant planned to blame the crime on black persons because of racial bias. "Evidence that is otherwise relevant and material to the issues in a criminal case does not become inadmissible simply because it incidentally puts a defendant's character or reputation into evidence." Daniels v. State, 252 Ga. 30, 32, 310 S.E.2d 904 (1984).
3. The defendant argues the trial court erred in charging the principles of flight as it was not possible to flee the confines of prison. It is undisputed that the defendant left the scene of the crime and obtained a pass to get a haircut. The defendant testified that he "came out of there pretty fast" after allegedly discovering the victim's body. The jury was charged that it might consider "whether to draw an inference of a consciousness of guilt" from "flight or similar acts." We find this to be a proper charge under the circumstances of the case. The charge was directed to the defendant's flight from the scene of the crime. The defendant's failure to "remain at the scene of the offense is circumstantial evidence of his guilt and of his knowledge of his guilt." Waters v. State, 248 Ga. 355, 366, 283 S.E.2d 238 (1981). (Emphasis supplied.) Thus the charge on flight was proper where the defendant left the scene of the crime even though he may have been unable to leave the confines of prison.
4. The defendant maintains he was denied the right to thoroughly cross-examine James Hylton regarding the victim's alleged homosexuality. We do not agree. Over the State's objection the defendant was permitted to inquire whether the witness had knowledge that the victim had made homosexual advances toward the witness "or anyone else." It is clear from the defendant's colloquy with the trial court following the State's objection that this was the only question the defendant sought to ask with regard to this issue.
5. In summarizing the evidence in closing argument the district attorney made reference to the prison superintendant's testimony that the defendant was a member of the Ku Klux Klan. The defendant objected that this statement placed his character in evidence; the trial court instructed the district attorney to "move on" with his argument. As we have held in Division 2, supra, that the reference to defendant's membership in this organization did not impermissibly place his character in evidence, we find no error.
In closing argument the district attorney referred to the defendant's testimony that he hoped "to get out [of prison] this year." The prosecutor then asked the jury, "Doesn't that put a shudder up and down your spine?" The defendant did not object to this statement at trial. We hold that he may not make his objection for the first time on appeal. Spivey v. State, 253 Ga. 187, 191, 319 S.E.2d 420 (1984). 5
6. Immediately after the victim's body was discovered all...
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Drane v. State, S99P1003.
...were relevant to show a possible motive for his actions. See Mize v. State, 269 Ga. 646(3), 501 S.E.2d 219 (1998); Boutwell v. State, 256 Ga. 63(2), 344 S.E.2d 222 (1986). 5. The trial court's curative instructions adequately prevented error from arising due to a spectator's emotional outbu......
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...case does not become inadmissible simply because it places a defendant's character or reputation into evidence.'" Boutwell v. State, 256 Ga. 63(2), 344 S.E.2d 222 (1986), quoting Daniels v. State, 252 Ga. 30(6), 310 S.E.2d 904 (1984); Earnest v. State, 262 Ga. 494(1), 422 S.E.2d 188 (1992) ......
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...the flight charge instructed the jury that it could infer a consciousness of guilt from evidence of flight. See Boutwell v. State, 256 Ga. 63(3), 344 S.E.2d 222 (1986). In disapproving of the flight charge in Renner, we said that[t]he charge serves no real purpose, as it is a particularizat......
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Death Penalty Law - Michael Mears and Holly Geerdes
...The court stated: "Errors not raised in the trial court will not be heard on appeal." Id. at 495, 422 S.E.2d 188 (citing Boutwell v. State, 256 Ga. 63, 65-66, 344 S.E.2d 222, 225 (1986)). 297. 276 Ga. at 50, 572 S.E.2d at 590. 298. Id. at 51-52, 572 S.E.2d at 591. 299. Id. at 52, 572 S.E.2d......