Boyd v. Pheo, Inc., 95-3693
| Decision Date | 21 November 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 95-3693,95-3693 |
| Parties | 20 Fla. L. Weekly D2583 Barbara BOYD, As Personal Representative of the Estate of Ila Eskridge and Sheila Turner, Petitioner, v. PHEO, INC. d/b/a Pheo Medical Center and d/b/a Lake Forest Medical Center, Pheo Med, Limited Partnership, d/b/a Lake Forest Medical Center, Winter Haven Homes, Inc., as General Partner of Pheo Med, Limited Partnership, and Care Centers Management Group, Inc., Respondents. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Kevin A. McLean of McLean & Schecht, Tampa, for petitioner.
R. Douglas Vaughn of Saalsfield, Catlin & Coulson, Jacksonville, for respondents Pheo Med, Limited Partnership and Winter Haven Homes, Inc.
Joseph L. Amos, Jr., of Fisher, Rushmer, Werrenrath, Keiner, Wack & Dickson, Orlando, for respondent Care Centers Management Group, Inc.
Barbara Boyd, the personal representative of the estate of Ila Eskridge, seeks certiorari review of an order prohibiting her counsel from engaging in ex parte communications with any of respondents' employees who personally participated in the care of Eskridge. We decline to exercise our certiorari jurisdiction to review this order, but write to explicate our reasons for this decision.
Petitioner is the plaintiff in an action against respondents, the owner and operator of the nursing home in which Eskridge formerly resided. After being advised that petitioner's counsel intended to make ex parte contact with current and former employees of the nursing home, respondents moved for a protective order, arguing that Rule 4-4.2 of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar prohibited such contact, and relying on the decision in Barfuss v. Diversicare Corp. of America, 656 So.2d 486 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) in support of this conclusion. Petitioner opposed this motion, arguing that Reynoso v. Greynolds Park Manor, Inc., 659 So.2d 1156 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) allowed ex parte contact with former employees of a party under circumstances such as this. The trial court thereafter entered its order partially granting the motion for protective order, finding that Rule 4-4.2 precluded ex parte contact with present and former employees who directly participated in the care of the decedent, but that the rule did not preclude ex parte contact with former employees who did not directly participate in such care. Petitioner now asks that this court quash the trial court's order and align itself with the position of the Third District Court of Appeal in Reynoso.
As petitioner correctly states, both the Barfuss and Reynoso courts invoked certiorari jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders such as the one at issue here, and reached conflicting conclusions regarding the propriety of such orders. Petitioner argues that such review is likewise warranted in this circumstance, but without addressing the merits of the trial court's order, we are compelled to conclude that the exercise of this court's certiorari jurisdiction is not warranted. Certiorari is an extraordinary remedy, the entitlement to which is dependent upon a showing that the order for which review is sought departs from the essential requirements of law, resulting in a material injury for which there is no adequate remedy by appeal. Martin-Johnson, Inc. v. Savage, 509 So.2d 1097 (Fla.1987). We conclude in this instance that petitioner has failed to demonstrate the likelihood of irreparable harm arising from the trial court's order. As evidenced by decisions such as Esman v. Board of Regents, 425 So.2d 156 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983),...
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...denying discovery are almost invariably not reviewable by certiorari because of the absence of irreparable harm." Boyd v. Pheo, Inc., 664 So. 2d 294, 295 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) ; see also Goslin v. Preisser, 148 So. 3d 869, 870 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) ("We do not have jurisdiction to review the or......
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