Box v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 13 March 1997
• Docket Number: No. 93-CA-00217-SCT,93-CA-00217-SCT
• Citation: 692 So.2d 54
• Parties: Misty Jo BOX v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Page 54

692 So.2d 54

Misty Jo BOX v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY.

No. 93-CA-00217-SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

March 13, 1997.

Wayne E. Ferrell, Jr., Attorney at Law, Jackson, for appellant.

Philip W. Gaines, William H. Creel, Jr., Currie Johnson Griffin Gaines & Myers, Jackson, for appellee.

Before SULLIVAN, P.J., and JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr. and MILLS, JJ.

MILLS, Justice, for the Court:

This action was initiated upon the filing of a complaint by Misty Jo Box (Box) a minor, through her natural parents, Donnie and Merita Bane, in the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County on November 15, 1989. Box was a passenger in a car owned and driven by Barry R. Williams. Barry R. Williams and his family were covered by three separate insurance policies with State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm). Box sought to stack uninsured motorist limits on separate policies covering other vehicles not involved in the accident, but owned by the Williams family. The complaint named as one of the defendants State Farm. Following a hearing on the matter, the circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of State Farm on January 29, 1993, without benefit of a written opinion. From the entry of this final judgment, Box appeals to this Court. She assigns as error the following:

1. Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor 2. Whether this Court should reverse State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Davis, 613 So.2d 1179 (Miss.1992), or, at least, limit that case to its facts?

of State Farm where genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether State Farm administered and managed the separate policies issued to the Williams family as one policy covering multiple vehicles such that Box should have been allowed to stack the coverages on all vehicles?

This Court finds that no genuine issues of material fact exist; that the law is clear that stacking is not permissible in this case; and we therefore affirm the decision of the lower court.

FACTS

On October 12, 1986, Box was a passenger in a 1985 Plymouth vehicle driven by Williams which was involved in a collision with a third vehicle driven by Cora Baker (Baker). The proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of Baker. As a result of the accident, Box sustained severe injuries and damages which she alleges exceed at least $200,000.

At the time of the accident, Baker was covered by an automobile insurance policy under which Box was paid the policy limits for liability coverage of $10,000. Box was covered under her own policy of insurance at the time of the accident through which she received uninsured motorist (UM) benefits in the total amount of$30,000. Also, at the time of the incident, Williams and his family were covered by three insurance policies through State Farm with identical coverages. The first policy was on the car involved in the collision. The other two policies with State Farm were: (1) policy number 174-5650-DO1-24 insuring a 1980 Oldsmobile (Williams' Oldsmobile policy); and (2) policy number 174-5651-DO1-24 insuring a 1979 Dodge one-half ton pickup (Williams' Dodge policy). Each carried uninsured motorist coverage with a per person limit of $100,000. State Farm has paid Box the total sum of $90,000 of uninsured motorist insurance benefits, but has refused to pay the remaining $200,000 of UM coverage alleged available to Box under her view of the principles of stacking. The sum of $90,000 represents the UM coverage on the vehicle involved in the accident in the amount of $100,000, less the $10,000 paid to Box by Baker's liability insurance carrier.

State Farm contends Box does not meet the definition of an insured under those policies for the following reasons: (1) the two Williams' vehicles listed on the separate policies were not involved in the accident in any way; (2) Box did not occupy those vehicles; and, (3) Box is not a relative of the Williams family and did not live in the Williams' household.

Through the course of discovery in this matter, Box established that, although State Farm issued separate policies of insurance to the Williams family, in many respects it treated those policies as one multiple-car policy. For instance, William E. Ligon (Ligon), an underwriting operations superintendent of State Farm, testified by deposition that multi-car discounts are applied to all of the policies purchased by a household. Thus, when a family insures multiple vehicles through separate policies from State Farm, a discount is applied to premiums of all policies the household purchases. Similarly, when asked about defensive driving discounts, Ligon testified that when an individual qualifies for the defensive driving discount, "it applies to all policies that have private passenger-type policies just like the multi-car discount."

It was also noted that when State Farm imposes a surcharge for a driving-under-the-influence (DUI) violation, State Farm assigns the surcharge to the highest rated vehicle in the household rather than the policy on the automobile in which the insured received the DUI citation. Thus, Box contends that rather than treating one policy covering one vehicle as separate and distinct, it appears that State Farm "mixes" coverage on some portions of the single car policies.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Rule 56 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure allows summary judgment where there are no genuine issues of material fact such that the moving part is entitled to judgment This Court employs a de novo standard of review in reviewing a lower court's grant of summary judgment motion. Mississippi Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co. v. Curtis, 678 So.2d 983 (Miss.1996), citing Spradlin v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 650 So.2d 1383, 1385 (Miss.1995); Daniels v. GNB, Inc., 629 So.2d 595, 599 (Miss.1993). Evidentiary matters are viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Palmer v. Biloxi Regional Medical Center, Inc., 564 So.2d 1346, 1354 (Miss.1990). If any triable issues of fact exist, the lower court's decision to grant summary judgment will be reversed. Otherwise, the decision is affirmed. Brown v. Credit Center, Inc., 444 So.2d 358, 362 (Miss.1983).

as a matter of law. To prevent summary judgment, the nonmoving party must establish a genuine issue of material fact by means allowable under the Rule. Lyle v. Mladinich, 584 So.2d 397, 398 (Miss.1991).

I.

Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to State Farm where genuine issues of material facts remain in dispute as to whether State Farm administers and manages separate insurance policies for multiple vehicles owned by a single family or household as one multiple-vehicle policy such that stacking should be permitted?

Box contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of State Farm because there remain genuine issues of material fact in dispute as to whether State Farm treated the three policies issued to the Williamses' as one. She asserts that State Farm issued the policies separately solely to avoid stacking under Mississippi law. Further, she asserts that the trial court erroneously resolved this factual issue on its own in favor of State Farm.

Box submits that it has been often noted by this Court that uninsured motorist insurance was developed in order "to provide innocent injured motorists a means of recovery of all sums to which they are entitled from an uninsured motorist." Wickline v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 530 So.2d 708, 712 (Miss.1988), citing, Rampy v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 278 So.2d 428, 431-32 (Miss.1973). In order to achieve this stated purpose, courts are advised to liberally construe the provisions of the Uninsured Motorist Act. Wickline, 530 So.2d at 711; Curry v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 728 F.Supp. 1299, 1300 (S.D.Miss.1989).

Box contends that at least since this Court's decision in Brown v. Maryland Casualty Co., 521 So.2d 854 (Miss.1987), it has been an accepted principle of uninsured motorist law that a Class 2 insured may stack the limits of UM coverage on the vehicle in which he or she was injured by multiplying the number of vehicles insured in the policy times the limits of UM coverage. Id. at 857. See also Wickline, 530 So.2d at 715.

She points to the case of Wickline where this Court allowed an injured passenger to stack the coverages on each of four vehicles covered under a multiple vehicle policy issued to the driver. Id. 530 So.2d at 714-15. In so holding, this Court stated that "stacking is firmly embedded in our uninsured motorist law" and that "stacking has become a positive gloss upon our Uninsured Motorist Act." Id. 530 So.2d at 714.

The Wickline Court further noted that stacking multiple coverages within a single policy had been mandated in Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Bridges, 350 So.2d 1379 (Miss.1977), and explained that the rationale behind this principle "is that multiple premiums are paid and multiple (stacked) coverages should be available." Wickline, 530 So.2d at 714. The Wickline Court concluded that:

[T]he operative provisions of the Mississippi Uninsured Motorist Act has been declared as a matter of positive law to provide that all classes [of] statutory insureds may recover of the UM insurer all amounts he or she may be entitled to recover as damages from the uninsured motorist, limited only by the limits of UM coverage multiplied by the number of vehicles insured in the policy.

530 So.2d at 715.

Box also states this is similar to Brown v. Maryland Casualty where this Court held Following its decisions in Wickline and Brown v. Maryland Casualty, this Court held in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Davis, 613 So.2d 1179 (Miss.1992), that a passenger injured in an insured vehicle was not entitled to stack UM coverages under separate policies issued to the owners of the vehicle. In so holding, the Davis Court concluded that the passenger was not an "ins...