Bowman v. National Graphics Corp.
| Decision Date | 26 July 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 77-1182,77-1182 |
| Citation | 9 O.O.3d 159,378 N.E.2d 1056,55 Ohio St.2d 222 |
| Parties | , 9 O.O.3d 159 BOWMAN, Appellee, v. NATIONAL GRAPHICS CORP., Appellant, Krouse, Admr., et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Joseph L. Bowman (appellee herein) had been employed by National Graphics Corporation (appellant herein) since 1960 as a book binder. According to Bowman, part of his duties involved lifting paper bundles weighing 50 to 150 pounds from a skid to an elevated work level.
In January of 1973, appellee experienced back pains which progressively worsened throughout that year. On or about January 10, 1974, appellee found that he could not lift the bundles as required by his job, and called his employer on that date to report that he was going to see a doctor. Appellee subsequently sent an accident report to appellant, and did not return to work.
It is admitted that there was no specific incident which appellee could identify as causing his back injury; rather, the injury was the result of a gradual worsening condition caused by or arising out of his employment.
Appellee subsequently filed a claim with the Bureau of Workers' Compensation, which claim was allowed by the deputy administrator on or about April 11, 1974, and affirmed by the regional board of review on September 26, 1974. On January 30, 1975, the Industrial Commission refused to hear appellant's appeal.
On appeal to the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County, the court affirmed the decision of the regional board of review.
The Court of Appeals, in affirming the judgment, held that appellee's injury, although not the result of a sudden mishap or accidental occurrence, was "accidental in character and result," and therefore was compensable.
Because its construction of the term "injury," as defined in R.C. 4123.01(C), was in conflict with the construction given to that term by the Court of Appeals for Allen County in Hamilton v. Keller (1967), 11 Ohio App.2d 121, 229 N.E.2d 63, the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, pursuant to Section 3(B) (4) of Article IV of the Ohio Constitution, certified the record of the case to this court for review and final determination.
Crane, Heltzel & Barridge and Rodger W. Heltzel, Worthington, for plaintiff-appellee Bowman.
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, Thomas M. Taggart and Robert E. Tait, Columbus, for appellant.
William J. Brown, Atty. Gen., and Michael J. Hickey, Columbus, for defendant-appellees, Krouse, Administrator and Industrial Commission.
The issue to be decided in this cause is whether the agency and the courts below correctly held that a physical disability caused by the performance of one's normal job duties, which disability develops gradually over a prolonged period of time on the job, is a compensable injury within the meaning of R.C. 4123.01(C). Amendatory language was inserted in the statute effective November 2, 1959 (Am.Sub. H.B.No. 470; 128 Ohio Laws 743, 745).
That section then provided and still provides:
" 'Injury' includes any injury, whether caused by external accidental means or accidental in character and result, received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's employment."
It is of particular interest that the Bureau of Workers' Compensation and the Industrial Commission are now alleging that they erred in originally allowing appellee's claim as an "injury" under R.C. 4123.01(C). Their brief states:
"The Bureau and the Commission feel compelled to make this concession (that they erred) since the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals in this case, adopts a definition of 'injury' substantially different than that currently being applied by these agencies, and substantially different from the definition set forth by this Court."
This court has never held a claim such as appellee's to be an "injury" as defined in the statute. We have held that in order to be a compensable injury, a claimant's condition must be "accidental in its character in the sense of being the result of a sudden mishap occurring by chance, unexpectedly and not in the usual course of events, at a particular time and place." Malone v. Indus. Comm. (1942), 140 Ohio St. 292, paragraph one of the syllabus, 43 N.E.2d 266.
The statutory language we are now required to interpret was the language of Malone and post-dated Malone. That language was offered as an amendment to proposed House Bill No. 470. In adopting the 1959 amendment, the General Assembly rejected the definition proposed in House Bill No. 470, which would have defined "injury" as follows:
By adopting the compromise definition of injury it is clear that the General Assembly intended to follow the rule articulated in Malone. The words "accidental in character and result" used in the compromise definition are precisely the words which had been used by the court in the second paragraph of the syllabus in Malone.
In 1962, this court recognized that legislative intent in the case of Hearing v. Wylie (1962), 173 Ohio St. 221, at 223, 180 N.E.2d 921, at 922, wherein it was stated:
"The conclusion is inescapable to a majority of this court that the General Assembly intended to define 'injury' in the terms of the Malone rule."
Under the stated facts of this cause it is clear that we cannot affirm the holding of the court below except by reversing our holding in Malone and by ignoring the language chosen by the General Assembly from that case.
Clearly, under the facts of the instant cause there was no occurrence which was unforeseen, unexpected, and unusual which produced Bowman's disability. His disability simply developed gradually over a period of time as a result of performing his normal work activities. As a matter of fact, given the type of physical work Bowman performed, his disability may well have been predicted and expected to have developed as a result of normal "wear and tear."
Whether the members of this court believe that gradually occurring "wear and tear" type disabilities resulting from normal employment activities should be compensable, the adoption of such a concept is properly a function of the General Assembly and not a function of the judiciary. Section 35 of Article II of the Ohio Constitution clearly grants the General Assembly that authority, by providing in part:
"For the purpose of providing compensation to workmen and their dependents, for death, injuries or occupational disease, occasioned in the course of such workmen's employment, laws may be passed establishing a state fund to be created by compulsory contribution thereto by employers, and administered by the state, Determining the terms and conditions upon which payment shall be made therefrom." (Emphasis added.)
In defining the term "injury" in R.C. 4123.01(C), the General Assembly outlined one of the most basic conditions for participation in the Workers' Compensation fund. This being so, it was the obligation of the Court of Appeals below to apply the enacted law rather than to attempt to amend it.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
Judgment reversed.
I must dissent to the majority's conclusion that the appellee's injury is not compensable under the Act. In coming to its conclusion, the majority has ignored the legislative response to the court's prior rulings as evidenced in the changes that have been made in the statutory definition of the term "injury," and has retained a distinction or test regarding the compensability of a work-related disability not founded on the statutory language or supported by the purposes of the Act.
In 1911, a voluntary system of workmen's compensation was introduced under former G.C. 1465-59 (102 Ohio Laws 524, 529) which provided coverage to those workers of employers participating in the plan who were "injured in the course of their employment, wheresoever such injury has occurred, and which have not been purposely self-inflicted * * *."
Pursuant to the 1912 Amendment to the Ohio Constitution, Section 35 of Article II granted the General Assembly the power to pass a compulsory Workmen's Compensation Act, stating:
"For the purpose of providing compensation to workmen and their dependents, for death, injuries or occupational disease, occasioned in the course of such workmen's employment, laws may be passed establishing a state fund to be created by compulsory contribution thereto by employers * * *."
Subsequently, the General Assembly enacted Am.S.B.No 48, 103 Ohio Laws 72, 79, which provided that employees qualifying under the plan who were "injured" were entitled to share in the Fund, and provided further that dependents of qualified employees who were killed "in the course of employment" were also entitled to share in the Fund.
As noted in Fassig v. State ex rel. Turner (1917), 95 Ohio St. 232, 236, 116 N.E. 104, 105, "the paramount purpose of the (constitutional) amendment was to leave no doubt as to the power of the legislature to pass a Compulsory act for the establishment of a state insurance fund to be administered by the state, to which fund employers should be compelled to contribute." (Emphasis Sic.)
The Fassig court explained the basic rationale of the constitutional amendment thusly at pages 236-237, 116 N.E. at page 105:
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...sudden mishap occurring at a particular time and place * * *," id. at 131, as previously had been done in Bowman v. National Graphics Corp. (1978), 55 Ohio St.2d 222, 378 N.E.2d 1056 Today, we again refer to the plain language of R.C. 4123.01(C) and apply the statutory directive that the Wo......
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Village v. General Motors Corp., G.M.A.D.
...result of the performance of the injured worker's job-related duties is compensable under R.C. 4123.01(C). (Bowman v. National Graphics Corp., 55 Ohio St.2d 222, 378 N.E.2d 1056 , Appellant, Michael Village, worked in various capacities for appellee, General Motors Corporation, from June 19......
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