Madison v. Resources for Human Development, Inc.

Decision Date08 January 1999
Docket NumberNo. Civ.A. 97-7402.,Civ.A. 97-7402.
Citation39 F.Supp.2d 542
PartiesDannett MADISON, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. RESOURCES FOR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, INC., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

Joshua P. Rubinsky, Philadelphia, PA, Jay H. Dahlke, Brodie & Rubinsky, Philadelphia, PA, for Dannett Madison, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated, plaintiff.

Paul G. Nofer, Klehr, Harrison, Harvey, Branzburg & Ellers, Philadelphia, PA, for Resources for Human Development, Inc., defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

KATZ, District Judge.

The plaintiffs, an opt-in class of fourteen current and former employees of defendant Resources for Human Development, Inc. (RHD), claim that RHD underpays its employees for overtime because it does not include bonuses and its contributions to the employees' benefit plan in the employees' regular pay rate as required by the Fair Labor Standards Act (the FLSA). Before the court is the defendant's motion for summary judgment.1

The Fair Labor Standards Act is intended to guarantee to employees certain minimum labor standards. See Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292, 80 S.Ct. 332, 4 L.Ed.2d 323 (1960). It does so principally by requiring the payment of a minimum wage and the payment of an overtime premium of one and one half times the employee's regular rate of pay for hours worked in excess of forty in a given week. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207(a). At issue in this case is whether the defendant is properly calculating its employees' regular rate. It uses their hourly wage, but plaintiffs argue it should be higher because it should include contributions to the benefit plan and bonuses. Preliminary to those issues, though, RHD argues that the FLSA's overtime pay rule is not applicable to plaintiffs at all because they are a type of employee exempted from the Act's coverage.

Companion Exemption

RHD argues that the plaintiffs are not covered by the FLSA because they are members of a class of employees exempted by statute. Specifically, the Act excludes from coverage "any employee employed in domestic service employment to provide companionship services for individuals who (because of age or infirmity) are unable to care for themselves." 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(15). To fit within the exemption, then, the statute requires that three elements must be met: (1) the employees must be employed in domestic employment, (2) the employees must provide companionship services, and (3) the services must be for qualified aged or infirm individuals.

Exemptions from the FLSA are to be construed narrowly against the employer. It is the employer's burden to prove that its employees come within the scope of the exemption, and "any exemption from the Act must be proven plainly and unmistakenly." Friedrich v. U.S. Computer Servs., 974 F.2d 409, 412 (3d Cir.1992). The specific requirements of the elements of the companion exemption are not set forth in the statute. Rather, they are articulated in the regulations and interpretations of the Secretary of Labor.2 The regulations define "domestic service employment" as follows:

services of a household nature performed by an employee in or about a private home (permanent or temporary) of the person by whom he or she is employed.3 The term includes employees such as cooks, waiters, butlers, valets, maids, housekeepers, governesses, nurses, janitors, laundresses, caretakers, handymen, gardeners, footmen, grooms, and chauffeurs.... This listing is illustrative and not exhaustive.

29 C.F.R. § 552.3. To restate, to be employed in domestic employment, employees must perform household services in a private home.

Defendant cannot satisfy its burden of proving that its employees meet this test for domestic employment, because RHD's clients' homes are sufficiently institutionalized that they are not "private homes" within the meaning of the statute. The court's decision is informed by the similar analyses performed by other district courts in Linn v. Developmental Servs. of Tulsa, Inc., 891 F.Supp. 574, 577-80 (N.D.Okla.1995), and Lott v. Rigby, 746 F.Supp. 1084, 1086-89 (N.D.Ga.1990), as well as Terwilliger v. Home of Hope, Inc., 21 F.Supp.2d 1294, 1300 (N.D.Okla.1998). See also Bowler v. Deseret Village Assoc., Inc., 922 P.2d 8 (Utah 1996). Each of these cases makes it clear that the private home determination is highly fact-specific and to be made on a case-by-case basis, and that no one factor is dispositive. To engage in the required analysis of the facts, it is first necessary to set forth a somewhat detailed description of the RHD program.4

RHD is a non-profit corporation engaged in providing human services programs including head-start programs, community health centers, low income housing, transportation services, community living programs for adults with mental health and mental retardation challenges, drug and alcohol abuse programs, and assistance to homeless people. To do so, it is subdivided into several programs, and it employs a total of approximately 2,400 people. Plaintiffs are or were residential advisors in RHD's "Mandela" and "Visions" programs. These programs provide assistance, support, and training to adults who face mental health or mental retardation challenges. Stip. ¶¶ 1-4.

These RHD programs serve adults released from state mental hospitals or referred by other agencies who are not able to care for themselves on their own but do not need hospitalization. See Def.Ex. 1 (Bligen.Decl.) ¶ 2; Def.Ex. 3 (Johnson Decl.) ¶ 2. The case managers overseeing the individuals' de-institutionalization must find a service provider that will provide community living arrangements in a controlled setting. RHD, through its Mandela and Visions programs, is one such provider in the Philadelphia area. The RHD community living arrangements are considered a middle step to independence. Some of the clients can learn to live on their own, through a long and difficult process.

Each individual receives the services of a county case management team, which oversees the use of government funds based on a treatment plan developed by the county mental health professionals on the team, with the input of the individual, the individual's advocate, and family members. When a service provider such as RHD is involved, it also has input into the development of the treatment plan. The plan, the contents and implementation of which are controlled by state and federal regulations, specifies the individual's appropriate living arrangement. If RHD and the individual agree to place the person in the program after a referral from the case manager, state and federal resources that supported that person in the institution or prior living arrangement follow him or her into the RHD community living arrangement. See Pl.Ex. 2 (Bligen Dep.) at 5-7. Once RHD enters into a contract with the county undertaking to provide services for the individual, it must comply with the requirements of the plan to receive funding. County case managers and other county officials assess compliance through periodic review of documentation and quarterly and yearly inspections. See Pl.Ex. 4 (Cox-Scales Dep.) at 35.

When a client first is referred to an RHD program, one of the first tasks for the client and RHD is to decide where the client will live. Usually, the RHD representative will know at the time of the initial interview at which location the new client will be placed. In other instances, the RHD representative will work with a realtor to develop a list of locations that are pre-approved by the county case management team. Only after that pre-approval is the location shown to the client. See Pl.Ex. 2 (Bligen Dep.) at 20, 34-35. The client enters into a rental agreement with RHD, and RHD rents from whatever third party owns the property (RHD owns one location itself). See Pl.Ex. 15-18 (examples). Each lease RHD enters into with a landlord contains a clause which provides that if the program loses government funding, RHD may terminate the lease. See Pl.Ex. 5 (Jackson Dep.) at 147; Pl.Ex. 17 (example).

RHD clients pay up to seventy-two percent of their monthly Social Security Disability payments to RHD, which goes toward rent and other ordinary household expenses such as food and utilities. See Def.Ex. 1 (Bligen Decl.) ¶ 6; Def.Ex. 3 (Johnson Decl.) ¶ 6. In the case of at least one residence, the amount paid by the client does not cover the lease expenses of the home.5 For an apartment at the 1705 Hamilton Building for which RHD pays monthly rent of $649, the one client who lives there pays $375.41 monthly, which goes not only to rent but for food and utilities. The difference is made up by state and county funds. See Pl.Ex. 2 (Bligen Dep.) at 39. Utilities are frequently registered in the resident's name, see Def Ex. 1 (Bligen Decl.) ¶ 8; Def.Ex. 3 (Johnson Decl.) ¶ 8, but under the terms of the lease the utility charges are included as part of the client' room and board payment to RHD. See Def.Ex. 1B.

All residents of RHD housing are bound by the house rules, which include the following: no drugs or alcohol, no loud music, residents must be dressed if outside their bedrooms between 8:30 a.m. and 10:00 p.m., and residents are to "keep the staff of Mandela apartments informed as to their whereabouts at all times." These rules are in the rental agreement the client signs with RHD. See Def.Ex. 1B.

RHD employees handle the personal spending money of some clients. Fifteen dollars per week (Social Security Disability provides thirty dollars each month, which amount is supplemented by the county) is disbursed by the county case manager to an RHD staff member, and the RHD staff then disburses the money to the client as provided in the individual's treatment plan. For clients who can handle fifteen dollars at a time, the whole amount is given to them once a week; for individuals who cannot manage such a sum of...

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4 cases
  • Madison v. Resources for Human Development
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit
    • 27 Diciembre 2000
    ...disputes on the application of the FLSA and of S 213(a)(15) and S 207(e)(4). See Madison v. Resources for Human Development, Inc., Civ. No. 97-7402, 39 F.Supp.2d 542,546 at n.4 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 8, 1999). The court also held as a matter of law RHD could not claim the companionship exemption an......
  • Carter v. Primary Home Care of Hot Springs, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Arkansas
    • 14 Mayo 2015
    ...be made on a case-by-case basis, and that no factor is dispositive.'" Johnston, 213 F.3d at 565 (quoting Madison v. Res. for Human Dev., Inc., 39 F. Supp. 2d 542, 546 (E.D. Pa. 1999)). In that case, the court determined that the defendant ran the residences at issue "as part of an overall c......
  • Johnston v. Volunteers of America Inc., KING-WILLIAMS
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit
    • 23 Mayo 2000
    ...exception did not apply because they were employed by the agency and not the individual clients); Madison v. Resources for Human Development, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 2d 542, 545 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (holding that pursuant to 29 C.F.R. 552.109, "[a]lthough the plaintiffs are employed by RHD rather ......
  • Welding v. Bios Corp.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit
    • 6 Enero 2004
    ...because the mere onset of services is not likely to change the nature of the living unit. See, e.g., Madison v. Res. for Human Dev., Inc., 39 F.Supp.2d 542, 548 (E.D.Pa.1999) (Madison I) (describing as an "easy-to-spot private home" those where "the families lived in their homes prior to an......

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