Boyd v. Boyd

• Decision Date: 27 March 1916
• Docket Number: 279
• Citation: 184 S.W. 838,123 Ark. 134
• Parties: BOYD v. BOYD
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

184 S.W. 838

123 Ark. 134

BOYD v. BOYD

No. 279

Supreme Court of Arkansas

March 27, 1916

Appeal from Searcy Chancery Court; T. H. Humphreys, Chancellor reversed.

STATEMENT BY THE COURT.

W. F Boyd died on the 2d day of April, 1912, leaving surviving him his widow, S. J. Boyd, and his son, C. A. Boyd, and his grandson, Haco Boyd a youth about ten years of age.

This suit was instituted by S. G. Daniel, as administrator of the estate of W. F. Boyd, and by Haco Boyd, through his mother as next friend. The complaint alleged that W. F. Boyd died seized of certain lots and parcels of land in Searcy County which are described, and also that he owned certain personal property consisting of stock in the First National Bank of Leslie, worth $ 2,500, and money on deposit in that bank in the sum of $ 800; that John Norman was indebted to him in the sum of $ 2,000; P. P. Boyd in the sum of $ 1,500, and Marion Dickens in the sum of $ 1,600, and various other parties in varying amounts, which were assets of the estate and should be turned over to the administrator thereof. They alleged that "on the night before the death of W. F. Boyd, and when he was greatly weakened from fever and the ravages of his disease, and while he was unconscious and in the very shadow of death, the defendants, C. A. Boyd and S. J. Boyd by fraud, misrepresentations, concealment, overreaching and undue influence, procured the signature, by mark, of the said W. F. Boyd to an instrument of writing which purports to be a warranty deed conveying from W. F. Boyd and S. J. Boyd to C A. Boyd all the above described property; that W. F. Boyd at the time did not have the mental capacity to execute a deed or to transact any business of any kind whatever or to understand the effect of the transaction."

The plaintiff, Haco Boyd, alleged that the pretended deed was an attempt to defeat him of his right to said property as heir, and was a cloud upon his title; that he was the owner of an undivided one-half of all the lands left by his grandfather, subject to the rights of the widow under the law, in said property.

And they further alleged that C. A. Boyd and S. J. Boyd wrongfully and fraudulently took possession of the money and bank stock and appropriated the same to their own use. Plaintiff, Haco Boyd, prayed that the deed be cancelled, and plaintiffs both prayed that the shares of stock, the money and all other personal assets in the hands of the defendants be surrendered and turned over to the administrator for proper distribution.

Appellants, C. A. Boyd and S. J. Boyd, denied the allegations of the complaint, and set up that W. F. Boyd "at the last practical time prior to his death sold and delivered to S. J. Boyd all his personal property, including moneys, bank deposits, bonds and notes," and that when he executed the deed described in the complaint he. acted upon his own free will and accord, and that he had full mental capacity to execute the same, having "full understanding of the effect of said deed; that at the time of the execution of said deed and the assignment of his personal property it was agreed and understood by and between the said W. F. Boyd, deceased, C. A. Boyd and S. J. Boyd; that the deed above referred to was to be executed to said C. A. Boyd to hold the same in trust for the said S. J. Boyd, and that the said C. A. Boyd was to execute a deed to all the property conveyed to him by the said W. F. Boyd to the said S. J. Boyd, which deed had been duly executed in accordance with said agreement, thereby investing the said S. J. Boyd with all the real and personal property which said W. F. Boyd possessed in his lifetime, and that W. F. Boyd died intestate and without any estate whatever."

The court below found that "at the time the transfer of all of said property by the deceased it was done at impending death, and that he was so weak mentally and physically that the court has grave doubts of his mental capacity to make said transfer, but finds that there is not sufficient evidence to warrant the cancellation thereof; but the evidence warrants a finding that the deed and transfer should be reformed so as to pass a life estate only to S. J. Boyd;" and further found that the personal property amounted in value to $ 6,427.68; that S. J. Boyd had turned all of said personal property over to C. A. Boyd, who had taken the same out of the jurisdiction of the court and had invested it in the State of Utah recklessly and in speculative securities which was more likely to result in waste. Upon this finding the court rendered a decree as follows: "That all conveyances and transfers be and are reformed so as to convey to S. J. Boyd a life estate only in said real estate and personal property; and that said defendants, C. A. Boyd and S. J. Boyd, are ordered to return one-half of all of said personal property either in kind or in money to this jurisdiction and invest same in safe and sound securities for the benefit of S. J. Boyd during her natural life, and after her death to Haco Boyd, her grandson." And dismissed the cause as to all other defendants. Both parties have appealed.

Judgment reversed and remanded.

A. Y. Barr, for appellants.

1. The evidence is overwhelming and conclusive that William Boyd was sane--knew what he was doing--and that no fraud was practiced on him. He was weak physically, but his mind was not impaired. Sanity and business capacity are presumed until the contrary are shown by evidence clear, satisfactory and convincing. This is elementary law.

2. No reformation of the deed should have been allowed. It was good or void. The law is well settled. 15 Ark. 555; 141 S.W. 1168; 101 Ark. 611.

3. Boyd did what he intended to do; left his property to his widow with the boys to receive whatever she left to them. The case has been fully made out and the case should be remanded with directions to dismiss the bill.

Bratton & Bratton, David Cotton and Garner Frazer, for appellees.

1. The pleadings warranted a cancellation or reformation. 96 Ark. 163; 91 Id. 400. The prayer was for general relief. 31 Cyc. 111. The court did not exceed its authority.

2. A life estate was intended without limitation. The finding is not clearly against the evidence. 101 Ark. 529; 85 Id. 105.

3. On the cross-appeal, the entire transaction should be cancelled. 14 Mich. 541; 133 Iowa 681; 100 Wis. 24; 63 Neb. 349; 2 Pom. Eq. Jur. (3 ed.) 951; Thornton on Gifts, 447 § 450; 33 Md. 188; 63 Tenn. 947. C. A. Boyd received the benefit of this death-bed conveyance; the burden is on him to show its fairness and the capacity of the grantor. He has failed. 15 Ark. 603; 26 Id. 110.

4. The whole business smacks of fraud and smells of suspicion; the deed and assignments should be cancelled. 15 Ark. 603; 26 Id. 110; 99 Mass. 88. The decree should be reversed with directions to cancel the entire transaction.

OPINION

WOOD, J. (after stating the facts).

(1) The first question is whether or not William Boyd, at the time of the execution of the deed, and of the alleged transfer of personal property, had sufficient mental capacity to understand the nature and effect of these transactions. This is purely an issue of fact which must be determined by the preponderance of the evidence.

William Boyd, for over a year before his death, had been afflicted with cancer. This disease gradually preyed upon his vitals until he finally died from exhaustion. The testimony is conflicting, but the finding of the chancellor that Wm. Boyd had sufficient mental capacity to execute the instrument is not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence.

The next question is whether or not Boyd executed the deed conveying the land and transferring the personal property in controversy with the intention of vesting absolute title therein to S. J. Boyd, his wife. This is also peculiarly a question of fact, depending upon a preponderance of the evidence.

C. A. Boyd was the only son and the only living child of William Boyd. He had been living away from his father some fifteen years, in Idaho and Utah. He stated that during these years he had seen his father only for brief periods some five or six times; that his personal association with his father had not been close for some fifteen years. Appellee Haco Boyd, whose father was dead, was the grandson of William Boyd. C. A. Boyd was a lawyer, and testified that he had prepared the papers to carry out his father's wishes; that his father signed all instruments by mark because of his weak physical condition, and requested two or three of those present to sign as witnesses; that his mind was good and he appeared to understand his business and his own condition and the condition in which his mother would be left at his death as well as at any time in former and healthier years. He stated that he never suggested to his father at any time what to do or urged him to make the disposition of the property that he did make; that his father asked him to arrange his property so that if he should die that his mother would have it all. He then suggested a will, but his father stated that he would rather turn it right over to her and that he would know that it was done. Witness then prepared all the papers and made the transfers that were made. He suggested to his father that the better way to convey the real estate would be for him and his mother to join in a deed to some third person, with the understanding that such person then make a deed direct to his mother, and that accordingly the instrument was prepared and executed.

Mrs. S J. Boyd, the wife of William Boyd, testified on this branch of the case, in part, as follows: "We talked the matter over several times. I don't know how many times. During his last illness he seemed to be interested in my...