Bowers v. Roth

• Decision Date: 16 November 1920
• Docket Number: No. 33615.,33615.
• Citation: 179 N.W. 859,189 Iowa 1264
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court
• Parties: BOWERS & KING v. ROTH.

189 Iowa 1264

179 N.W. 859

BOWERS & KING

v.ROTH.

No. 33615.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Nov. 16, 1920.

Appeal from District Court, Poweshiek County; H. F. Wagner, Judge.

Original action upon a promissory note in justice of the peace court. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appealed to the district court, where a trial was had to a jury, resulting in a verdict and second judgment in favor of plaintiff. Defendant appeals. Reversed.Frank Bechly, of Montezuma, and M. W. Hyland, of Tama, for appellant.

Boyd & Boyd, of Malcolm, for appellee.

STEVENS, J.

It is conceded that the consideration of the note was services rendered to defendant in a real estate transaction with one George Owens. It is further admitted that plaintiff was the agent of both the defendant and Owens, and that the latter paid the agreed commission. Defendant alleged in his answer to plaintiff's petition, filed in justice of the peace court, that plaintiff represented Owens without his knowledge, and also that neither party knew that plaintiff was representing the other. Owens was called as a witness on behalf of defendant, and asked to state whether he paid plaintiff a commission in the transaction in question. Objections to this and other questions, seeking to show that plaintiff represented Owens, were sustained. The defendant then offered to prove by the witness that plaintiff acted as agent for him, and that at the time of the transaction, and when the note in suit was executed, he had no knowledge that plaintiff was receiving a commission from the defendant. Objection that this testimony was incompetent, immaterial, and irrelevant, and did not tend to support any issue in the case was sustained by the court. Defendant filed a motion for new trial upon the ground, among others, that the verdict of the jury was not sustained by the evidence, and that the court committed error in excluding the testimony of Owens. Contracts by which real estate and other agents agree, and seek, to represent and receive a commission from both the buyer and seller are quite uniformly held to be contrary to public policy and good morals, and a recovery will be permitted thereon only when both principals are shown to have had knowledge thereof. Rasmussen v. Hansen, 176 Iowa, 26, 157 N. W. 154;Rodenkirch v. Layton, 176 N. W. 897;Murphy v. Development Co., 169 Iowa, 551, 151 N. W. 500;Lindt v. Schlitz Brewing Co., 113 Iowa, 200, 84 N. W. 1059;Glenn v. Rice, 174 Cal. 269, 162 Pac. 1020;Hoffhines v. Thorson, 92 Kan. 605, 141 Pac. 253;Dennison v. Gault, 132 Mo. App. 301, 111 S. W. 844;Bell v. McConnell, 37 Ohio St. 396, 41 Am. Rep. 528;Friar v. Smith, 120 Mich. 411, 79 N. W. 633, 46 L. R. A. 229;Sullivan v. Tufts, 203 Mass. 155, 89 N. E. 239;Rice v. Wood, 113 Mass. 133, 18 Am. Rep. 459;Howard v. Murphy, 70 N. J. Law, 141, 56 Atl. 143, 1 Ann. Cas. 571;Campbell v. Baxter, 41 Neb. 729, 60 N. W. 90;Green v. So. States Lbr. Co., 141 Ala. 680, 37 South. 670;Chapman v. Currie, 51 Mo. App. 40.

If, therefore, only one of the parties knows of the dual agency, no recovery can be had from either. Glenn v. Rice, and other cases cited, supra. It is not sufficient if the proof shows only that the defendant knew of, and consented to, the arrangement by which the agent is employed to represent both parties. As was said by the Supreme Court of California in Glenn v. Rice, supra:

“The authorities, with practical unanimity, declare that, if an agent is engaged by both parties to effect a sale of property from one to the other, or an exchange between them, not as a mere middleman to bring them together, but actively in inducing each to make the trade, he cannot recover compensation from either party, unless both parties knew of the double agency at the time of the transaction. The reason for the rule is that he thereby puts himself in a position where his duty to one conflicts with his duty to the other, where his own interests tempt him to be unfaithful to both principals, a position which is against sound public policy and good morals. His contract for compensation being thus tainted, the law will not permit him to enforce it against either party. It is no answer to this objection to say that he did, in the particular case, act fairly and honorably to both. The infirmity of his contract does not arise from his actual conduct in the given case, but from the policy of the law, which will not allow a man to gain anything from a relation so conducive to bad faith and double dealing. And the fact that the party whom he sues was aware of the double agency and of the payment, or agreement to pay, compensation by the other party, and consented...