Langford v. McDonough
| Docket Number | 21-cv-3724 |
| Decision Date | 22 August 2023 |
| Parties | REBEKAH LANGFORD, Plaintiff, v. DENIS McDONOUGH, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Defendant Denis McDonough, Secretary of Veterans Affairs (“Defendant”), has moved for summary judgment on plaintiff Rebekah Langford's (“Plaintiff”) failure to accommodate, interference, and retaliation claims under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant violated the Rehabilitation Act by terminating her employment because of her request for a reasonable accommodation related to her Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”). Defendant has also moved to dismiss Plaintiff's reasonable accommodation claim under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). For the reasons that follow, Defendant's motion to dismiss is granted as to Plaintiff's failure to accommodate claim. Summary judgment is granted in Defendant's favor as to Plaintiff's remaining claims.
Local Rule 56.1 outlines the requirements for the introduction of facts parties would like considered in connection with a motion for summary judgment. The Court enforces Local Rule 56.1 strictly. See FTC v. Bay Area Bus. Council Inc., 423 F.3d 627, 633 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Because of the important function local rules like Rule 56.1 serve in organizing the evidence and identifying disputed facts, we have consistently upheld the district court's discretion to require strict compliance with those rules.”). At the summary judgment stage, a party cannot rely on allegations; he or it must put forth evidence. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A); see also Grant v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 2017) (). Where one party supports a fact with admissible evidence and the other party fails to controvert the fact with citation to admissible evidence, the Court deems the fact admitted. See Curtis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 807 F.3d 215, 218-19 (7th Cir. 2015); Ammons v. Aramark Unif. Servs., Inc., 368 F.3d 809, 817-18 (7th Cir. 2004).
This does not, however, absolve the party putting forth the fact of the duty to support the fact with admissible evidence. See Keeton v. Morningstar, Inc., 667 F.3d 877, 880 (7th Cir. 2012). Statements not based on personal knowledge cannot be considered in determining whether there is a genuine issue of material fact. Toro Co. v. Krouse, Kern & Co., 827 F.2d 155, 163 n.3 (7th Cir. 1987) (“Rule 56[(c)]'s requirement of personal knowledge is mandatory.”). Purely argumentative allegations are disregarded. Rivera v. Guevara, 319 F.Supp.3d 1004, 1018 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (); Boyd v. City of Chicago, 225 F.Supp.3d 708, 716 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (nonmovant's statement of additional facts “must represent only material facts and are not the proper province of argumentative or conclusory allegations.”).
In accordance with the law set forth above, to the extent Plaintiff fails to properly dispute any of Defendant's asserted facts, the Court deems those facts admitted. Furthermore, the Court will not consider Plaintiff's asserted facts that are purely argumentative or are not supported by deposition testimony, documents, affidavits, or other evidence admissible for summary judgment purposes. The facts set forth in the “Background” section are undisputed by the parties unless otherwise noted.
Plaintiff Rebekah Langford began working as a Food Service Systems Dietitian (“FSD”) at the Jesse Brown VA Medical Center (the “Medical Center”) on June 9, 2019. The Medical Center is a 200-bed inpatient facility providing a full range of patient care services. The FSD has responsibilities relating to food production, service, and safety; menus; room service; dietetic software; quality management; and training. The FSD also provides professional support to the facility's Food Operations section and serves as the liaison to the clinical section of Nutrition and Food Service (“NFS”). A major duty of the FSD is planning and maintaining menus for regular and modified diets and special events, taking into consideration factors such as nutritional requirements, patient satisfaction, budget allocation, available manpower, and equipment limitations. The FSD performs regular inspections to ensure food safety and quality procedures are being followed.
Plaintiff's first line supervisor was Michelle Angarita, Food Operations Manager (“FOM”), and her second line supervisor was Laura Dolezal, Assistant Chief, NFS. Plaintiff's employment at the Medical Center was subject to an initial one-year probationary period, during which her supervisors were required to evaluate her performance and adjustment to the job, as well as any training or outstanding work that warranted attention. Plaintiff was also a bargaining- unit employee subject to the collective bargaining agreement (“Master Agreement”) between the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) and the American Federation of Government Employees (“AFGE”).
The Medical Center hired Plaintiff to work daily from 9:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m., which the VA terms a “tour of duty” (“TOD”). On September 5, 2019, Plaintiff approached Angarita to request a change in her TOD to 8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. Angarita suggested they meet with Dolezal and Jolie Rubin-Lewis, the Chief of the Service, and Plaintiff was asked to put her request into writing. Plaintiff did so that same day, writing in pertinent part as follows:
On September 11, 2019, Angarita issued a memorandum to Plaintiff describing Plaintiff's request as a schedule change “for work-life balance purposes.” The memorandum permits “a three month-trial schedule change [from 8am-4:30pm] will be implemented to determine if the schedule change does meet[] the needs of the Service and veterans served[.]” The three-month trial period was set for September 15, 2019 until December 14, 2019, at which time “the schedule change will be reviewed and a permanent schedule will be put into place.” The memorandum further required the following “accommodations” from Plaintiff during the threemonth trial period: Plaintiff did not sign the memorandum, disagreeing with the evening requirements.
On September 27, 2019, Plaintiff met with Angarita, Dolezal, Rubin-Lewis, AFGE steward Joseph Ferguson, and Human Resources (“HR”) staff Megan Castillo and again requested a change in her TOD. The parties submit conflicting affidavits regarding what was discussed at that meeting. On the one hand, Ferguson and Plaintiff declare that Plaintiff explained that she was suffering a mental health crisis, for which she was seeking professional help, because of what her son was going through as well as domestic violence that she was experiencing at home. On the other hand, Angarita declares that Plaintiff only discussed her son's medical conditions and difficulties with his childcare due to scheduling and her financial situation, and that she was separated from her husband. Angarita maintains that Plaintiff did not raise the domestic violence or personal medical issues she was experiencing, and that Plaintiff did not say that she was seeking treatment for mental health issues.
On October 4, 2019, Angarita issued another memorandum to Plaintiff, stating that Plaintiff's TOD was temporarily changed per her request to 8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. through January 4, 2020. The memorandum also stated that Plaintiff's “position description will not change,” the “primary functions of this assignment will remain the same,” and “[a]ny requests for leave should be made to [Angarita], in accordance with established leave policies and procedures.” The memorandum set forth four dates on which Plaintiff would need to work from 9:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. due to another dietician's planned leave. The memorandum encouraged Plaintiff to “take advantage” of the Employee Assistance Program (“EAP”), as well as certain HR Assistants, for “child care assistance.” The EAP does not handle accommodations, and no one began the reasonable accommodation process or mentioned it to Plaintiff at that time. The VA's reasonable...
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