Boyd v. Lane

• Decision Date: 31 January 1994
• Docket Number: No. 18831,18831
• Citation: 869 S.W.2d 305
• Parties: H. Eugene BOYD and Patricia Boyd, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Frank LANE, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 305

869 S.W.2d 305

H. Eugene BOYD and Patricia Boyd, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Frank LANE, Defendant-Respondent.

No. 18831.

Missouri Court of Appeals,

Southern District,

Division Two.

Jan. 31, 1994.

Stuart H. King, Woolsey, Fisher, Whiteaker & McDonald, Springfield, for plaintiffs-appellants.

James E. Baldwin, Donnelly, Baldwin and Wilhite, Lebanon, for defendant-respondent.

FLANIGAN, Presiding Judge.

On April 30, 1992, plaintiffs H. Eugene Boyd and Patricia Boyd filed this action against defendant Frank Lane in the Circuit Court of Pulaski County. During the course of the proceeding, plaintiffs filed an amended petition. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the amended petition failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The trial court sustained the motion "with prejudice to plaintiffs' right to proceed further in this action." Plaintiffs appeal.

Plaintiffs contend that the amended petition stated a claim upon which relief can be granted and that the trial court erred in ruling otherwise. This court agrees.

When a petition is attacked by motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the mere conclusions of the pleader are not admitted. The facts alleged, however, are taken to be true and the pleader is entitled to all inferences fairly deducible therefrom. If such facts and such inferences, viewed most favorably from plaintiff's standpoint, show any ground for relief, the petition should not be dismissed. The petition is not to be dismissed when the allegations of the petition invoke principles of substantive law which may entitle the plaintiff to relief or when it appears that the plaintiff may be able to prove a set of facts which would entitle him to relief on his claim. The ruling on a motion to dismiss is ordinarily confined to the face of the petition which is construed in a light favorable to plaintiff.... The petition must be accorded a liberal construction. (Citing authorities.)

Counts v. Morrison-Knudsen, Inc., 663 S.W.2d 357, 360 (Mo.App.1983). See also Wear v. Walker, 800 S.W.2d 99, 101 (Mo.App.1990).

The prayer of the petition may be disregarded in determining what relief is authorized by the facts pleaded. Wear, at 101. So long as plaintiffs allege facts showing that they are entitled to some relief, it is immaterial whether they are entitled to any or all of the relief prayed for. Id.

A pleading that sets forth a claim for relief must contain "a short and plain statement of the facts showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," and "a demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled." Rule 55.05. ¹ A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim, alternatively or hypothetically, either in one count or in separate counts. Rule 55.10. When two or more statements are made in the alternative and if one of them independently would be sufficient, the pleading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the alternative statements. Id. A party may state as many separate claims as he has, regardless of consistency and whether based on legal or equitable grounds. Id. All pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice. Rule 55.24. Whenever the claim asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the same transaction or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading. Rule 55.33(c).

The amended petition contains five counts. Each count contains a caption which purports to describe the nature of the claim being asserted. ² Count I, the shortest count, contains 15 paragraphs. Each of the other counts adopts Count I and adds more paragraphs. It is unnecessary to summarize all of the counts because if any one was sufficient the trial court's ruling was erroneous.

The amended petition included the matters set forth in the next six paragraphs:

Defendant owns land in Pulaski County known as the Lane Farm. In 1974 plaintiffs, who are husband and wife, entered into an agreement with defendant and his wife, now deceased, to act as equal partners in a cattle raising operation. The agreement was that defendant and his wife would acquire cattle and land and plaintiffs would supply all the labor for the care of the cattle and the land. The proceeds from the sale of the offspring would be applied to loans taken out to acquire cattle and the land. After all liabilities were discharged, proceeds were to be divided equally between plaintiffs and defendant and his wife.

The Lane Farm adjoins plaintiffs' farm. In 1974, defendant and his wife purchased cattle which were placed on plaintiffs' farm and were cared for by plaintiffs until 1975 when defendant and his wife purchased additional cattle and the Lane Farm. Thereafter, all cattle were cared for by plaintiffs on the Lane Farm.

From 1974 until 1989, pursuant to the agreement, plaintiffs cared for 50 to 200 head of cattle. Plaintiffs fully performed their obligations under the agreement and spent substantial time and money for the care of the cattle and the Lane Farm.

Between 1975 and 1989, plaintiffs, in addition to caring for the Lane Farm and the cattle, provided services to the defendant, consisting of personal services, home repair, and moving assistance. During this period, defendant proposed to plaintiffs in modification of the existing partnership agreement that in exchange for plaintiffs' waiver of their claim to the cattle sale proceeds, plaintiffs would receive the Lane Farm upon defendant's death. Plaintiffs accepted the proposal and allowed the cattle to be sold in 1989 without making a claim to any portion of the proceeds of the sale of the cattle.

In anticipatory repudiation of the modified agreement, and as a material breach of it, defendant is now negotiating to sell the Lane Farm to a third party.

Plaintiffs reasonably expected to receive consideration for their services and property pursuant to the agreement between the parties, and reasonably expected to receive the Lane Farm upon defendant's death. Plaintiffs have received no consideration for their services and no repayment for their expenditures.

An express contract and an implied contract may be pleaded in the alternative without the pleading being struck for insufficiency. Cervantes v. Ryan, 799 S.W.2d 111, 115 (Mo.App.1990); Norman Schuman Interiors, Inc. v. Sacks, 479 S.W.2d 200, 203 (Mo.App.1972). A pleading states a claim in quantum meruit if it alleges that the defendant is justly indebted to the plaintiff for services rendered or materials furnished at defendant's instance and request. State ex rel. Scott v. Sanders, 560 S.W.2d 899, 901 (Mo.App.1978). To state a claim in quantum meruit, all that is required to be alleged is a "request, consideration, indebtedness, performance by the claimant, a demand and a claim for damages or allegations from which it could only be inferred that the services were not gratuitously rendered or had not been paid for." Laughlin v. Boatmen's Nat. Bank of St. Louis, 354 Mo. 467, 189 S.W.2d 974, 978 (1945); Scott, 560 S.W.2d at 902.

Seeking to uphold the trial court's order of dismissal, defendant argues: (a) The amended petition does not state a claim upon which relief may be granted in that the Statute of Frauds, § 432.010, ³ would bar enforcement of the oral contract and "the alleged oral contract is properly characterized as a contract to devise real estate which § 474.155 ⁴ requires to be in writing and which cannot be breached until promisor's death"; and (b) the amended petition fails to state a cause of action for quantum meruit in that plaintiffs "failed to allege that they made demand for the reasonable value of their services." Neither (a) nor (b) is valid.

In support of prong (a) of his argument, defendant says: "Plaintiffs averred that under the modified agreement, which they accepted in 1989, they were not to receive the farm until defendant's death. Such an arrangement would be appropriately characterized as a contract to devise which would be governed by § 474.155. Prior to the adoption of this section, such contracts, if they did not otherwise violate the Statute of Frauds, were not required to be in writing. However, under this new statutory section, any such contract executed after January 1, 1981, can be established only by provisions of a will setting out the contract, or an express reference to such a contract in a will supported by extrinsic evidence or some other writing evidencing the contract. In other words, plaintiffs must plead some form of written agreement in order to state a cause of action and enforce such a contract to devise. Plaintiffs do not allege in their petition, nor do they profess to this court to even have any knowledge of any specific written documents."

It is unnecessary to consider defendant's arguments concerning § 432.010 and § 474.155. This appeal involves the sufficiency of the petition to state a claim for relief. Claims may be stated alternatively, regardless of consistency, and whether based on legal or equitable grounds. The sufficiency of a statement is not impaired by an insufficiency in one or more of the alternative statements.

Further, it is not necessary to consider whether proof of some of the facts alleged in the amended petition, including some not previously set forth, might serve to circumvent the provisions of § 432.010 or § 474.155.

In essence, the petition pleads an oral agreement ("the first agreement"), entered into in 1974 and acted upon until 1989. It then pleads a modification of the agreement "during this period"--between 1975 and 1989. The modification will be referred to as "the second agreement." Defendant seeks to challenge the validity of the second agreement on the basis of the two statutes.

The flaw in defendant's position is that even if the second agreement is vulnerable to either or both of those challenges, a matter which this opinion neither discusses...