Rodriguez v. Casey
| Decision Date | 18 July 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 01-195.,01-195. |
| Citation | 2002 WY 111,50 P.3d 323 |
| Parties | Joseph A. RODRIGUEZ, Personal Representative of the Estate of Loren Linton, Deceased, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. June C. CASEY, Personal Representative of the Estate of Robert C. Wilkoske, Deceased, Appellee (Defendant). |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
David G. Lewis, Jackson, Wyoming; and David Broiles, Fort Worth, TX, Representing Appellant.
J. Kent Rutledge and Becket B. Hinckley of Lathrop & Rutledge, P.C., Cheyenne, WY, Representing Appellee.
Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN,1 KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.
[¶ 1] This is an appeal from a judgment on the pleadings granted to the Wilkoske Estate in a wrongful death action. The district court held that the complaint was premature and ineffective because it was filed before the related claim was rejected by the personal representative of the Wilkoske Estate, and that, when the two-year condition precedent of the wrongful death statute expired prior to such rejection, so, too, did the cause of action.
[¶ 2] We reverse.
[¶ 3] The Linton Estate phrases the issue as follows:
Can a wrongful death claimant against a tortfeasor-decedent's estate file suit on the day the condition precedent terminates, even though the personal representative has yet not rejected his claim.
The Wilkoske Estate rephrases the issue as follows:
Where a wrongful death suit against an estate is filed before the required creditor's claim is rejected, is the suit timely under the wrongful death statu[t]e if the creditor's claim is not rejected until after the two-year wrongful death condition precedent has expired?
For simplicity's sake, we state the issue as follows:
What does the word "maintain" mean in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-7-717 (LexisNexis 2001)?
[¶ 4] W.R.C.P. 12(c) provides, in part, for motions for judgment on the pleadings:
Motion for judgment on the pleadings.— After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings.
We have a well-established standard for application of this rule:
cert. denied, 519 U.S. 971, 117 S.Ct. 402, 136 L.Ed.2d 316 (1996)). Our review is akin to consideration of a motion to dismiss under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Greeves, 965 P.2d at 672. We consider the allegations of the complaint to be true, and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. We have previously held that W.R.C.P. 12(c) is available when an entire controversy may be disposed of because a statute of limitations provides an effective bar to recovery, and we see no reason why the same remedy should not be available when the issue is the condition precedent of the wrongful death statute. Johnson, 922 P.2d at 862.
[¶ 5] On October 25, 1998, Loren Linton was driving a truck belonging to Sunrise Express on Interstate 80 near Laramie. Linton was killed when his truck collided with a tow truck being driven by Robert Wilkoske. Wilkoske died several months later of causes unrelated to the accident.
[¶ 6] On October 20, 2000, acting as an estate creditor, Sunrise Express filed a petition to open the Wilkoske Estate. On October 23, 2000, the Linton Estate was also established. On the same date, the Linton Estate filed a creditor's claim in the Wilkoske Estate, based on the alleged wrongful death of Linton. The following day, the Linton Estate filed a wrongful death complaint against the Wilkoske Estate. The Linton Estate's probate claim was not rejected by the personal representative of the Wilkoske Estate until January 26, 2001. The same attorney created both estates, got both personal representatives appointed, and filed the creditor's claim, the claim rejection, and the wrongful death complaint.
[¶ 7] The present appeal arises within the above-mentioned wrongful death action. At issue is the interplay between two separate statutory time limitations—one in the wrongful death statutes and one in the probate code. The substantive cause of action for wrongful death is created by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-38-101 (LexisNexis 2001):
Whenever the death of a person is caused by wrongful act, neglect or default such as would have entitled the party injured to maintain an action to recover damages if death had not ensued, the person who would have been liable if death had not ensued is liable in an action for damages, even though the death was caused under circumstances as amount in law to murder in the first or second degree or manslaughter. If the person liable dies, the action may be brought against the executor or administrator of his estate. If he left no estate within the state of Wyoming, the court may appoint an administrator upon application.
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-38-102(d) (LexisNexis 2001) contains the time limitation that is pertinent to the present controversy:
Every such action shall be commenced within two (2) years after the death of the deceased person.
[¶ 8] The import of this time constraint in the matter at hand lies in its application by the district court because of the way the district court construed certain time limitations in the probate code. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-7-703(a) (LexisNexis 2001) requires claims against an estate to be filed with the court clerk within three months after the date of first publication of a notice to creditors. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-7-712(a) (LexisNexis 2001) then provides that the personal representative is to allow or reject the claim within thirty days after expiration of the time for filing claims. The probate code time requirement bearing most directly on the instant case is found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-7-717 (LexisNexis 2001):
No holder of any claim against an estate shall maintain any action thereon unless the claim is first rejected in whole or in part by the personal representative and the rejection filed with the clerk....
(Emphasis added.) Finally, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-7-718 (LexisNexis 2001) provides as follows:
When a claim is rejected and notice given as required, the holder shall bring suit in the proper court against the personal representative within thirty (30) days after the date of mailing the notice, otherwise the claim is forever barred.
(Emphasis added.)
[¶ 9] The issue before this Court is purely a question of statutory construction. Our standards for that process have often been repeated:
19 P.3d at 506 (quoting In re Claim of Prasad, 11 P.3d at 347). An ambiguous statute is one whose meaning is uncertain because it is susceptible to more than one interpretation. Pierson v. State, 956 P.2d 1119, 1125 (Wyo. 1998) (quoting Amrein v. State, 836 P.2d 862, 864-65 (Wyo.1992)).
It is a basic rule of statutory construction that courts may try to determine legislative intent by considering the type of statute being interpreted and what the legislature intended by the language used, viewed in light of the objects and purposes to be accomplished.... Furthermore, when we are confronted with two possible but conflicting conclusions, we will choose the one most logically designed to cure the mischief or inequity that the legislature was attempting to accomplish.
In re Collicott, 2001 WY 35, ¶ 9, 20 P.3d 1077, 1080 (Wyo.2001). We presume that statutes are enacted by the legislature with full knowledge of existing law, so we construe statutes in harmony with existing law, particularly other statutes relating to the same subject or having the same purpose. In re Estate of Fosler, 13 P.3d 686, 688-89 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting Matter of Voss' Adoption, 550 P.2d 481, 486 (Wyo.1976)
).
[¶ 10] Statutes must be construed so that no portion is rendered meaningless. Mazurek v. State, 10 P.3d 531, 541 (Wyo.2000). Interpretation should not produce an absurd result. Id. We are guided by the full text of the statute, paying attention to its internal structure and the functional relation between the parts and the whole. In re Worker's Compensation Claim of Johnson, 2001 WY 48, ¶ 8, 23 P.3d 32, 35 (Wyo.2001) (quoting In re Hernandez, 8 P.3d 318, 321 (Wyo.2000)
and Parker Land and Cattle Co. v. Wyoming Game and Fish Com'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Wyo.1993)). Each word of a statute is to be afforded meaning, with none rendered superfluous. Jessen v. Burry, 13 P.3d 1118, 1120 (Wyo. 2000). Further, the meaning afforded to a word should be that word's standard popular meaning unless another meaning is clearly intended. Soles v. State, 809 P.2d 772, 773 (Wyo.1991). If the meaning of a word is unclear, it should be afforded the...
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