Box v State

• Decision Date: 06 June 2001
• Docket Number: 00-802
• Parties: TERRENCE D. BOX, APPELLANT, V. STATE OF ARKANSAS, APPELLEE. CACR 00-802 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF ARKANSAS 6 June 2001 APPEAL FROM THE DESHA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT; ; HONORABLE SAMUEL B. POPE, CIRCUIT JUDGE; REVERSED AND REMANDED. Josephine Linker Hart, Judge. A jury found Terrence D. Box guilty of aggravated robbery and battery in the first degree and sentenced him to a total of 420 months in the Arkansas Department of Correction ("ADC"). For reversal, appellant argues that (1) there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction and, accordingly, the trial court erred by denying his directed-verdict motion; (2) his right under the United States Constitution to a fair trial was violated because the trial court forced him to appear at trial and before the jury in his prison uniform; (3) the trial court violated the Arkansas Constitution by commenting on a critical piece of the State's evidence; and (4) the trial court erred by admitting intoevidence a letter and envelope in violation of Ark. R. Evid. 901-902. We agree with appellant on his second and last points, and, therefore, we reverse and remand. The State filed a criminal information on
• Court: Arkansas Court of Appeals

TERRENCE D. BOX, APPELLANT,

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS, APPELLEE

CACR 00-802

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF ARKANSAS

6 June 2001

APPEAL FROM THE DESHA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT; [NO. CR-99-25-1B]; HONORABLE SAMUEL B. POPE, CIRCUIT JUDGE; REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Josephine Linker Hart, Judge.

A jury found Terrence D. Box guilty of aggravated robbery and battery in the first degree and sentenced him to a total of 420 months in the Arkansas Department of Correction ("ADC"). For reversal, appellant argues that (1) there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction and, accordingly, the trial court erred by denying his directed-verdict motion; (2) his right under the United States Constitution to a fair trial was violated because the trial court forced him to appear at trial and before the jury in his prison uniform; (3) the trial court violated the Arkansas Constitution by commenting on a critical piece of the State's evidence; and (4) the trial court erred by admitting intoevidence a letter and envelope in violation of Ark. R. Evid. 901-902. We agree with appellant on his second and last points, and, therefore, we reverse and remand.

The State filed a criminal information on May 25, 1999, alleging that on April 14, 1999, appellant, while armed with a .22 caliber rifle, robbed Geisla Cantrell and shot Tommy Cantrell. The matter proceeded to trial on November 16-17, 1999, when appellant, who was incarcerated at ADC, appeared before the court and jury in his prison uniform. Despite the fact that the matter had been raised, the trial court ordered appellant to stand for the jury trial while wearing his prison uniform, reasoning that it was appellant's responsibility to dress himself in civilian clothing. At trial, included among the witnesses that testified were Eli Hudson, who had been a suspect in the robbery, and Tommy Cantrell, who was one of the two victims.

Hudson gave incriminating testimony against appellant. According to Hudson, he was told "everything" concerning the robbery by Travell Lawson, his cousin and participant in the robbery, in appellant's presence; however, appellant did not deny his involvement. Following cross-examination by

appellant's attorney, the trial judge inquired into the specifics of Lawson's conversation with Hudson. At that time, Hudson stated that in appellant's presence he was told by Lawson that while he was grabbing and trying to take Geisla Cantrell's purse, Tommy Cantrell appeared and was shot by appellant.

Tommy Cantrell, one of the two victims, testified regarding the events of the evening of April 14, and a letter dated November 3, 1999, that he purportedly received from appellant. Although the letter was unsigned, the envelope in which it was located had "correctional" stamped across it. Over appellant's authentication objection, the letter was admitted into evidence and read into the record by Cantrell. In the letter, appellant admitted to having a camera that was located in Geisla Cantrell's purse, but denied having anything to do with the robbery.

I. Sufficiency of the evidence

In an effort to avoid potential double-jeopardy concerns on remand, we do not consider errors by the trial court until we first consider a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. See Harris v. State, 284 Ark. 247, 249-250, 681 S.W.2d 334, 335 (1984). On this point, appellant argues forreversal that the trial court erred by denying his directed-verdict motion because there was insufficient evidence to sustain the conviction of aggravated robbery.¹ Our review is governed by the standard expressed in Flowers v. State, 342 Ark. 45, 48, 25 S.W.3d 422, 425 (2000) (citations omitted), which stated:

A motion for a directed verdict is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. The test for such motions is whether the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial. Substantial evidence is evidence of sufficient certainty and precision to compel a conclusion one way or another and pass beyond mere suspicion or conjecture. On appeal, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellee and consider only the evidence that supports the verdict.

The trial court denied appellant's directed-verdict motion, reasoning that Hudson's testimony presented a valid jury question of whether appellant had admitted to committing the crime. We agree with the trial court.

Rule 801(d)(2)(ii) of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence provides that "a statement of which [a party] has manifested his adoption or belief in its truth . . ." constitutes nonhearsay. "[T]he admissibility is tested by whether a reasonable person, under the circumstances, would have been expected to deny the statements if they were in fact untrue." Morris v. State, 302 Ark. 532, 537, 792 S.W.2d 288, 291 (1990). Here, Hudson testified that he was told by Lawson that appellant was involved in the robbery and shot Tommy Cantrell. Despite the fact that this story was told in appellant's presence, he did not deny the truthfulness of the story.

Pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 5-12-103 (Repl. 1997):

(a) A person commits aggravated robbery if he commits robbery as defined in § 5-12-102, and he:

(1) Is armed with a deadly weapon or represented by word or conduct that he is so armed; or

(2) Inflicts or attempts to inflict death or serious physical injury upon another person.

Furthermore, a person commits robbery as defined in Ark. Code Ann. § 5-12-102 (Repl. 1997), "if, with the purpose of committing a felony or misdemeanor theft . . . he employs or threatens to immediately employ physical force upon another." In light of these matters, we conclude that Hudson's testimony presented a valid jury question as to whether appellant had committed aggravated robbery. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to appellee, the proof suggests that appellant used a deadly weapon and attempted to cause either death or serious physical harm while also trying to commit a theft. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's denial of appellant's directed-verdict motion.

II. Fair trial

For his next argument, appellant contends that his Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial was violated because the trial court ordered that he stand trial while wearing his ADC uniform. As we review this matter, we are mindful that:

The responsibility of striving for an atmosphere of impartiality during the course of a trial rests upon the trial judge. . . . Even though the trial judge runs the court, the right of an accused to a fair trial, although not perfect, is paramount. If the exercise of discretion results in the denial of a fair trial to a defendant, the discretion is certainly abused.

75 AM. JUR. 2D Trial § 193 (1991). Furthermore, as the United States Supreme Court stated in Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976), "The right to a fair trial is a fundamental liberty secured by the Fourteenth Amendment." Despite the fact that this critical term is left undefined by our United States Constitution, we consider the term "fair trial" to consist of the following:

A fair trial is a legal trial; one conducted according to the rules of common law except in so far as it has been changed by statute; one where the accused's legal rights are safeguarded and respected. A fair trial is a proceeding which hears before it condemns, which proceeds on inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial. A fair trial is that which is such in contemplation of law, namely, that which the law secures to the party, and a fair trial before an impartial jury means one where the jurors are entirely indifferent between the parties. The necessary factors in a fair trial are an adequate hearing and an impartial tribunal, free from any interest, bias, or prejudice. A fair trial is only likely to accomplish full justice within human limitations.

88 C.J.S. Trial § 1 (1955). Accordingly, on review we must determine whether the trial court's order requiring appellant to stand trial in his prison uniform constituted an abuse of discretion inasmuch as it denied appellant a fair trial. For the reasons expressed below, we conclude that the lower court's actions constituted such an abuse.

It is well settled that under the Fourteenth Amendment, a State cannot "compel an accused to stand trial before a jury while dressed in identifiable prison clothing . . . ." Estelle, 425 U.S. at 512. Such a prohibition is necessary because, although not stated in the Constitution, a defendant is presumed innocent, and "an accused should not be compelled to go to trial in prison or jail clothing because of the possible impairment of the presumption so basic to the adversary system." Estelle, 425 U.S. at 503-504. However,"`[a] defendant may not remain silent and willingly go to trial in prison garb and thereafter claim error.'" Estelle, 425 U.S. at 508 (quoting Hernandez v. Beto, 443 F.2d 634, 637 (5th Cir. 1971)). Accordingly, to determine whether appellant was denied a fair trial in this matter, we must conclude whether there is anything in the record on appeal that "warrants a conclusion that [appellant] was compelled to stand trial in jail garb or that there was sufficient reason to excuse the failure to raise the issue before trial." Estelle, 425 U.S. at 512.

We conclude that the abstract plainly reveals that the issue was sufficiently brought to the trial court's attention and that appellant was made to stand trial in his ADC uniform. Prior to the beginning of the trial, the State alerted the trial judge to the fact that appellant was wearing his ADC uniform, and appellant, thereafter, also raised the issue to the trial judge. Nonetheless, the trial judge ordered appellant to stand trial while wearing his prison uniform.

The relevant colloquy was as follows:

Prosecutor: The defendant has been brought in his prison whites.

Court: I instructed the sheriff to bring him in that way.

Prosecutor: Oh, okay.

Court: And the reason I did this -- I'll rule for the record...