Boyd v. State
| Decision Date | 06 November 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 41557,41557 |
| Citation | 322 S.E.2d 256,253 Ga. 515 |
| Parties | BOYD v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
M. Randall Peek, Decatur, for Tony Boyd.
Robert E. Wilson, Dist. Atty., Barbara Conroy, Asst. Dist. Atty., Decatur, Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Atlanta, Dennis R. Dunn, for the State.
Appellant, Tony Boyd, was tried before a DeKalb County jury for the murder of Leon Hart. He was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, he raises seven enumerations of error. We affirm. 1
The victim and a friend were drinking beer at the Libra Lounge on Memorial Drive when a woman stepped on the victim's foot and caused him to spill his beer. He demanded an apology, and she delivered a less than apologetic response. Appellant, the woman's date, and the victim then began to fight.
The bouncer at the bar broke up the fight and asked appellant and the woman to leave. They did. The victim and his friend followed shortly afterwards.
The victim saw appellant and the woman in the parking lot. He took a tire tool out of his friend's car and began to walk towards appellant and the woman. The woman pulled a pistol out of her pocket, and the victim turned abruptly back to his friend's car.
The victim's friend started the car, put it in reverse, and picked up the victim. Appellant grabbed the pistol from the woman and ran towards the car. As he reached the car, he began firing the pistol at the victim. The friend jumped out of the car, which was still rolling backwards, and ran into the bar to find the bouncer. Appellant and the woman left the parking lot in their car. The victim, who had been hit by a number of bullets, was dead.
1. We find that the evidence presented at trial could have authorized a rational trier of fact to find appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the murder of Leon Hart. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). We thus find appellant's first contention, that the trial court erred in not directing a verdict of acquittal, to be without merit.
2. Appellant's second enumeration deals with the court's refusal of a number of appellant's requested charges.
Four of the requested charges concerned the presumption of innocence in a criminal case. The court charged the jury that the defendant "enters upon the trial of this case with the presumption of innocence in his favor," that this presumption lasts throughout the trial, and that the state has the burden of overcoming this presumption beyond a reasonable doubt through the use of evidence alone. In this area, the requested charges "were fairly given to the jury in the general charge of the court." Shirley v. State, 245 Ga. 616, 266 S.E.2d 218 (1980).
The other requested charges involved in this enumeration dealt with the defense of justification. The court's charge to the jury on the issue of justification followed the language of the statute that defines the parameters of that defense, OCGA § 16-3-21. The charge also fit the facts of this case more precisely than most of appellant's requested charges. We find this enumeration to be without merit.
3. Appellant, in his third enumeration of error, asserts that the trial court should have charged the jury on the law of involuntary manslaughter under OCGA § 16-5-3(b). He claims that his act could be construed as self-defense with the use of excessive force. The charge requested here is not available to a defendant who uses a gun in self-defense and kills a person as a result. Appleby v. State, 247 Ga. 587, 278 S.E.2d 366 (1981). We find no error here.
4. Appellant's fourth enumeration deals with the trial court's troubling charge on the law of malice and intent. The court charged that the state must prove the intent to do the prohibited act beyond a reasonable doubt. The court then instructed the jury that "the law infers every intentional homicide to be malicious unless the contrary is established."
These instructions, when seen in isolation, could be said to require the defendant to produce "some quantum of proof" to disprove the accusation of malice. See Johnson v. State, 249 Ga. 621, 624, 292 S.E.2d 696 (1982). The charge, however, clearly did not create an irrebuttable presumption. In light of the instructions as a whole, the jury was adequately instructed as to the state's burden of proof. For these reasons, the charge did not violate the standards set out in Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d (1979). The instructions as, a whole, were sound. In addition, under the facts of this case any error involving the particular charge in this enumeration would be harmless error.
5. Appellant, in his fifth enumeration, claims that the trial court's recharge to the jury on malice and voluntary manslaughter shifted the burden of proof from the state to appellant. We disagree. The court simply repeated instructions on malice that it had given earlier, and followed those instructions with a charge on voluntary manslaughter. The charge and recharge on malice followed OCGA § 16-5-1. The charge on voluntary manslaughter was appropriate following the charge on malice. We find no error.
6. Appellant's sixth enumeration cites as error yet another charge by the court.
The court charged the jury: ...
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