Bowler v. Deseret Village Ass'n, Inc., 950363

• Decision Date: 20 August 1996
• Docket Number: No. 950363,950363
• Citation: 922 P.2d 8
• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Parties: 132 Lab.Cas. P 33,427, 3 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 754 Kent and Amy BOWLER, husband and wife; Eduardo and Flora Rivera, husband and wife; and John and Mira Morgan, husband and wife, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. DESERET VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., a Utah corporation; Lee Childs, Leroi Nelson, Evelyn Fugate, Ray Beckham, Jim Chapman, and George Money, individuals; and Does 1 through 100, Defendants and Appellees.

Page 8

922 P.2d 8

132 Lab.Cas. P 33,427, 3 Wage & Hour Cas.2d

(BNA) 754

Kent and Amy BOWLER, husband and wife; Eduardo and Flora

Rivera, husband and wife; and John and Mira

Morgan, husband and wife, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. DESERET VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., a Utah corporation; Lee

Childs, Leroi Nelson, Evelyn Fugate, Ray Beckham, Jim

Chapman, and George Money, individuals; and Does 1 through

100, Defendants and Appellees.

No. 950363.

Supreme Court of Utah.

Aug. 20, 1996.

David G. Turcotte, Provo, for plaintiffs.

Michael E. Blue, Robert O. Rice, Salt Lake City, for defendants.

DURHAM, Justice:

Plaintiffs Kent and Amy Bowler, Eduardo and Flora Rivera, and John and Mira Morgan appeal from a district court decision denying their motion for summary judgment and granting summary judgment in favor of defendants Deseret Village Association, Inc. (Deseret Village), and others. Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in holding that they were exempt from the minimum wage and overtime protections of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 to 219 (1994 & Supp.1995). We affirm in part and reverse in part.

Deseret Village is a privately funded, nonprofit Utah corporation which provides a residential and vocational "development habitation" for fourteen marginally mentally and physically handicapped adults. Deseret Village employed plaintiffs to provide residents with general nurturing and companionship, emotional and spiritual support, fellowship, care, and protection. Pursuant to contract, they also performed a variety of maintenance services for Deseret Village, including meal preparation, cleaning laundry areas, general cleaning, washing vehicles, cleaning the garage, and maintaining the yards and grounds. Although residents were responsible for cleaning their own living quarters, plaintiffs supervised them. Deseret Village provided plaintiffs with an apartment to live in, a stipend for food and supplies, and a monthly salary of $350 to $400.

In 1994, plaintiffs filed an action in the district court seeking the minimum wage and overtime protections of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(f), 207 (1994 & Supp.1995). Defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis that under section 213(a)(15) of the FLSA, plaintiffs' services were exempt from the minimum wage and overtime protections because they qualified as "companionship" services. Plaintiffs objected and moved for summary judgment. The district court, however, determined that plaintiffs were domestic service employees who provided companionship services to the residents of Deseret Village under section 213(a)(15) of the FLSA and were therefore exempt from the minimum wage and overtime protections. Moreover, the court held that the general household exception to the companionship services exemption did not apply to plaintiffs as a matter of law. The court therefore granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals, which transferred plaintiffs' appeal to this court pursuant to section 78-2-2(3)(b) of the Utah Code.

Summary judgment is appropriate when the record indicates that no genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c); Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 438 (Utah 1996). In Walling v. General Industries Co., the United States Supreme Court held that questions regarding an employee's inclusion within one of the exemptions of the FLSA are questions of fact and should be overturned only where the judgment is clearly erroneous. 330 U.S. 545, 550, 67 S.Ct. 883, 885, 91 L.Ed. 1088 (1947); see also Legg v. Rock Prods. Mfg. Corp., 309 F.2d 172, 174 (10th Cir.1962). In this case, however, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants as a matter of law, finding no issue of material fact. "Should we conclude that a genuine issue of material fact exists, we must reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand for trial on that issue." Christensen v. Swenson, 874 P.2d 125, 127 (Utah 1994) (citing Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'l Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1989)). " 'Because entitlement to summary judgment is a question of law, we accord no deference to the trial court's resolution of the legal issues presented.' " Harline, 912 P.2d at 438 (quoting K & T, Inc. v. Koroulis, 888 P.2d 623, 627 (Utah 1994)). Thus, we review de novo a grant of summary judgment based on statutory construction. Id.

The FLSA generally provides minimum wage and overtime protection for domestic service employees. ¹ 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(f), 207. Section 213(a)(15) of the FLSA, however, exempts from these protections "any employee employed in domestic service employment to provide companionship services for individuals who (because of age or infirmity) are unable to care for themselves (as such terms are defined and delimited by regulations of the Secretary)." (Emphasis added.)

Plaintiffs first contend that they are not subject to section 213(a)(15) because they are not domestic service employees. They claim that the trial court erred in holding that they were domestic service employees because they performed services of a household nature in a privately funded residence. "Domestic service employment" is defined by federal regulation as

services of a household nature performed by an employee in or about a private home (permanent or temporary) of the person by whom he or she is employed. The term includes employees such as cooks, waiters, butlers, valets, maids, housekeepers, governesses, nurses, janitors, laundresses, caretakers, handymen, gardeners, footmen, grooms, and chauffeurs of automobiles for family use.... This listing is illustrative and not exhaustive.

29 C.F.R. § 552.3 (1995). The regulations also explain that the definition of "domestic service employment ... is derived from the regulations issued under the Social Security Act and from 'the generally accepted meaning' of the term. Accordingly, the term includes persons who are frequently referred to as 'private household workers.' " ² Id. § 552.101(a) (citation omitted). The House Report on section 213(a)(15) defines the term similarly:

The term "domestic service" employees is not defined in the Act. However the generally accepted meaning of domestic service relates to services of a household nature performed by an employee in or about the private home of the person by whom he or she is employed.... Generally, domestic service ... includes services performed by persons employed as cooks, butlers, valets, maids, housekeepers, governesses, janitors, laundresses, caretakers, handymen, gardeners, footmen, grooms, and chauffeurs of automobiles for family use.

H.R.Rep. No. 913, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2811, 2845. In the instant case, plaintiffs provided Deseret Village with a variety of maintenance services, including preparing meals, cleaning laundry areas, general cleaning, washing vehicles, cleaning the garage, and maintaining the yards. These are clearly the type of services the regulation envisioned as domestic services. See McCune v. Oregon Senior Servs. Div., 894 F.2d 1107, 1108 (9th Cir.1990) (holding that daily services such as general cleaning, cooking, and providing clients with medical care and hygiene fall within domestic services portion of FLSA).

Plaintiffs, however, contend that they were not domestic service employees because the services they provided were not "performed in or about the private home of [their] employer." See 29 C.F.R. §§ 552.3, 552.101 (1995). Neither the FLSA, its regulations, nor its legislative history defines the exact meaning of "private home." Therefore, we must "closely examine the living arrangement to determine whether the residences where the Plaintiff works should be characterized as 'private homes.' " Linn v. Developmental Servs. of Tulsa, Inc., 891 F.Supp. 574, 579 (N.D.Okla.1995). The regulations state that the definition of "private home" comes from "the generally accepted meaning" of the term and that a "private home" could include a "separate and distinct dwelling maintained by an individual or a family in an apartment house, condominium or hotel." 29 C.F.R. § 552.101(a). The regulations, however, exclude from the definition "dwelling places which are primarily rooming or boarding houses" where such are "commercial or business establishments." Id. § 552.101(b). Similarly, the House Report states that "a dwelling house used primarily as a boarding or lodging house for the purpose of supplying such services to the public, as a business enterprise, is not a private home." H.R.Rep. No. 913, 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2845. Section 203(r)(2) of the FLSA, in defining an enterprise, states:

[T]he activities performed by any person or persons--

(A) in connection with the operation of a hospital, [or] an institution primarily engaged in the care of the sick, the aged, the mentally ill or defective who reside on the premises of such institution, ... (regardless of whether ... such hospital, institution, or school is operated for profit or not for profit),

....

... shall be deemed to be activities performed for a business purpose.

(Emphasis added.)

No federal case law has determined whether a residence identical to Deseret Village would qualify as a private home under the FLSA. ³ The statute and its regulations, however, indicate that the definition of a "private home" exists along a continuum. A traditional family home in which a single family resides would clearly be a "private home," but a "private home" would not include an "institution primarily engaged in the care of the sick, the aged, the mentally ill" or a boarding house used for business or commercial purposes. However, various living situations fall in between these extremes which may or may not be "private homes" for the purposes of 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(15). ⁴ Because the definition of "private home" envisions various living arrangements, we...