BOX L CORP. v. TETON COUNTY BD. OF COM'RS

• Citation: 2004 WY 75,92 P.3d 811
• Decision Date: 29 June 2004
• Docket Number: No. 03-153.,03-153.
• Parties: BOX L CORPORATION, a Wyoming corporation, Russell Lucas and Jim Lucas, d/b/a Lazy Double A Ranch, Appellants (Plaintiffs), v. TETON COUNTY, Wyoming, by the BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF TETON COUNTY, Consisting of Jolynn Coonce, Bob Shervin, Bill Paddleford, Sandy Shuptrine and Andy Schwartz; and Gros Ventre Utility Company, a Wyoming corporation, Appellees (Defendants).
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Wyoming

92 P.3d 811

2004 WY 75

BOX L CORPORATION, a Wyoming corporation, Russell Lucas and Jim Lucas, d/b/a Lazy Double A Ranch, Appellants (Plaintiffs), v. TETON COUNTY, Wyoming, by the BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF TETON COUNTY, Consisting of Jolynn Coonce, Bob Shervin, Bill Paddleford, Sandy Shuptrine and Andy Schwartz; and Gros Ventre Utility Company, a Wyoming corporation, Appellees (Defendants).

No. 03-153.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

June 29, 2004.

Representing Appellants: William L. Miller of Miller & Fasse, P.C., Riverton, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee Board of County Commissioners of Teton County: James L. Radda, Deputy County Attorney, Jackson, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee Gros Ventre Utility Company: Christopher H. Hawks of Christopher Hawks, P.C., Jackson, Wyoming.

Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

VOIGT, Justice.

[¶ 1] Servient estate owners brought a declaratory judgment action challenging a county's agreement with a utility company for use of a public road easement. The servient estate owners now appeal the district court's order granting the county and the utility company judgment on the pleadings. We affirm.

ISSUES

1. May the grantee of a public road easement convey to another the right to use the right-of-way?

2. May a public road easement be used for purposes other than road travel?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶ 2] We recently reiterated our standard of review of a judgment on the pleadings in Rodriguez v. Casey, 2002 WY 111, ¶ 4, 50 P.3d 323, 325 (Wyo.2002):

W.R.C.P. 12(c) provides, in part, for motions for judgment on the pleadings:

"Motion for judgment on the pleadings.—After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings."

We have a well-established standard for application of this rule:

"A defendant is entitled to judgment on the pleadings if the undisputed facts appearing in the pleadings, supplemented by any facts of which the district court may take judicial notice, establish that no relief can be granted.... A judgment on the pleadings is appropriate if all material allegations of fact are admitted in the pleadings and only questions of law remain."

Greeves v. Rosenbaum, 965 P.2d 669, 671 (Wyo.1998) (citing Johnson v. Griffin, 922 P.2d 860, 861-62 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 971, 117 S.Ct. 402, 136 L.Ed.2d 316 (1996)). Our review is akin to consideration of a motion to dismiss under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Greeves, 965 P.2d at 672. We consider the allegations of the complaint to be true, and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id.

FACTS¹

[¶ 3] This controversy concerns the Spring Gulch Road, in Teton County, Wyoming. In 1975, Phillip W. Lucas (Lucas) granted to Teton County (the County) a Right of Way Easement for that portion of the Spring Gulch Road crossing his lands. The purpose of the easement was "to lay out, construct, inspect, operate and maintain a road for the use of the public...." Lucas granted the easement for a nominal fee, as a good citizen and neighbor.

[¶ 4] In 1981, Clifford P. Hansen, Martha C. Hansen, Peter B. Mead, Mary H. Mead, and Spring Creek Ranch Company (collectively Hansen/Mead) granted to the County a Spring Gulch Road Easement and Agreement for that portion of the Spring Gulch Road crossing their properties. The purpose of the easement was "to lay out, construct, operate and maintain a road thereon for the use of the public and for the placement of utilities...." The easement was to be perpetual and was to "inure to the benefit of the parties, their respective heirs, personal representatives, successors and assigns." The easement was granted for a nominal fee, as good citizens and neighbors.

[¶ 5] In 1987, Box L Ranch (Box L) granted to the county and its successors and assigns, an Easement for that portion of the Spring Gulch Road crossing its lands. The purpose of the easement was "to lay out, construct, inspect, operate and maintain a road for the use of the public...." Box L granted the easement for a nominal fee, as a good citizen and neighbor.²

[¶ 6] In 2002, the County and Gros Ventre Utility Company (Gros Ventre) entered into a Spring Gulch Road Right-of-Way Use Agreement (the Use Agreement). The purpose of the Use Agreement is to allow Gros Ventre, a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Jackson Hole Golf & Tennis Club, Inc., to construct "an eight (8) inch waste water interceptor line or main and appurtenant structures specifically including manholes for the purpose of connecting the current and proposed development at Jackson Hole Golf and Tennis Club, Teton Shadows, and possibly other adjacent development to the Town of Jackson Waste Water Collection and Treatment System." Gros Ventre is to pay the County $280,000.00 for the right to use the right-of-way.

[¶ 7] The appellants are the current owners of the servient estates in the Lucas and Box L Easements.³ Their complaint sought from the district court a declaration that the County did not have the right to convey to Gros Ventre the right to use the right-of-way covered by the easements, and also sought an order enjoining the County from transferring any interest in the easements to any non-public entity or for any non-public use.

DISCUSSION

[¶ 8] In their Joint Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, the County and Gros Ventre first noted that Gros Ventre is a public utility,⁴ and then presented three arguments supporting the legality of the Use Agreement: (1) the easements are assignable by their very terms; (2) commercial easements in gross are freely assignable; and (3) the proposed sewer line does not exceed the scope of the public road easements. The appellants' traverse to the motion contended in response that: (1) pursuant to Public Service Commission v. Formal Complaint of WWZ Co., 641 P.2d 183, 187 (Wyo.1982), Gros Ventre, as a private sewage disposal company, is not a public utility; (2) the easements do not contain express assignment provisions; (3) the intent of the parties to the easements was limited to a roadway; (4) easements in gross are not freely assignable; (5) the proposed sewer line is not for the benefit of the public; and (6) the County cannot transfer an easement upon an easement. The parties make the same arguments on appeal.⁵

[¶ 9] The district court issued its decision letter on September 3, 2002, granting judgment on the pleadings to the County and Gros Ventre on two grounds: (1) commercial easements in gross are alienable; and (2) public road easements may be used for other purposes, including sewer lines. The district court added that, the appellants having conceded that the County could install a sewer line, it should make no difference that this sewer line was being installed by a private company. Finally, the district court noted that it did not appear the appellants were injured by the project.

[¶ 10] Discussion of the specific issues of this case best takes place in the context of the general law of easements. An easement is "`an interest in land which entitles the easement holder to a limited use or enjoyment over another person's property.'" Hasvold v. Park County School Dist. No. 6, 2002 WY 65, ¶ 13, 45 P.3d 635, 638 (Wyo.2002) (quoting Mueller v. Hoblyn, 887 P.2d 500, 504 (Wyo.1994)

). We attempt to ascertain the intent of the parties to an easement first from its language, and we resort to extrinsic evidence only if we find that language ambiguous. Hasvold, 2002 WY 65, ¶ 13,

45 P.3d at 638. Of particular pertinence to the present case is the distinction between an appurtenant easement and an easement in gross:

"`"An easement is appurtenant to the land when the easement is created to benefit and does benefit the possessor of the land in his use of the land."' Weber v. Johnston Fuel Liners, Inc., 519 P.2d 972, 975 (Wyo.1974) (quoting Restatement of Property § 453, at 2914 (1944)). In contrast, `"[a]n easement is in gross when it is not created to benefit or when it does not benefit the possessor of any tract of land in his use of it as such possessor."' Id. (quoting Restatement of Property, supra, § 454, at 2917). An easement will not be presumed to be in gross when it can fairly be construed to be appurtenant. Id."

Hasvold, 2002 WY 65, ¶ 14, 45 P.3d at 638 (quoting R.C.R., Inc. v. Rainbow Canyon, Inc., 978 P.2d 581, 586 (Wyo.1999)

). The parties concur that the Lucas and Box L easements are easements in gross.

[¶ 11] Generally, the law favors the free alienability of property interests. 63C Am.Jur.2d Property § 35 at 103 (1997). This public policy has been articulated as follows:

"Property interests are, in general, alienable. If a particular property interest is not alienable, this result must be due to some policy against the alienability of such an interest. The policy of the law has been, in general, in favor of a high degree of alienability of property interests. This policy arises from a belief that the social interest is promoted by the greater utilization of the subject matter of property resulting from the freedom of alienation of interests in it."

Thar v. Edwin N. Moran Revocable Trust, 905 P.2d 413, 415 (Wyo.1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Restatement of the Law of Property § 489, cmt. a (1944)). See also Williams v. Watt, 668 P.2d 620, 635 (Wyo. 1983) (Thomas, J., specially concurring)

; Hartnett v. Jones, 629 P.2d 1357, 1361 (Wyo. 1981); and McGinnis v. McGinnis, 391 P.2d 927, 933 (Wyo.1964).

[¶ 12] This general rule of free alienability, however, has limited application to easements. An appurtenant easement is tied to the dominant estate, is conveyed with a conveyance of that estate, and cannot be conveyed independently thereof. Voss v. Albany County Com'rs, 2003 WY 94, ¶ 28, 74 P.3d 714, 723 (Wyo.2003); Baker v. Pike, 2002 WY 34, ¶ 14, 41 P.3d 537, 542 (Wyo. 2002); Weber v. Johnston Fuel Liners, Inc., 519 P.2d 972, 976-77 (Wyo.1974); 25 Am....