Boyd v. City of Chi.

• Citation: 225 F.Supp.3d 708
• Decision Date: 06 December 2016
• Docket Number: Case No. 13 C 7152
• Parties: Lathierial BOYD, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF CHICAGO; Chicago Police Officer Richard Zuley, Star No. 15185; Chicago Police Officer Lawrence Thezan, Star No. 9419; Chicago Police Officer Steve Schorsch, Star No. 8955; and Chicago Police Officer John Murray, Star No. 3175, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

225 F.Supp.3d 708

Lathierial BOYD, Plaintiff,

v.CITY OF CHICAGO; Chicago Police Officer Richard Zuley, Star No. 15185; Chicago Police Officer Lawrence Thezan, Star No. 9419; Chicago Police Officer Steve Schorsch, Star No. 8955; and Chicago Police Officer John Murray, Star No. 3175, Defendants.

Case No. 13 C 7152

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

Signed December 6, 2016

Kathleen T. Zellner, Douglas Henry Johnson, Nicholas M. Curran, Kathleen T. Zellner & Associates, P.C., Downers Grove, IL, for Plaintiff.

Terrence Michael Burns, Daniel Matthew Noland, Molly E. Thompson, Paul A. Michalik, Dykema Gossett PLLC, John F. Gibbons, Elizabeth Susan Ralph, Tiffany S. Fordyce, Greenberg Traurig, LLP, Chicago, IL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Robert W. Gettleman, United States District Judge

Plaintiff Lathierial Boyd filed a nine count third amended complaint on July 12, 2016, asserting various claims against the defendant officers and the City of Chicago. On July 11, 2016 the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on all counts.¹ For the reasons stated below, the court grants defendants' motion for summary judgment in its entirety.

BACKGROUND²

On December 10, 1990, plaintiff was convicted of first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, and aggravated battery following a bench trial in the Circuit Court of Cook County. The trial court found that on February 24, 1990, petitioner fired a Tec–9 or "Uzi–style" assault rifle into a crowd outside a bar on Chicago's north side. One individual was killed, one was rendered a quadriplegic, and three others were wounded. The court sentenced plaintiff to 55 years' imprisonment for first-degree murder and a consecutive 27 years' imprisonment for attempted murder, in addition to 5 years' imprisonment for aggravated battery, to run concurrently.

For the next two decades plaintiff maintained his innocence and filed several unsuccessful appeals. In 2012 the Cook County State's Attorney's Conviction Integrity Unit re-investigated the case and, ultimately, on September 10, 2013, Cook County State's Attorney Anita Alvarez moved to vacate plaintiff's conviction and dismissed the charges against him. On September 13, 2013, plaintiff filed an unopposed Petition for Certificate of Innocence, which was granted on September 25, 2013. Plaintiff then moved to California and filed this lawsuit against the City of Chicago and the homicide detectives who investigated the shooting.

THE SHOOTING, INVESTIGATION, AND TRIAL

In the early morning hours of February 24, 1990, Ricky Warner and Michael Fleming were on North Clark Street near Wrigley Field attempting to sell drugs to people leaving nearby bars. At around 2:00 a.m. somebody approached them with an uzi-like machine gun and opened fire. When the police arrived at the scene, Michael Fleming was dead, Ricky Warner lay on the sidewalk (he survived, but was rendered a quadriplegic and died three years later), and three bystanders had minor injuries. The investigating officers interviewed witnesses at the scene and their investigation began.

The major focus of the investigation was the surviving victim, Ricky Warner ("Ricky") and his father, Herbert Warner ("Herbert"). During the investigating officers' first interaction with Ricky, just days after the shooting, Ricky relayed to the officers that he did not know who shot him, but that he owed an individual named "Rat" some money for a drug debt. The officers followed up on this information by interviewing Ricky's father, Herbert, who confirmed that an individual named Rat had come to the Warner home and threatened Herbert and the entire Warner family over the debt. The officers subsequently learned that Rat is Lathierial Boyd's childhood nickname. As the days progressed, Ricky identified Rat from a photo array and relayed to the investigating officers that Rat had shot him.

After plaintiff was identified as Rat, the officers went to his family home to speak with him. They instead spoke with his father, who informed them that he was not there. After plaintiff learned that the police were looking for him in connection with the shooting, he reported to the police station voluntarily on March 12, 1990. Plaintiff answered questions, allowed the officers to search his home, and agreed to participate in a lineup. The investigating officers brought in the eyewitnesses who were interviewed at the scene and Herbert. Herbert identified plaintiff as the man who had threatened him. None of the eyewitnesses identified plaintiff as the shooter, and he did not match the description that was given at the scene. The investigating officers' lineup report reflected that two of the witnesses relayed to them that they were drunk on the night of the shooting and may not be able to pick anyone out of the lineup.

Plaintiff was ultimately arrested and charged with murder, attempted murder, and aggravated battery. Several weeks later, the investigating officers were given a note by hospital staff who treated Ricky. This note became known as the "Rat note" or, at trial, "Exhibit 20." Exhibit 20 was a piece of paper that had written on it the name "Rat," a telephone number, and numbers representing drug quantities and prices. According to the officers, Exhibit 20 was given to the hospital staff on behalf of Ricky, who told them that plaintiff had given it to him along with cocaine that he was to sell for plaintiff. It was from this transaction, according to Ricky, that the drug debt between the two arose. Although he sold the cocaine, Ricky never gave plaintiff his share of the proceeds.³

With Exhibit 20 and Ricky and Herbert's testimony, the case went to trial. Ricky testified unequivocally that plaintiff shot him and Herbert testified unequivocally that plaintiff threatened to kill the Warner family over the drug debt. No testimony regarding the lineup was elicited by either party, and no evidence of the lineup was used at trial by either party. Plaintiff presented two alibi witnesses: his sister, Angela Boyd, whose apartment he stayed at on the night of the shooting, and her boyfriend, Harold Casey, who also stayed at the apartment. Both of them testified that they, along with plaintiff, ate pizza and watched a Bulls game before going to bed on the night of February 23, 1990. Plaintiff's trial attorney did not elicit testimony from either of them that they had seen plaintiff in the apartment between the time they went to bed and the time they woke up. Plaintiff was found guilty on this evidence.⁴

DISCUSSION

I. Summary Judgment Under Rule 56

Defendants have moved for summary judgment on all counts. Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. The movant bears the burden of establishing both elements, Becker v. Tenenbaum–Hill Associates, Inc. , 914 F.2d 107, 110 (7th Cir. 1990), and all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the non-movant. Jones v. Illinois Bell Tele. Co. , 2013 WL 5781814 at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 24, 2013) (citing Fisher v. Transco Services–Milwaukee, Inc. , 979 F.2d 1239, 1242 (7th Cir. 1992) ). If the movant satisfies this burden, then the non-movant must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Nitz v. Craig , 2013 WL 593851 at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 12, 2013). In doing so, the non-movant cannot simply show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Id. (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-movant]'s position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find in favor for the [non-movant]." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

II. Summary Judgment Under Local Rule 56.1

The facts underlying summary judgment proceedings are drawn from the parties' Local Rule 56.1 submissions. "[I]n the Northern District of Illinois, the Rule 56.1 statement is a critical, and required, component of a litigant's response to a motion for summary judgment." Sojka v. Bovis Lend Lease, Inc. , 686 F.3d 394, 398 (7th Cir. 2012). Local Rule 56.1 assists the court "by organizing the evidence, identifying undisputed facts, and demonstrating precisely how each side propose[s] to prove a disputed fact with admissible evidence." Bordelon v. Chi. Sch. Reform Bd. of Trustees , 233 F.3d 524, 527 (7th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation omitted). It "is designed, in part, to aid the district court, which does not have the advantage of the parties' familiarity with the record and often cannot afford to spend the time combing the record to locate the relevant information in determining whether a trial is necessary." Delapaz v. Richardson , 634 F.3d 895, 899 (7th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation omitted). "This rule may be the most important litigation rule outside statutes of limitation because the consequences of failing to satisfy its requirements are so dire." Malec v. Sanford , 191 F.R.D. 581, 584 (N.D. Ill. 2000).

Local Rule 56.1(b)(3) governs the nonmovant's response to the movant's Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) statement of material facts. The party opposing summary judgment must respond to the movant's statement of proposed material facts with a concise response for "each numbered paragraph in the moving party's statement," including specific references to "supporting materials relied upon." L.R. 56.1(b)(3)(B) ; Id. Each response, and each asserted fact, must be supported with a specific reference to the record. L.R. 56.1(b)(3)(B)–(C) ; Cracco v. Vitran Exp., Inc. , 559 F.3d 625, 632 (7th Cir. 2009). Responses and facts that are not set out and appropriately supported in an opponent's Rule 56.1 response will not be considered, and the movant's version of the facts—if compliant with the rule—will be deemed admitted. L.R....